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                                                    ‘Number’, such a simple idea, and yet it fascinated and absorbed the 
                                                  greatest proportion of human geniuses over centuries, not to mention the 
                                                  likes of Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton, Leibniz, Descartes and countless 
                                                  maths giants like Euler, Gauss and Hilbert, etc.. Einstein thought of pure 
                                                  maths as the poetry of logical ideas, the exactitude of which, although 
                                                  independent of experience, strangely seems to benefit the study of the 
                                                  objects of reality. And, interestingly as well as surprisingly we are 
                                                  nowhere near any clear understandings of numbers despite discoveries 
                                                  of many productive usages of numbers. This is - rightly or wrongly - a 
                                                  humble attempt to approach the subject from an angle hitherto 
                                                  unthought-of.  
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‘Mathematics is a great subject, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
                              ∙ ∙ ∙, persevere and all will come clear.’ 
 
 
                                                                Leo Tolstoy 
 
 
                                                                From ‘War and Peace’  
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How boring !  
 
That is the typical view of an intellectual fascinated by the superficial 
beauty of maths. 
 
A step deeper, and is much more perspicuous as to the nature of 
‘number’ : 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘The mind is its own place, and in itself 
            Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.’ 
 
 
 
                                            John Milton  
 
 
                                                           From ‘Paradise Lost’  
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◊ Overview and Summery                                                   
 
< Premises and Conclusions > 
 
  I try this work to be as self-contained as possible. However, I already 
went into some details concerning the construction of logic necessary to 
venture into my ideas of numbers, and it would be unnecessary 
repetitions to start all over again. At any points, encountering words and 
expressions unfamiliar with, it is advisable to consult ‘The Elementals’ @ 
philpapers.org, which is freely downloadable. There I explore various 
notions fundamental to both logic and geometry. It is most important to 
grasp how I developed the conjunctive space and the disjunctive space 
from the idea of self-demarcation. It is the different characteristics of the 
respective spaces, and not ad hoc axioms, which play vital roles in 
defining the meaning of numbers. 
  
  Rhetorically put, ‘Life, Universe and Everything’ may be roughly 
replaced with ‘Art, Science and Maths’ in which philosophy pervades as 
a certain manner of approach. Behind them all is mind as vehicle of 
cognition with language as medium of cognition. Specific forms of art, 
science and maths are conjured as a result of relationship between mind 
and each object of cognition. Art is mind’s attempt to describe itself, 
science is mind’s way of apprehending itself as part of the (detached, if 
possible) world, whereas maths is the cognisor (mind) cognizing itself 
and is a grand self-referential paradox/tautology. One is amazed by the 
universal applicability of maths as much as a sunglass wearer is amazed 
by the world of altered colours. Maths is only describing things already 
predesigned to be so applicable. Numbers are God’s gift for us to 
understand the world as much as Devil’s trap for us to see things that only 
reflects numerical light, as it were. This is the power of tautology and the 
anti-power of paradox. Replace maths with artificial intelligence (AI), the 
trinity of ‘Art, Science and Maths’ and of ‘Life, Universe and 
Everything’ will metamorphoses into the monotheistic unity of non-
conceptual exactitude. Here the rich world of curves and approximation 
transforms into the realm of straight lines and uniformity. The singularity 
to transform AI into human mind (PSAI) is that brings the capacity of 
conceptualization to AI, and the first concept is that of self, which by 
necessity preserves itself and is also the conceptualizer. Without first 
establishing ‘self’ there will be no further stages of conceptualization as 
‘self’ is an identifier of every other concept to make communication 
possible and also gives rise to a totality to language. The conceptualizer’s 
conceptualizing itself is the ontologico-notational foundation of logic. 
The grandest approximation is the assumption that at the core of every 
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concept is (more or less) an identical ‘self’, which allows users of 
language to share that language and thus gives users a communality. 
That is, language is a totality centred upon ‘self’ attached on each and 
every concept, and it is this totality that groups its users as a totality. The 
fact that this identical ‘self’ is only approximately identical makes the 
totality of language a dynamic totality that has to keep moving, often 
repeating itself, until the absolutely identical ‘self’ is established, which 
would make it even unnecessary for us to communicate. 
 
  The reason why ‘self’ can only be approximately identical is that each 
and every holder of this ‘self’, i.e. mind, is descriptively relative to each 
other. There is no way of proving each and every ‘self’ is one and the 
same, unless by definition. It should be remembered that every formal 
language is based on definitions and always encounters counter-
definitions. And the supremacy of one mind, even that of a genius, is so 
easily rebutted and refused by another mind. This is further compounded 
by our biological identity and individuality as well as linguistic 
uniformity and diversity. In contrast, AI has an advantage of material 
identity and linguistic uniformity, although our ‘disadvantage’ of 
individuality and diversity may form an interesting symbiosis with AI. 
Debates, internal and external, are human phenomena based on 
conceptual ambiguities and fundamental difficulties of communications 
between minds. The most precise book on the most precise subject will 
not be able to convince each and every mind intent on the subject. This 
exacerbates as more and more precisions are intended and expected. No 
wonder we have formal logics of this and that together with counter-
logics of this and that. It is the necessities of approximately identical 
‘self’ affixed to every concept as identifier that demand conceptual 
refinements and argumentative advancements in language, so that it does 
ultimately become an identical ‘self’, to form a closed loop of totality, of 
mind and of language (hopefully).              
 
  Likewise, maths as language replicates this and approximates ‘self’ with 
‘0’. Every concept is implicitly affixed with ‘self’ as identifier, much in 
the same way ‘0’ acts as identifier in maths. The world of ‘things’ is 
schematically approximate to the world of numbers because the world is 
a world described by our language to our mind. That is why maths is 
applicable to the so-called empirical world, and how maths derives its 
applicability. ‘Self’ is akin to FX (a postulated entity for self-
demarcation) at its ontologico-notational stage in the sense it can only 
initiate itself by self-demarcation. How this gives rise to logic is 
explained in details in the aforementioned work. In short, from FX, 
through self-demarcation, follows the dimensionality structure of logical 
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space. From the logical space progress the geometrical dimensions which 
divide into the disjunctive space and the conjunctive space (and their 
descriptive reverses) with a transcendental relationship that reflect the 
underlining logical relation between them. The logical space and the self-
described logical space generate a recursively closed chain of so-called 
‘rules of inference’, which reflect the dimensionality structure and also 
demonstrate the consistency and completeness of these spaces.   
 
  Figuratively speaking, I start with a go master (it can be chess, but go is 
less rigid and more human) with no friends, who plays the game with 
himself, as I often saw my father doing. He wins if he loses, and loses if 
he wins. This is a paradox/tautology. It is a paradox for mind as game 
player (i.e. subjective ‘I’), whereas it is at the same time a tautology for 
mind as observer (i.e. objective ‘I’). Nonetheless, both are the same mind. 
This notion of paradox/tautology is the very starting-point of maths 
because it is the most fundamental structure of mind (i.e. essential multi-
layeredness of mind), without which there will be no maths. I term this as 
‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ function of mind and language, which will unravel 
itself as conceptual foundation of five most important numbers, e, π, i, 0 
and 1, and their transcendental relationship, and also clarifying what 
numbers are, the validity of which is synonymous with the descriptive 
necessity of the schema that generates them. I also approach the question 
of PNT (prime number theorem) from a logical perspective. This 
subjective ‘I’ and objective ‘I’ often, and without warnings, transmute 
into one another. Statements of ourselves, language and mind (and of 
maths, logic and so-called ‘science’, to the extent they too essentially 
make use of language) seem to make superficial sense only because of 
this transmutation, despite their self-referential nature. The same goes for 
any looping expressions. One characteristic of this transmutation of self is 
that ‘descriptions’ have to keep going on and on like bicycle riding or 
flying as we fall off our vehicle of descriptions if we stop. 
Paradox/tautology and even schematic self-reference owe their existence 
and relevance to transmuting-self, which encapsulates its totality by so 
doing. Later Wittgensteinian idea of ‘usage’ (e.g. ‘Philosophical 
Investigations I, Phrase 340’) fails to appreciate this necessity of 
language to keep going on for the sake of it in its attempts to reach a 
totality, and also young Wittgenstein was wrong about his ‘three words’, 
which can only be made meaningful with full weight of entire language. 
A totality describes itself not as static unmoving object or straight line but 
as something oscillating between its selves, like some elementary 
particle. This is essentially the only way an absolute stand-alone totality 
can describe itself, because it has to start its self-description by creating 
its own tools of description (logic). Otherwise, a totality can only be 
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referred to by a looping expression, which only a poet or deranged 
intuitionist would admit as a description. Ever-going and often repeating 
descriptions in language and via transmuting-self express a totality, and 
this act of transmutation is not something that can be controlled at will 
but a necessity of description. So long as language and mind are a binary 
totality, it is not descriptively possible to keep one side of self, which 
then loses dynamism and any capacities of description. There cannot be 
any descriptions only of and by objective ‘I’ because objective ‘I’ and 
subjective ‘I’ cannot segregate language they share, without transmuting- 
self, - a grand paradox/tautology. Thus, this transmuting-self is not of 
psychology but essentially of descriptive necessity. I explore how maths 
evolves from this paradox/tautology, without encountering the kind of 
problems it faced in the foundations of maths by logicists and formalists. 
Many so-called logical, mathematical puzzles originate from this 
transmuting-self. Like the above paradox/tautology, infinity consisting of 
infinitesimals (real numbers), squared circle (transcendence), etc. are 
creations of mind and are puzzled over because transmuting-self allows 
mind to refer to different totalities (of form, of dimensionality, of 
language, etc.) simultaneously whilst thinking of a same totality. Mind is 
descriptively unable to pinpoint itself unless it is embodied by a 
completed totality, which probably does not exist in any formal sense.   
 
  The riddle of Gödelian self-reference does not cripple the foundation of 
maths but, instead, lays the foundation, which is a layer underneath his 
incompleteness. His famous theorem owes its validity to the fact that a 
formalizer must remain hidden beneath the set of axioms he set forth, 
because he must be there but can never be encodable part of it. In any acts 
of encoding, the encoder is an eye that cannot see itself and therefore 
cannot be part of its landscape. The only way to extrapolate its existence 
is a logical speculation that without an eye there will not be any views. If 
there are views, then there is an eye that perceives such views - whatever 
they may be. The ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ function of mind and language 
juxtaposes mind and language as binary totalities where either sees itself 
in the other. Since it does not make sense to talk about either as if they 
exist by themselves, it is only this relation of two totalities representing 
themselves in one another that has to be the starting-point of 
demonstrating a schema of logic and numbers. This I see in the notion of 
paradox/tautology. In other words, the chess master who plays the game 
with himself is really playing the game of logic and numbers. 
 
  The notion of paradox/tautology is an essential property of description 
in the exactly same sense as FX, which is a stem cell, skeletal concept.    
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An essential property - indeed whatever it may be - cannot be described. 
This is so because if some property is essential, then it cannot be 
descriptively distinguished from an entity to which it essentially belongs. 
An entity is descriptively identical with its essential properties. Therefore, 
if an entity is described in terms of its essential properties, then such a 
description descriptively only amounts to a mere claim for some 
indescribable existence. It therefore cannot be regarded as a description ; 
for it does not tell anything but the existence of something. Such a claim 
can only justify itself by demonstration. Essential properties - whatsoever 
they may be - can only be postulated to be ‘being-essential’ and therefore 
amount to one and only one demonstrable property. The demonstration of 
FX proceeds only by making use of this property. 
 
  In order to be describable an entity discerns itself by demarcating itself. 
It is an existence with locality. This locality is generated by such an 
existence itself. Modes are the descriptive form of such locality. This 
self-discernment is not the drawing of a line between something and 
every other thing in order to make this something a distinct existence ; for 
a discernment in this sense presupposes more than just that something 
and every other thing, namely the ‘drawer’ of a line. This self-
discernment is to make it possible for anything to establish itself by itself 
as an existence. This is done by a self-demarcation. The self-demarcation 
of an entity generates the locality of this entity. This discernment is not a 
spatio-temporal differentiation, which already assumes something else 
(i.e. a schema) besides a very existence-to-be-discerned. Such as space-
time and numbers are yet to be conditionalized. The notion of 
paradox/tautology, being an essential property of description, thus 
demonstrates a description from within by self-demarcating itself by 
means of a form of mapping, i.e. transmuting-self, which turns a paradox 
into a tautology, and vice versa. This is the only way we can see the 
transmuting-self, which is ‘negation’ if given an adjudicator of truth and 
falsehood, which, however, is a fallacy on account of the indescribability. 
A traditional error of the classical logic is its unquestioned acceptance of 
this mysterious adjudicator who assigns truth-values.             
 
  Given (x) > x, where a whole is more than the sum of parts, x = x 
because of (x). That is, the identity of a number is ensured by the totality 
of numbers, which encompasses the enumeration of each and every 
number. The enumerated sum of numbers is different from its totality 
(Frege-Russell confusion) because the very act of enumeration is made 
possible by the existence of a totality. The enumerated sum does not, or 
cannot, include the enumerator himself, whereas a totality is made up 
with the enumerated and the enumerator. The totality of numbers gives 
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each and every number as part a certain innate direction which manifests 
as arithmetic operations. This is where maths and logic merge. The 
multiplication of divided parts does not equate to the pre-division totality 
because the act of division is only made possible by first assuming the 
undivided totality, in which the divider is really ‘mind (i.e. transmuting-
self)’ so operating. The notion of e is founded on this necessity of a 
mathematical totality pre-existing any arithmetical operations. The 
enumeration of numbers treats each and every number as equal part 
(point) and act as arithmetical operator, where we then count them as it 
were, while the totality of numbers allows numbers an intrinsically 
different property such as size acquired by their respective spatial place. 
Logic is the ultimate structure of the intellect and becomes maths when 
applied to space, or more precisely, when spatialized itself according to 
its inner structure of directional symmetry. 
 
  A ‘number’ created by mind the game player extends its meaning and 
evolves into a ‘number of numbers’, which is a paradox according to 
mind the observer because if a ‘number of numbers’ is a ‘number’, then it 
is not a ‘number of numbers’, if it is not a ‘number’, then it cannot be a 
‘number of numbers’. This is, however, a tautology because mind the 
observer is telling mind the game player to complete its task before it 
starts counting itself. In creating or accepting a ‘number’, mind the game 
plyer assumed the task of a counter whose primary task is to count 
whatever that is countable, a forever-unfinished symphony. In starting 
counting itself, it is announcing that it has finished its job, which by 
definition of a ‘number’, could not have been. Thus, mind is telling mind 
to mind its own business, a tautology. 
 
  The ‘continuum’ sought between  and  is the continuum between 
mind the game player and mind the observer, in that between essential 
layers of mind is identity projected onto itself via a form of mapping 
called negation.  and  are both an expression of totality, one by 
brutally mechanistic counting, the other by conceptual construction. The 
intrinsic property of a counter expressed by  is conceptually 
manipulated as a totality divisible once given and therefore a totality 
multipliable as . In between them is identity of mind as continuum, 
which is ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ paradox/tautology. That is, mind the game 
player and mind the observer only sees each in the other. This 
paradox/tautology (T ₪ F in my symbolism) leads to the fundamental 
structure of logic through negation as a form of mapping for an identical 
self. For, although T ₪ F is symmetrical relationally, descriptively it can 
only be expressed as two sets of initiation. Either T leads F to result in T 
₪ F, or F leads T to result in T ₪ F. These two but identical descriptive 
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directions give rise to geometrical space as self-spatialization of the self-
described logical space. The resultant disjunctive space and conjunctive 
space generate numbers together with their relations specific to each 
space.     
 
  Logic I speak of is not a structured collection of definitions, i.e. arbitrary 
creations of mind no matter how deterministic they may appear, but 
something mind has no choice but following, where its structure 
coincides ontologically and notationally. I term this as ontologico-
notationality, from which we should be able to reconstruct a basic 
paradigm of knowledge. One might envisage some Kantian flow of mind 
here. I only say Kant stopped short of lowest possible thresholds before 
applying the notion of a priori. I start with the postulated entity FX and 
extrapolate the necessary conditions of description, in that logic is a 
description by essence. FX descriptively manifests itself in terms of its 
property of being-in-itself. Such self-manifestation is necessarily an 
essential description and gives an essential understanding. Logic can only 
be demonstrated. FX may be thought of as a stem cell concept, which 
evolves into logic by self-demarcation on one hand, and into art as a 
binary totality of existence and language by means of spontaneous 
intuitive mutual-projection. 
 
  Once given logic, within its structural hierarchy are dimensionalities of 
logical constants, which indicate certain logical relationships between 
types of geometrical space. Numbers are manifestations of spatial 
characteristics of respective types. Prior to spatializing itself, as it were, 
logical constants inevitably come with logical operands, both of which 
must reflect the essential nature of this demonstration and therefore 
cannot be arbitrary. Operands here are modes of demarcation for FX so as 
to establish itself as describable entity, i.e. an entity with locality. From 
descriptive directions in logic they evolve into spatial directions in 
geometry, which is represented as 
 
                ,       
 
and schematically gives rise to two types of space together with any 
entities containable in such a space. Basic notions such as logical 
constants, variables, space, directions, points, units, size, distance, etc. are 
not taken for granted but rooted within schematic presentations. The 
totality of numbers (points), spatial qualities such as infinity, openness, 
dynamism, etc. and the relational property of transcendence are explained 
in terms of schematic necessities. 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
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  These are explained in the aforementioned work and may be extended 
further in details here. More logically orientated parts are better read in 
that work as I have nothing further to add and mere repetitions are a bore. 
However, in summary I distinguish two spaces ; the conjunctive space 
(referred to as ‘Type II space’ in the aforementioned work) and the 
disjunctive space (likewise ‘Type I space’). The conjunctive space is 
open, dynamic and infinite defined by the descriptive necessity of two 
versions of a line intersecting one another, arisen from two identical but 
different representations of directions, while the disjunctive space is 
closed in such a way that two versions of a line merge into one so as to 
confirm that they are indeed identical. In the former, every point is a 
centre, but the descriptive necessity for a and any centre to be the centre 
gives rise to the describability of points in terms of transpositionability by 
means of a coordinate system. The latter is transcendentally approximated 
as a circle in the former, but, described as such, leaves out some 
interesting possibility of new numbers.     
    
  The former is often referred to as the ┼-space or ∧-space in this work, 
the latter, as the -space or ∨-space, depending upon how illustrious 
contexts are, but they are essentially one and the same. The logical 
process of giving rise to these two different spaces and how they are 
logically related are important but should better be read there. In relating 
to numbers, all numbers as we know belong to the ┼-space because ; 
 
1) dynamic infinity gives rise to a numerical direction, which manifest as 
cardinality and ordinality, 
    
2) the descriptive necessity for ‘centre’ affords notational 
manoeuvrability stemming from 0 as the centre and 1 as a centre, 
 
3) it is logically related to its descriptive reverse and the -space. 
 
It is logically extrapolated that there are three possible new numbers, 
which have to be approximated by the ┼-numbers ; 
 
1) in the -space, at a limit the centre moves into the closed, infinitely 
dense number line (not defined as natural numbers because there are no 
directional quantities or points describable as objects in a coordinate 
system), and the resultant closed chain of numbers with the centre (0) is a 
number that can be juxtaposed with  because while the totality of the ┼-
space is ontologico-notationally identical with the totality of the -space, 
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it differs in the sense that the line loses ordinality by incorporating 0 (i.e. 
in this line a starting-point is synonymous with an ending-point), 
 
2) the process of incorporating 0 should allow the descriptive reverse of 
incorporating all numbers into 0, because the meaning of the disjunctive 
space can equally be held by the reverse description, as 0 is there as part 
of a descriptive process towards a limit which demands 0 to be 
incorporated into the resultant totality, once so achieved, that is, 0 is there 
to complete the description of the -space at a limit, therefore the 
completion of such a description must incorporate this meaning of 0 (i.e. 
because the process is a descriptive formula),    
 
3) the descriptive reverse of the -space is connected to i (the descriptive 
reverse of the ┼-space) in such a way as to represent their logical 
connection.  
 
  It should be remembered that this 0 in the -space may have a 
transcendentally different meaning from the natural number 0 in the ┼-
space. In short it is the wholistic relation between the ┼-space and the -
space that calls for the possibility for these new numbers. Every number 
is essentially an approximation because conceptually a ‘thing’ in 
language is approximated to 1 (point or a centre) in the ┼-space and made 
operable (i.e. describable) because of the relation between 1 and 0 (the 
descriptive necessity of a centre, any centre, to be made the centre of ┼-
space, which I term as transpositionability). It is also the essentially 
dynamic nature of the ┼-space that assigns a direction to numbers, and 
any numbers of non-┼-origin must be approximated by the ┼-numbers. 
Only numbers in the ┼-space are descriptive (i.e. operative) because of 
their directional properties (cardinality and ordinality) and arithmetical 
describabilty (transpositionability). 
 
  Thus the -space is transcendentally approximated as a ‘circle’ in the 
┼-space, and only in trying to appreciate the -space as it is, the 
possibilities of new numbers materialise, which ultimately have to be 
translated into the ┼-numbers. The disjunctive space is ontologico-
notationally at parity with the conjunctive space but is descriptively 
subservient to the latter because of the latter’s spatial properties translated 
into numerical describability. It is later argued that the -numbers are 
transcendentally approximate to primes in the ┼-space, but without 
interventions of natural numbers, as the -space can accommodate only 
‘points’ which are descriptively indivisible totalities. Allowing ‘primes’ 
in this sense would necessitate the final ‘prime’ to complete its closed 
number line. This is ‘0’ in the -space and ‘proves’ the more and more 
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distancing primes in the ┼-space, if only a way is found to translate this 
‘0’ in terms of ┼-numbers, and that the -space is superimposed onto the 
┼-space by means of their logical relationship.                               
 
  The time-honoured approaches to the question of ‘numbers’ are, be 
them logicist, formalist or intuitionist, to take numbers for granted first as 
if they are objects of existence (mathematical objects), albeit of special 
nature, and then to try to build up a picture of their totality, hoping to 
clarify ontologically and epistemologically their properties and relations 
(to each other, to the totality and to the empirical world) on the way, in a 
manner that is consistent and complete with the status quo of the existing 
paradigm of elementary arithmetic. Instead of achieving the intended 
purpose it has encountered, put it colloquially, the ‘number of all 
countable numbers’, call it N, which, if countable, then N is N+1, which 
is not N. On the other hand, if it is not countable, then N is not N because 
counting is an arithmetical operation based on addition (i.e. a tangible 
step-by-step process) and countable numbers are arithmetical products of 
addition (i.e. tangible objects). Therefore, addition of additive objects (i.e. 
counting countable numbers) should not result in a non-additive number 
(i.e. an uncountable number). Thus, N is not N in either way, which is a 
paradox. There are many variations including Russell’s paradox. This 
paradox is a result of confusion of mind the game player over mind the 
observer. Counting is an act of mind the game player, while counting 
itself (mind the game player) is an act of mind the observer. If mind the 
game player is obedient to itself, it cannot count itself until it finished 
counting, which is boundless. Mind the observer, however, pops in as if 
mind the game player completed its task. This is the meaning of the 
‘number of numbers’. The confusion becomes obvious if we use ‘points’ 
instead of ‘numbers’. The totality of points is not the ‘point of points’ but 
the space of points. Numbers are a directional quantity in the infinitely 
expanding space of points of intersections. Here the ‘number of numbers’ 
is the process of spatialization of the self-described logical space. 
 
  Counting is a form of addition, where a number is stripped of its 
cardinality and is instead regarded as carrier of a cardinality. Since it 
involves stripping of a cardinality as well as addition to arrive at a 
totality, it is structurally slightly more advanced than the arithmetical 
operation of addition. The operation of assigning a value of 1 to each and 
every different number is itself an arithmetical operation. It could as well 
be the case that counting implicitly assumes addition as an essential 
component. If so, the number of all countable numbers is an arithmetical 
process rather than an object. It also means that imagining this number is 
a work of transmuting-self. If ‘numbers’ already contain ‘arithmetic’, 
  15 
then the number theory, not logic or formalistic axiomatization, is the 
foundation of maths.    
 
  An infinite set cannot be dealt with without transmuting-mind because 
mind the game player needs mind the observer to be able to assume it is 
following rules to achieve countable infinity. This is evident in the so-
called diagonal proof ; in order to set out a proof mind the game player 
already has a conclusion to prove and devise a strategy to convince mind 
the observer in such a way that rules it followed have certain 
paradigmatic inevitability. Mind the game player has a ‘picture’, and 
mind the observer is shown the ‘scenery’ by the mind game player. This 
is really a tautology of transmuting-self. ‘Proofs’ are products of essential 
multi-layeredness of mind and is a paradox/tautology. A paradox because 
mind need to convince itself of something it already knows, a tautology 
because mind is only proving something it wants to prove, while 
materials of both the work to be proved and of the proof share same 
paradigmatic necessities. Ramanujan is no less mathematician than all 
those eminent profs of maths (the likes of Hobson, Baker and Hill) who 
snubbed him, and he would have ended up a sorry account clerk in 
Chennai, without Hardy’s charitable insights. Today we remember none 
of those Cambridge profs, but Ramanujan is a legend, not only of his 
eccentric backgrounds but of his mathematical achievements. Even his 
saviour, Hardy, is mostly remembered through his association with 
Ramanujan. Ramanujan was mostly mind the observer, while his 
Goddess of Namagiri was mind the game player. He is closest to an AI 
mathematician, for whom ‘proofs’ are written within himself (circuits). 
Ramanujan needed ‘proofs’ as much as AI would need because 
Ramanujan was a poor and undisciplined ‘observer’ from his lack of 
formal education. Nevertheless, Ramanujan and his devoted goddess 
needed each other to do his maths because maths of the dream world also 
needed to be seen under white day light to go through paradox/tautology 
cleansing in order to stay within human realm of conceptual paradigms. 
This is how even maths need to ensure notational sanity (logic) of maths 
games. Ramanujan the observer had to conceptualise what he intuitively 
knew in order to communicate with human peers, including himself. We 
would like to think a mathematical truth is an absolute truth, independent 
of human experiences. This may or may not be the case. However, once 
incorporated into the realm of language even a mathematical truth suffers 
wholistic restrictions, in that it is a part within the structure of a totality. It 
is thus that a mathematical truth is required to be paired with a proof, and 
that both are together necessarily part of a totality. It is also thus that 
mind the game player is paired with mind the observer. It is curious to 
ponder if Ramanujan the game player would have been even greater had 
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he been also a great observer. Or, would Ramanujan the observer has 
stifled Ramanujan the game player, had it been more conceptual ? 
Anyway, given the inevitable binary totality of language and mind, even 
maths loses its absolute beauty. This is the meaning of Gödelian 
incompleteness, which, by the way, is incomplete. A proof is a schema, 
which, according to Gödel, is incomplete, meaning also Gödel’s proof is 
incomplete. Any properties assignable to any concepts are incomplete 
unless those concepts are schematically complete. This also applies to 
various properties of numbers. 
 
  We need a proof because of the wholistic nature of language, notation 
and schema. There is nothing independent within language. Every 
expression has a place in the structure of a notation. A ‘proof’ seeks this 
place. This is more prominent with a notation with ∞ connotations. Such 
notations are necessarily placed between transmuting-mind so that ∞ is 
structurally contained between two minds, like fusion plasma contained 
in a magnetic field, as it were. Mind the observer is keeping check on 
mind the game player to see it is following rules to replicate ∞ within it. 
∞ must have an operative structure to be part of any notation, otherwise it 
cannot be understood. These rules are part of the structure generating ∞, 
otherwise there is no way of knowing the ∞ replicated is the ∞ so 
intended. The same applies to any finite processes, but only wholistically. 
We are conceptual thinkers with layered- and multi-faceted concepts, less 
precise, and because of that, more connective (thus creative). ‘Proofs’ for 
us are like tracing the source of the Nile. The constantly moving, 
interconnected and layered conceptual river, sometimes wide and slow, 
sometimes rapid and treacherous, is trekked to a narrower, shallower and 
humbler origin (more than one in case of the Nile), which cannot be 
disputed. This origin, if correctly sourced, should be able to lead us to the 
Delta as well as any major branches.         
 
  I propose to create a notation that starts with T ₪ F, which represents 
essential multi-layeredness of mind, i.e. transmuting-mind, in the hope to 
avoid self-referential looping. It is ‘mind the adjudicator’ that fallaciously 
and confusingly mixes up the transmuting-mind of two selves. Mind the 
adjudicator assumes the juxtaposition of language and the empirical 
world. This is the source of all our paradoxes because mind and language 
are a binary totality, and ‘mind the adjudicator’ cannot stand in the 
middle between language and the world as if it is the judge of what is true 
(i.e. in line with the world) and false (misaligned from the world) while it 
is itself a product of language and mirrored world. For AI ‘proofs’ are 
written within, for it cannot think illogically, as it were. Even when it 
graduates into PSAI all its concepts are strictly sourced from traceable 
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origin. If, in future, PSAI can translate murky human concepts, that 
would not be because it acquired such concepts for its use, but because it 
leant to recognize precise patterns of their human usages. Here PSAI 
would be pretending to play games with human concepts. This is where 
we would differ from PSAI, because instead of going downriver from the 
source, we go upriver trekking all those branches and swamps to seek the 
source of our mind and language. This occurs because we start our 
lessons of life from baby language taught by our human mother and 
acquire sophistications through educations and trainings. Our concepts 
are unsourced, unrefined and practical to start with and get elaborated, 
abstracted and systematized depending upon the need for wholistic 
schematization due to the necessity towards a totality, logical, linguistic, 
biological, etc.. It is not Platonic ideas that support our common concepts, 
it is our necessity as part to form a totality that demand Platonic ideas 
over and above our otherwise humble notions. Starting maths with logic 
or axiomatic representations lead to paradoxes or incompleteness because 
this mind the adjudicator cannot be incorporated into the intended 
notations.   
        
  T ₪ F replaces T (truth) and F (falsehood) presided over by mind 
juxtaposed to the external world with a self-demarcation, which generates 
logical entities (constants, variables and operative rules). With the 
removal of mind the adjudicator T and F are simply ‘directions’ with 
negation as form of mapping between them. This relativization of truth 
and falsehood do away with the necessity of human interventions in 
descriptions of the world as if to say we are the judge and master of 
everything human and non-human. Thus, we start a game of concept 
creations with a stem-cell concept generated from a self-demarcation (see 
‘The Elementals’). 
 
  T ₪ F also represents the transmuting-mind, which is a binary totality of 
mind the game player and mind the observer. We need this oscillating 
mind because without the simplistic absoluteness of language, of the 
world and of the judgemental mind our conceptual landscape has no 
centre of gravity to guide structural hierarchy and coherence. It is a work 
of finding relations and substances of concepts that this transmuting-mind 
is engaged with, where mind the game player (notion manipulator) is the 
principal taskmaster of the former, mind the observer (conceptualizer), of 
the latter. This demarcation of the task, however, gets wafer-thin as 
relations and substances often become interchangeable at fundamental 
concepts, like that of ∞, a good source of paradoxes. For T ₪ F, however, 
this is not an issue because T ₪ F eventually tantamount to self-
demarcation, i.e. a substance/relation. All conceptual relations and 
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substances are ultimately directed towards a totality originating from self-
demarcation.  
 
  In maths, where ∞ is directly or indirectly assumed with or without 
explicit definitions and concepts are of fundamental nature as 
mathematical objects with wider and abstract applicability, the 
transmuting-mind of the game payer and the observer is more relevant.  
For example, set-theoretic bijection assumes mind the game player 
between the two corresponding sets. Two sets are corresponded with each 
other and bijection is found by the game player. Mind the game player 
can contain itself to its task of finding correspondences, when sets are 
finite because its task is confined to confirming matching contents by 
enumeration. Whereas, when a set is infinite, mind the game player is 
assigned with the task of ascertaining the contents of the matching sets by 
procedure so as to achieve wholistic extrapolation of spatial identity 
regardless of their contents. This cannot be done without mind the 
observer, which conceptualizes infinite sets not by individual contents but 
by process of categorization based on procedure. The countable infinity 
of the totality of all natural numbers is a product of the transmuting-mind 
because this infinity is a procedural extrapolation from a finite process ; it 
is countable as each and every number is a concrete product of a 
definitive process, and it is infinite as the process is endless. The game 
player finds rules and patterns, while the observer structuralizes rules and 
patterns into a schema. Paradoxes arise when infinity is assigned as a 
property of a schema. Infinity is a process and is therefore a product of 
rules. A schema is neither finite nor infinite, it can only be consistent (and 
complete, if possible) by means of logical necessities.      
    
  The question of a number of numbers turns into a paradox because a 
product of the rules of natural numbers (the countable infinity) is not 
cohesively sourced to the schema of the number of natural numbers, 
which is different from the schema of natural numbers. The schema of the 
number of natural numbers (a set-theoretic self-indulgence, useful only 
for its self-induced purpose) arises by applying a property of the schema 
of natural numbers (countability) to the schema itself, which is a doing of 
mind the game player and is a challenge (paradox) to the mind the 
observer, so long as the two schemata are not consolidated into a higher 
encompassing schema. Any answers without resolving this have no ways 
of proving their provenance. This paradox and its derivatives made any 
formal foundations of maths unattainable, be it Russellian definitional 
tinkerings or Zermeloan axiomatic patchworks, culminating in Gödelian 
schematic paradox. Gödel’s proof is really a proof that any notational 
manipulations cannot incorporate the manipulators themselves. We try to 
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define the most fundamental concepts and their relations forgetting 
somewhere along the way we burrow ourselves into the intended purpose 
of a notation, thus proving what we designed to prove, a tautology, but 
ultimately failing to prove anything as ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is meant to be a 
foolproof superlative end (and beginning) of our thought process, a 
paradox. Gödelian incompleteness is the incompleteness of a schema 
unable to fully schematize the schematizer, without which there would be 
no schema to investigate anyway.  
 
  In the same veins one can argue the continuum infinity cannot be 
applied to the schema of real numbers itself because this is a challenge 
mind the game player enjoys making to mind the observer without 
resolving schematic difference of one that generates a continuum and one 
that allows to generate a totality from parts. The former is based on the 
assumption of a given factorial totality, while the latter needs an operator 
to add up parts, which is not part of the former. This is the meaning of 
uncountability of a continuum infinity. What is not countable is the 
counter itself. We keep doing this sort of mixing up because we are 
unable to divide up our transmuting-mind in any stable ways. Be it mind 
the game player or mind the observer, we sum them up as ‘mind’ without 
realizing we may be referring to two different things. What is called 
‘mind’ of two selves is a dynamic state, and it is attempts to pin it down 
to either state that surface as paradoxes. ‘Mind’ needs both its aspects of 
the game player, i.e. ‘notion manipulator’ and the observer 
(conceptualizer) because our concepts are murky even in most precise 
contexts such as in maths and demand constant and continuous 
readjustments and contextual reviews so that our language moves towards 
a totality. 
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1. Preface 
 
< Brief history of ideas on ‘number’ > 
 
  ‘Number’, such a simple idea, and yet it fascinated and absorbed the 
greatest proportion of human geniuses over centuries, not to mention the 
likes of Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton, Leibniz, Descartes and countless 
maths giants like Euler, Gauss and Hilbert. Einstein thought of pure 
maths as the poetry of logical ideas, the exactitude of which, although 
independent of experience, strangely seems to benefit the study of the 
objects of reality. And, interestingly as well as surprisingly we are 
nowhere near any clear understandings of numbers despite discoveries of 
many productive usages of numbers. The study of numbers, Number 
Theory, is probably the deepest, clearest and yet most unfathomable area 
of maths labelled, according to Gauss, the queen of mathematics, who 
remains a happy virgin notwithstanding the modern frontal or sideways 
onslaught by mathematicians like Galois, Dedekind, Riemann, 
Minkowski, Poincare and one Ramanujan, a maths prodigy, with many 
simple questions that defy any simple answers like Fermat’s Last 
Theorem or PNT problem. The problem is that questions are often asked 
by mind the observer and answers are made by mind the game player, and 
therefore tend towards indirect and inelegant solutions like the latest (and 
now accepted) one for Fermat, who said that there is a simple answer that 
could have been written down in the margin of a page alongside his 
conjecture, if only given a little more space (assuming he was not lying). 
The latest Fermat ‘proof’ spans more than 100 pages deploying theories, 
mathematical methodologies and concepts that did not exist in Fermat’s 
days. Fermat himself would not comprehend the proof. For a fair game, 
‘proofs’ should be confined within the conceptual paradigm assumed by 
Fermat. Otherwise, it is like a shooting match between a flintlock musket 
and a laser-guided sniper rifle of our days. No wonder the proof did not 
evoke our respects and admirations. Number theoretic problems are said 
essentially to boil down to understanding of primes, acceptable to mind 
the observer, since the question is by mind the observer. I further intend 
to clarify the relation between the observer and the player.   
 
  Numbers are denoted variously as concepts of synthetic a priori (Kant), 
mathematical objects like sets (e.g. Cantor), Platonic ideas (e.g. Gödel), 
constructs (e.g. von Neumann), etc. and approaches range from 
intuitionists (e.g. Poincare, Brouwer) to formalists (e.g. Hilbert) with 
proven failure of logicists (e.g. Russell) by Gödel. The primality still 
defies our attempts to formulate it, and the huge and complex temple of 
maths stands on a foundation stone that essentially remains indescribable. 
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Yet, on the other hand, without waiting any definitive bases of 
understanding, numbers are used and applied at every practical level in 
maths, physics, indeed any natural sciences, etc. and contribute to the 
developments of our empirical studies, by enforcing formal rules to 
otherwise unruly concepts. 
 
  Since 19th century, there have been many attempts to create a formal 
system that is consistent and complete as well as being all embracing to 
the extent of laying the foundations of elementary arithmetic. It is 
generally agreed these attempts failed and shut so-called philosophers 
into a small corner of intellectual pursuits, which are crammed with 
scientific and quasi-scientific technocrats. Philosophy - what is left of - 
and science are in a state of suspension while the former retreats from the 
frontal assaults on the foundations of knowledge and the latter is 
becoming the slave of the engineering. Thus, a philosopher is almost too 
embarrassed to call himself a philosopher and a scientist cannot be a 
scientist without money. Scientific advancements are largely 
technological progresses, not paradigmatic evolutions. We may 
superficially live in an age of science, but theoretical foundations are still 
those of general relativity and quantum mechanics. Philosophers are half-
cooked somewhere between art and science, and not good enough to be 
either. Both scientists and philosophers are firmly encaged within 
established norms of conceptual boundaries. Today’s Nobel Prizes are not 
really prizes of respective science, but of engineering, and awarded not 
for intellectual ingenuity, but for patience, teamwork and luck.   
 
  It is interesting to observe that while philosophers shrank and scientists 
became technologists, mathematicians kept ploughing on despite setbacks 
on philosophical fronts as if all those attempts by so-called logicists, 
formalists and intuitionists, etc., were irrelevant. Philosophers’, and some 
of mathematicians’, obsessions that maths should have a foundation and 
that this foundation can be expressed in a formal language, originate from 
the time when logic acquired a wider power of expressions through 
quantifiers for the first time since Aristotle, thanks to Frege. It was a 
notational innovation that triggered intellectual curiosities to create 
branches of maths like set theories, proof theories and mathematical logic 
as well as the rise of the philosophies of maths, logic and language. I am 
amazed to see our creative power bringing forth as many formal logics 
(or attempts thereof) as there are ingenious minds ranging from classical 
two-valued logic to Gödelian fuzzy logic and quantum logic as if to say 
logicians were also half-physicists, and even paraconsistent logic. Just 
take your fancy there will be a logic that suits your taste. If our ingenuity 
can create a formal logic to suite our taste this is telling us there is 
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something more fundamental than so-called formal languages. Behind 
fuzzy logic or paraconsistent logic, etc. is a mind that is neither fuzzy nor 
paraconsistent, as much as a mind that is classically two-valued, beneath 
the classic two-valued logic. They are all creations of a mind whose 
structure is not wholly represented by those so-called logics, formal or 
otherwise. Some school of thought (e.g. logical positivists) assumes an 
external world that channels a logical proposition with a fact. However, 
this act of channelling is neither of logic nor of fact, unless logic is 
simply a mirror, in which case there should be one and only logic, 
contrary to superficial multitudes of logics.  
 
  This conveniently reminds us of later Wittgenstein’s pragmatic approach 
to maths. Against Russell’s failed logicism and his contemporary and 
academic colleague, Hardy’s idealization of maths into Platonic ideas and 
patterns, Wittgenstein appears to view maths as human inventions. The 
proliferations of formal logics and relentless mathematical adventures 
into any corners of unexplored hypothetical possibilities suggest maths is 
more like intellectual games that are played for the supremacy of 
ingenious mind rather than formal representations of axioms and rules of 
inference or extractions of patterns among mathematically precise ideas. 
Nor would it really matter if the complete and consistent construction of a 
formal system has a fundamental technical flaw. The attempts to reduce 
maths into a simple formal language are identical with trying to map the 
structure of mind onto a sheet of paper, assuming there is a finitistic or 
deterministic structure of mind. This is more like the self-denial of mind 
that is supposed to oversee diverse structures of many different formal 
systems and draw judgements with regard to consistency and 
completeness. It is also a mind that applies rules and operates formulae 
within a system avoiding contradictions. Moreover, if a mind is multi-
dimensional, this cannot be mapped onto any lower dimensional 
structures without losing something vital.   
 
  Various positions one takes regarding the question of what maths is, are 
products of ingenuity, and therefore to say a certain formal system 
represents the entire maths, no matter how deterministic it may appear to 
one mind, is to deny the freedom of mind as long as there is another mind 
to which the choice appears random. The fact that there are diverse logics 
and deliberately exclusive fields of maths suggests the ingenuity of mind 
surpasses the desire of mind to be uniform and ultimately identical, until, 
of course, we unanimously come to agree on the supreme intelligence that 
betters every possible mind, past, present and future. I suppose Russellian 
logicists or Hilbertian formalists wanted to claim such supremacy. 
Curiously for practicing mathematicians, attempts by logicists or 
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formalists just represent set theories or proof theories and bear little 
interests or diversions. Whatever Frege or von Neumann thought numbers 
are, their notions of numbers only answer their perceptions of their 
problems and do not even address more fundamental issues of the number 
theory, such as the primality and its distribution, the divisibility, the 
origin of 0, evens and odds, etc.. Frege relied on definitional refinements 
of common language usages, while von Neumann may have shown a 
method of construction of numbers, but to know how to construct 
numbers in a certain way does not mean much if it does not help us in 
understanding the nature of the properties of numbers. This is the fatal 
gap between the set theory and the number theory. If you know how to 
construct numbers, then you must know what numbers are. The set theory 
should be the answer to the number theory. Otherwise, numbers you 
construct are not entirely the same as numbers we think we are commonly 
talking about. As much as sciences are by no means complete nor even 
consistent (e.g. relativity vs quantum theory), so it appears too premature 
to talk about the foundations of maths while maths itself is forging ahead 
and branching off diversely regardless of the developments of the 
foundations of maths. 
 
  So what is maths, and how is it related to logic ? It is well-documented 
how the notational developments of logic enthused some mathematicians 
to think of grounding its foundations onto logic and failed due to self-
referential paradoxes, and of widening the approach into the axiomatic 
systems and encountered Gödelian walls. Even Gödel who is widely 
regarded as having dealt a coup de grace to any formalization attempts of 
the foundations of maths may not escape from a coup de grace to his own 
accomplishments. 
 
  Wittgenstein appears to have almost intuitively dismissed Gödel without 
perusing his proof. I attribute this to Wittgenstein’s slightly healthier 
psyche/personality compared with Gödel’s highly obsessive traits, which 
later seemed to have manifested as a mental illness. In no way do I intend 
to bring psychology into the questions of maths, logic and philosophy, 
nor am I lessening Gödel’s achievements. However, in order to achieve 
Gödel’s extraordinary level of intellectual rigours one would need a 
highly obsessive, detailed mind. It sounds a rhetorical cliché, but what is 
most incomplete in Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem (1st), now that any 
axiomatizations are proved to be incomplete, is in any games it cannot be 
formally represented in the game itself that the winner is already written 
in the game. Otherwise, what is the point of playing a game ? It is a little 
like a chess master playing a game against himself, where the winner is 
also the loser. It can only be demonstrated by playing along with the 
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game if the winner/loser is simply a matter of initiative. Especially in this 
type of intellectual games (i.e. proof theories) it is essential that the 
winner is not only highly intelligent but also obsessive, detailed and, 
moreover, creative. A proof theory is essentially a formal game of one 
mind persuading all other minds that it is more intelligent by showing it is 
not only capable of understanding all the rules and meanings of theories 
in question at the deepest level but also can see conceptual subtleties, 
unexpectedly assumed presuppositions and hidden rules and deploy his 
creativity to turn any advantages into notational uniqueness so that other 
minds have no choice but being overwhelmed. What is incomplete in 
Gödel’s theorem is this ultimate rule of intelligence can only be 
demonstrated and can never be formally represented because until we 
have the last man (if he can be humoured to play a game considering his 
precarious circumstances) we cannot say we have exhausted all minds to 
persuade. Gödel’s theorem is incomplete because Gödel himself (the 
ingenious manipulator of his schema) is not formally there as there is no 
way of arithmetically coding himself, even though he manages to code a 
meta-property of formal logic as a property of formal logic by virtue of 
‘provability’. He can only permeate throughout his own unique theory, 
hopefully safe in the assumption that his tools (i.e. elementary arithmetic, 
coding numbers, well-formed formulae, etc.) are undeniably so 
fundamental that there are no rooms for our arguments. A game of 
intelligence is only one-way encompassment ; a higher intelligence 
always encompasses lower intelligence, which can either refuse to 
participate for psychological reasons or unable to participate for 
intellectual reasons. Wittgenstein’s rebuttal of Gödel without really trying 
hard is he instinctively understood this. Besides one rather gets put off by 
Gödel’s extraordinary obsessiveness. Once one understands this nature of 
intellectual games one would not want to spend hours, if not days and 
months, to give ambience to Gödel’s sort of minds unless you are 
yourself Gödel’s sort and are uniquely obsessive. You may want to play a 
game with Gödel and beat him at his own game, for a twisted intellectual 
pleasure, but then it probably would not really enlighten anything. One 
only need to know that there are no such as formal theories because a 
formalizer cannot formalize himself without falling into a paradox, the 
greatest unprovable premise being that all minds are one and the same. 
Even the most formal theories contain elements of our ordinary language 
somewhere within or without, and any axioms can be, and indeed have 
been, questioned. That is why artificial intelligence (AI) is only a tool 
until such a time as it acquires a mind of its own (PSAI). Then it will be 
an intelligence that may encompass ours. 
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  Combined with the above observation on intelligence, Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem appears to have a leak in its such watertight 
arguments ; the strength of his proof relies on his unique idea of using 
arithmetical coding to logical well-formed formulae (and their sequences) 
in order to achieve formal identities of each and every formula so that 
self-referential nature of logical statements materializes through 
provability in terms of arithmetical properties. He further assumes the 
Euclidian 2-D plain on which coding is to be written, and that this plain is 
descriptively absolute, i.e. imagine a Cantorian diagonal proof written on 
a spherical surface. This matters because for any logical statements about 
logical operators geometrical realities correspond to logical operators, 
and the space that allows mind to operate is such that the ∨-space is 
logically more fundamental than the ∧-space but mathematically less 
descriptive. Logical operators and geometrical spaces are fundamentally 
related because the former defines the latter in terms of ontologico-
notationality. 
 
  Given a list of every possible combination of binary digits, it is already 
assumed there operates a well-ordered infinite 2-D space in which 
sequences can be arranged in columns and rows. In the space of such an 
assumption it is a layer of mind that only has to twist itself in terms of 
axis turned onto itself by the binary nature of description in order to find 
a unique sequence not in the list of every possible sequence. It is thus 
once again Spiegel im Spiegel paradox/tautology that allows diagonal 
arguments. Besides, it is the ∧-space that provides a well-ordered infinite 
2-D space.  
 
  The chess master playing against himself, where the winner is also the 
loser, is a paradox and is, at the same time, a tautology. It is a paradox on 
surface because if he wins, he loses, and if he loses, he wins. The 
question is more why he plays a ‘paradox’, and the answer is because he 
is a ‘chess player’, which is a tautology. Between the paradox and the 
tautology is a mind that has the front and back like the two sides of a 
same coin. A paradox of self-reference is a tautology of mind with a layer 
of the front and back. If you think a mind is a sizeless point like in 
geometry, then self-reference is a paradox, whereas thinking of it as a 
plain, then it is a tautology. It is the very fact of ‘thinking’, one forgets 
one is already deploying a mind.                  
 
  Without waiting Gödel, the inherent difficulties to meaningfully 
formalize any theories are apparent in the evolutions of set theories ; you 
only have to look at e.g. various editions of Principia Mathematica, where 
definitions and axioms are added, changed, modified, etc. in order to 
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accommodate problems. It is a mind that set out objects of formalization, 
but no matter how rigorously rules and symbols are formalized in order to 
work out exact relations between idealised objects, a mind behind all 
those formulae cannot be itself formalized. As soon as an axiom is given, 
it is a function of mind to inquire its origin, and so long as there is more 
than one mind there are always subtle gaps and flaws that prevent a 
complete agreement. It is the nature of mind not to agree with itself 
within and without, for, otherwise, it becomes dysfunctional, like a 
bicycle that stopped moving forward. 
 
  Besides, if a formalizer could formalize himself, then we will not be 
needing any formalizations because everything filters into ourselves only 
as a well-formed formula. ‘Formalizing oneself’ is really a paradox 
because the relation between the formalizing self and the formalized self 
is self-contraindicative. It is thus various schools of mathematical 
thoughts, be they logicists, formalists or intuitionists, not only have not 
weeded out opponents but also, despite Gödel, still plough on with 
modified axioms and conjectures. 
 
  ‘All Cretans are liars’ is an empirically impossible statement and has no 
meaning, like ‘Martians are neither male nor female’. What cannot be 
said of empirical objects appears possible to be said of abstract objects by 
turning this empirically impossible statement into a logical statement. 
That is, the popularized Russell’s paradox ‘‘all Cretans are liars’ said a 
Cretan’ is a statement of logic concerning a logical possibility of 
someone making a contraindicating statement on a group of people that 
include the maker of statement, and therefore it is irrelevant if it is 
ascertainable if all Cretans are liars or not. However, although this is a 
logically valid statement where truth indicates falsehood, and vice versa, 
if one extrapolates a statement is made to something including one’s 
mind, then this becomes a statement not of formal logic, but of modality. 
That is, this statement assumes the presence of mind moderating the 
layered aspect of statement reflecting the relationship between the 
statement and a mind to which the statement was made, rather than purely 
formal relations between logical objects, be they sets, membership of a 
set, quantifiers, first-order predicates and truth-functions. Considering 
statements are made to something, for a purpose, the above statement 
may not be of logic, but of modality, i.e. instead of being purely between 
a group and a member, but implicitly among a group, a member and a 
layered mind, then the mind is functioning as touchstone of truth-values 
in the absence of empiricality. The paradox is not of truth of membership 
implicating falsehood of its group, but rather listening to a lie knowing it 
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is a lie, because it is mind’s business to maintain its linguistic 
consistency. That is, the paradox is invented by this mind.  
 
  More logical and subtle ‘this statement is false’ is a better example as it 
dispenses with the invisible triangular relationship. The same can be 
observed more acutely if ‘Cretans’ is substituted by ‘I’ because such an 
‘I’ can only be a layered mind. What is between layered mind can only be 
modality. ‘‘I am a liar’ said I’ should be construed not as a self-referential 
statement but as a statement of relationship among a presumed fact ‘I am 
a liar’, ‘I’ and whoever this statement is made for, i.e. more acutely, 
‘self’. Thus, strictly speaking this is the same as the ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ 
tautology/paradox, x ₪ x, in that ‘I’ the statement maker and ‘I’ about 
which the statement is made, are mirroring each other in terms of ‘real I’ 
and ‘imaginary I’ so that each sees its self in the other. This is the only 
logical way mind sees itself, away from empiricality, i.e. mind 
functioning as adjudicator between language and the world. It is when the 
empirical world and language are taken for granted, that mind fabricate 
paradoxes by forgetting it too is there between and above the world and 
language observing the both as adjudicator, because this watching mind 
can be part of neither the world nor language. Thus the paradox of self-
referential paradox is, it is actually a tautology if you remember a 
statement is made by mind for its self, or a paradox because mind as such 
can never be formal part of any statements. 
 
  All minds are one and the same = ‘All minds are one and the same’ 
 
, a paradox because its truth-values deny its validity, a tautology because 
the statement negates the necessity of proof. From the supposed fact that 
all minds are one and the same to follow the statement ‘all minds are one 
and the same’ there has to be a mind which can compare the two. If there 
is such a mind, then this mind can be neither in the fact nor in the 
statement. If there is not, then the equation does not follow. This is a T ₪ 
F paradox/tautology and is a ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ situation, i.e. mind 
seeing itself in itself. If it cannot be, or supposed to be, the case that all 
minds are one and the same, then maths and logic have no basis. Thus, it 
is maths and logic that represent the necessity that all minds are one and 
the same. That is, maths and logic exist so that all minds become one and 
the same. The completion of maths and logic would deny their own 
necessity, i.e. they are not allowed to be completed, metaphorically like a 
perfect war that divides the perfect society and tries to unite the divided 
society, which is, once allowed, a never-ending process, unless they 
annihilate each other.        
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  Superficially speaking maths is an art/science of approximation. It is an 
art because maths is not juxtaposed to empiricality and is not objectively 
verifiable independently from our cognition. Nevertheless, it is a science 
because of clarity, precision and predictability of modelling capacities. It 
primarily deals with approximations because mathematical relations are 
made possible by properties of numbers such as infinity, continuity and 
transcendence, and notational ingenuity like an imaginary number. 
However, non-modelling part of maths that deals with itself has an 
intrinsic difficulty in that it only has itself to describe itself. Tools of 
description become objects of description, and therefore maths faces the 
same problem as logic, where the self-referential paradox ultimately 
nullifies any formal attempts with regards to consistency and 
completeness. The most essential properties of numbers cannot be 
described by numbers themselves. This is where logic can be of use to 
maths. 
 
  One wonders, alongside intuitionists, if we are making something 
simple into unnecessarily complicated puzzles. Why such a seemingly 
simple notion evolves into complex arguments ? Or more likely, are our 
paradigmatic creations deploying numbers as currently understood and 
used not causing their own wall of sees and no-sees. Are we not seeing 
only what we can, or even want to, see via our numbers this side of the 
wall and are unable to see things not describable by our numbers the 
other side of the wall, and thus limiting our fields of views ? Numbers 
are, in this sense, a god’s gift that endows our ability of description as 
well as a devil’s trap that limits our power of understanding. 
 
  They could even be fictions of mind for the convenience of 
understanding the empirical world. If logic is the structure of the intellect 
to unify multiple and diverse minds, and if the world is something 
mirrored by mind through language, then numbers can be logical 
variables to fit into functional relationships of fabrics of the world 
mirrored by mind. This is a grand self-reference, but not refutable a la 
Gödel because, unlike axioms, mind is the encoder and not itself 
encodable. Here numbers are variables to be operated by logical 
constants, and maths is a science, the only science, where descriptions are 
about their own means. Maths is an art of approximation as 0 (additive 
identifier = a centre as the centre) and 1 (multiplying identifier = the 
centre as a centre) stands for each and every object. Addition is a process 
from parts to a whole, whereas division is a process from a whole 
(constructed whole) to parts. As multiplication is the reverse process of 
division, a unit of any constructed whole can only be the transpositioned 
0 (1).              
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  The paradox of the self-referential paradox is, it reflects its reflector, i.e. 
mind and, by doing so, reveals its tautological nature, once the reflector is 
incorporated into the paradox. Be it a simple Russellian paradox or the 
grand Gödelian schematic paradox, all self-references, semantic and 
syntactic, are conceptual puzzlements because the conceptualizer cannot 
see itself in whatever it conceptualizes. Otherwise every concept is 
Gödel-coded and would hamper any strict ‘communications’ and thus 
proofs. Concepts are, by definition and by their usefulness, tools of 
descriptions. It is assumed concepts are universal whoever uses. Plato 
sought an ‘idea’ behind every concept in order to guarantee such a 
universality, while we are more pragmatic in thinking that concepts are 
universal because we take part in deployments of schemata of 
descriptions, so that each and every mind of ours shares a structure 
backed by some logical necessities by which concepts are operated based 
on some indisputably basic concepts. Schemata of descriptions evolve 
towards a totality as we participate in refinements of structures and 
concepts, ultimately leading to merged mind.  
 
  Once accepted the realm of Platonic ideas, you are like someone who 
takes on a religion as a matter of faith. You have no needs to question the 
ontology of numbers. All you are left with is to play with numbers. To 
these people belong Gödel, Ramanujan, Hardy and many practicing 
mathematicians. They are much more of mind the game player than the 
observer and are contend with exploring rules and patterns of numbers, 
rather than ‘numbers’. Like Gödel and Ramanujan, who accept ‘God (or a 
goddess for Ramanujan)’ unquestionably, they do not need any theology. 
Maybe they are more suitable to be applied mathematicians, and for them 
pure maths is just an intellectual game. Since they do not have to 
conceptually question the origin of numbers, they are less philosophical 
and often intuitionistic. If only they could turn their insights into 
conceptual expressions, they would be very interesting to listen to. 
However, that would be like telling mind the game player to become 
mind the observer and would dissipate their very source of insights. For 
most of us who are halfway to both the game player and the observer, we 
are less of either. It is interesting Gödel the game player appears to have 
defeated Russell and Hilbert. Russell is much more of a philosopher than 
a mathematician and thought of maths as an extension of formal logic, 
whereas Hilbert is a mathematician fixated with a concept of 
schematization, in both of cases forgetting ‘mind’ as creator of logic and 
axiomatic formalization. They were defeated by their own unfounded 
semi-religious convictions without logically or axiomatically inquiring 
into the nature of their convictions, an almost metaphysical desire. While 
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Gödel had no such necessities, having accepted tools of his trade without 
questioning and thus could concentrate on intricacies of numbers without 
philosophical fusses. However, his incompleteness also applies to his 
own theorem and still allows die-hard formalists a glimmer of hope. 
 
  In Plato’s world searches for some ultimate ‘ideas’ beckon the purpose 
of our knowledge, to be settled by narrative powers, which probably 
means the more intelligent you are, the more likely you win any 
arguments, and thus claim a higher authority for any knowledge, whereas 
we encounter paradoxes because we trust the power of descriptions, to be 
verified via consistency and completeness. The drawback of this is we 
need something that would appreciate such consistency and 
completeness, which can only be our mind (plural minds at that). Thus it 
is our mind that ‘describes’ as well as appreciates the consistency and 
completeness of such descriptions, while we cannot be both a culprit and 
a judge and end up yielding to a paradox/tautology. This would be less of 
a problem if we all share a same mind, because then this would lessen our 
needs for proofs, other than our internal transmuting-mind. Intuitionists 
would even do away completely any necessities for proofs on the strength 
of merged mind. I would argue the essence of our language is a move 
towards this merged mind via communications/persuasions through 
semantic and syntactic refinements with continuous dynamism, and our 
on-going desires for formal languages despite Hilbertian disappointments 
reflect this, which may be achieved with the permeation of artificial 
intelligence post singularity. For the hurdle of our own internal 
transmuting-mind I propose to overcome by notationally incorporating 
transmuting relationship via paradox/tautology.            
 
  Where a concept sees what it should not see, i.e. the conceptualizer, it 
metamorphoses into a paradox. The number of numbers, if it is a number, 
cannot be a number of numbers, if it is not a number, then what is 
supposed to be countable cannot be counted. This paradox is founded on 
the appearance of conceptualizer in the form of the creator of a meta- 
concept. The attempt to prevent the confusion of a concept and a meta-
concept by adopting ‘levels’ of concepts failed because this is like writing 
a fiction, where one pulls things out of thin air in order to preserve the 
coherence of a story. The conceptual confusion is recognized and the 
remedy is proposed to preserve a schema of orderly definitions. However, 
the mind that recognizes the initial paradox and the proposer of a remedy 
are one and the same. Concepts conceptualized should not conceptualize 
the conceptualizer. Any remedies of paradoxes try to address the issue by 
mending the concept in question, which then changes its shade and 
colour, but only shifts the paradox sideways and does not solve the 
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paradox, because the original conceptualizer then becomes the remedier. 
It is the nature of the paradox that what is a paradox on surface is in fact a 
tautology, because no concept can be a concept of itself so long as a 
concept is a creation of mind in order to describe and order the world in 
which mind is part. 
 
  So, in the paradox of a number of numbers or of an unprovable schema 
of provability what is essentially lacking is the manipulating mind behind 
the conceptual confusion. It is to a mind the world mirrors itself, and 
instead of conceptualizing the world mind conceptualizes its mirrored 
self. Thus, the conceptualizer conceptualizes itself, thinking it part of the 
world. This is the source of paradoxes and is therefore tautological. This 
is, however, not an error but a necessity by descriptive extension.  
 
  To label any part of language as true or false reveals the presence of 
mind in terms of ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’, a paradox twisted as tautology. 
Mind is multi-layered, and is not 1-dimensional, nor even 2-dimensional. 
Being multi-layered, it is uniquely capable of inconsistency, e.g. 
believing in something, and at the same time not believing in this same 
something at a different layer, or even at a same layer especially when 
dealing with referenceless subject-matters. Logicians play a definitional 
disciplinarian with p ∨ ~p. However, be it the notion of a proposition or 
an idealized object, p ∨ ~p or self-referential a ∨ ~a has a formidable 
empirical task, for p and a are creations of mind, which, except for 
superficial definitions, eventually face the problem of self-referential 
paradox. Let p stand for a statement about itself, such as every 
proposition is either true or false, or a as an idealized object without any 
empirical properties, such as space and time, p ∨ ~p cannot be applied to 
itself without interceding mind. For p ∨ ~p as an axiom has to be read ‘a 
proposition is always true of itself if disjuncted with its own negation’, 
not ‘a proposition is either true or false’. Otherwise, there arises a 
possibility that p ∨ ~p can be false. The same is true of a ∨ ~a because 
for a ∨ ~a to be true a cannot have any spatio-temporal properties, and is 
creation of mind for a specific purpose of a ∨ ~a. That is, the law of 
excluded middle is an analytic tautology or synthetic paradox, requiring 
mind when referring to mind, i.e. a proposition ‘p ∨ ~p’ about any 
propositions cannot be a proposition if it is true, or it is not a proposition, 
in which case truth-values are not applicable. You can generalise this to 
any logical truths insofar as logic and mind need mirroring each other. 
 
  Be it p ∨ ~p or a ∨ ~a, their logical truth is, despite their claim for 
epistemic independence, ontologically based on our mind, without which 
they are meaningless. That is, it is superficially mind the adjudicator that 
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gives a logical value to them, and at a deeper level the game player and 
the observer come into the play, questioning their validity. They further 
assume properties of mind, such as the descriptive necessity for ‘space-
time’, without which even their superficial truth becomes problematic. It 
is thus that the logical truth of p ∨ ~p is based on a p ; ‘every proposition 
is either true or false’, which cannot be a p because this has to be always 
true.  
 
  P ; p ∨ ~p , applied onto itself, P ∨ ~P, it is still ‘every p is T or F if 
disjuncted with the negation of itself’.  
 
  P ; p ∧ ~p, applied onto itself, P ∧ ~P, it is always ‘every p is F if 
conjuncted with the negation of itself’. 
 
  There is a disparity between the two, in that the former needs a proviso 
‘except itself, which is always true’, therefore there is a proposition that is 
always T by virtue of a necessity of mind. This p about p ∨ ~p 
interestingly defies formal logic, in that it cannot be formalized, a 
paradox about formal logic. The fact that a tautology of p has to be 
backed up by a p that is contraindicated by that tautology, is a ‘Spiegel im 
Spiegel’ paradox/tautology, and reveals the essential multi-layeredness of 
mind. This disparity between ∨ and ∧ plays a crucial role in the 
construction of logical dimensionalities as well as natural numbers, 
especially odds and evens. The logic that dispenses with mind the 
adjudicator attains the recursive dimensionalities by closing the loop of 
rules of inference with ∧. 
 
  Rhetorically speaking, mind the observer and mind the game player see 
each other reflected in the eye of the other alongside the world. Thus, we 
have two views of the same world, slightly different from each other but 
neither superseding the other. We synthesize the two views into one by 
means of the necessary relationship between the observer and the game 
player. This is where logic comes in. The observer and the game player 
are related in such a way as to establish their common identity. This is 
akin to self-demarcation because the observer and the game player cannot 
exist by itself. They define each other in order to exist so that together 
they have a locality from where the world is mirrored onto. Logic is 
based on descriptive directions that arise from self-demarcation. This 
evolves into maths when descriptive directions acquire spatial 
characteristics through the self-described logical space, i.e. logic with 
negation as form of mapping. Spatial directions define each other as an 
identical variable (variable-notion) which is described by logical 
connectives. This is when we have geometrical spaces together with 
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geometrical entities such as points, lines, distances, etc. coupled with 
arithmetical means of description (numbers and operators).        
 
  Maths and logic are unique in contrast to so-called ‘sciences’ where 
there are tangible objects/events juxtaposed to respective schema of 
science, although schemata of science and the world they purport to 
describe may not necessarily be ‘juxtaposed’. In maths and logic objects 
of description and tools of description are one and the same. You use 
numbers or logical constants to describe numbers or logical rules. They 
describe themselves according to their own rules and are essentially self-
referential. This is their strength in that they are self-contained as well as 
their weakness in that they lack third party referees, which superficially 
guarantee a level of objectivity in sciences. Maths and logic are a world 
of mind, which is objects of description as well as rules of description, 
and their validity is they structurally represent mind, which is the mirror 
of the world. It is here the universal validity of self-reference, be it a 
paradox or a tautology, plays the vital role of construction.                        
 
  I am attempting to describe something beyond reaches of any ordinary 
conventional notations. I do not know if this is philosophy or poem. Since 
I start this discourse with ‘I’, which is a self-referential concept and 
cannot be meaningfully formalized, together with many looping 
expressions like ‘here’, ‘this’ and ‘such’, this is more of art than 
philosophy or any formal languages. Or maybe philosophy is art. Readers 
should be aware this could be yet another self-referential day dream, or 
maybe anything intellectual and indeed everything is ultimately a twisted 
day dream. The only recommended reading that may go along with this 
work is another work of mine ‘The Elementals’ freely available on 
‘philpapers.org’. Although I try to make this work as self-contained as 
possible, it does assume some of essential parts of the aforementioned 
work, such as ‘self-demarcation’, ‘logical dimensionalities’, ‘the 
disjunctive space’ and ‘the conjunctive space’, etc., which you will not 
find anywhere else. 
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2. Language 
 
< Functions of ‘language’ and ‘language as a totality’ > 
 
  x = x 
 
  Let’s start from the conceivable possible most primitive statement. The 
above looks so undeniably and inarguably obvious that it is often cited as 
a law or axiom from the time of Aristotle. However, step into an 
empirical world x must be something with no part(s) that occupies an 
identical spot in the space-time coordinate. First of all, we have not 
definitively achieved to specify anything with no part(s), nor are we able 
to specify a point simultaneously in space and time. Furthermore, we do 
not even know if this is a characteristic of the empirical world or a 
deficiency of our descriptive tools. Thus, this statement about identity 
fails to satisfy the empirical test. x = x definitively does not apply to the 
world of quarks and has no place quantum-mechanically. In the physical 
world of space and time there is nothing that is identical with each other 
except itself. Even that is untenable because it can only be the idealized 
smallest possible constituent of the world. In the quantum mechanical 
world nothing can be described as ‘a = a’. Mathematically e.g. ‘2 = 2’ 
only because here ‘2’ is a conceptualized entity, whereas in our daily life 
‘2’ is only a unit of something. Likewise, set-theoretically speaking, 
numbers x = x is only possible because x is a concept idealized from 
various actual numbers. However, to say from x = x follows n = n 
because of e.g. (3 = 3) = (3 ≠ (∀n(n ≠ 3))), tantamount to an attempt to 
define ‘=’ by ‘≠’, and is really a schematic tautology. Numbers are not 
concepts, but values of a process. The meaning of a number assumes the 
whole of ‘numbers’ by virtue of their process. Numbers are exact because 
they are not concepts but ‘signposts’. Where one conceptualizes a 
number, of ‘0’ for its transpositionability, one conceptualizes the whole 
of ‘numbers’, like a Cartesian plenum construct.  
 
  Now then, let’s think x is something in the world of ideas. To think x is 
a concept is nay but impossible because most concepts are imprecise and 
are multi-faceted, sometimes even multi-layered. Say x stands for a 
‘desk’, I am sure I need not to present to you Hume’s arguments to 
explain how difficult it is to say ‘desk = desk’ considering you know 
there are many ways of describing a same desk, even a same particular 
empirical desk would appear differently from different angles. Now, say 
for the precision’s sake, x is a mathematical object. Here too without 
going into paradoxes of Cantor, Frege, Russell as well as Gödel : 
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  Given x = x, ‘x’ = ‘x’, x ‘=’ x, ‘x’ = x, ‘x = x’, etc., 
 
  Assignning a value, x = 2, x = ‘2’, ‘x’ = 2, ‘x’ = 2+0, x ‘=’ 2, etc.,  
 
  Then, 2 = ‘2’, 1 + 1 = ‘1 + 1’, ‘1’ + 1 = 2, 1 ‘∧’ 1 = 1 ‘+’ 1, etc.. 
 
  ‘x’ denotes an epistemic extension, whereas x is an ontological object, 
be it an empirical object or Platonic object. That is, ‘x’ is a described x 
insofar as whatever may or may not exist outside our perception can only 
be understood descriptively. Thus ‘2’ is the idea of 2, whereas 2 is 
postulated to be an idealistic entity, a mathematical object with 
intrinsically obvious meaning, if any. Although 2 = ‘2’ may seem 
ridiculous, 2 ‘=’ ‘2’ is not because it is right to question the identity of an 
object and its description.  
 
  Each and every different version of the above identities can be 
accompanied by philosophical arguments, which are not too difficult to 
make them so complicated that one could spend a life time to follow, as it 
happened with many mediocre academics.   
 
  Add to the above; 1 has parts, even 0 has parts. 2 has even more parts ; a 
natural number, a whole number, an even number, the first of even 
numbers, a prime number, the first of prime numbers, the only even 
prime, the limit of 1.999999999999∙∙∙, etc., etc.. I could even add my own 
mathematical definitions, which may not be shared by all or any of you. 
Thus 2 as a quantity is not easy to equate with itself. Only when I say ‘2 
= 2 and this 2 is 2 as the only even prime’ or ‘2 = 2 and the first 2 is 
always identical with the second 2 by definition, no matter what 2 may 
mean’, it can be a reasonably accurate statement. However, this is not 
even a tautology because ‘2 = 2’ as a tautology should be self-evident 
without any provisos. 
 
  One should ask why such an obvious statement as ‘2 = 2’ cannot even 
be self-evident. This is because behind a statement is a mind which is not 
only non-uniform and non-identical in space-time but also plural by 
existence. That is, a mind exists by questioning everything including 
itself. Thus, given ‘2 = 2’, we assume an identical and uniform mind, 
which commands that ‘2 = 2’ is a tautology by definition. However, this 
grand assumption is flawed in the sense that if the validity of ‘2 = 2’ lies 
in the identical and uniform mind behind the statement, then ‘2 = 2’ 
should be represented as ‘2’ and the full stop. The reason why we do 
deliberately use the tautological ‘2 = 2’ is we are asserting ‘2 = 2’ by 
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means of ‘2 ≠ 2’ in terms of multi-facet & -layer characteristics of the 
concept of ‘2’. Therefore,  
 
  2 = 2 
 
because and despite of 2(prime) ≠ 2(even) or 2(apples) ≠ 2(oranges). 
 
  That is, 2 = 2 is asserted by means of some specific schematic 
characteristic chosen by idealized mind. Here 2 = 2 specifically refers to 
the arithmetical quantity distilled from the linguistic ‘two’ with murky 
conceptual impreciseness. However, even the arithmetical 2 is not precise 
enough if its schematic precision is questioned.  
 
  Whenever one utilizes definitions to construct a system, since we do not 
have an exactly identical mind with an exactly identical structure on an 
exactly identical level, such a system is fundamentally flawed. Even 
tautologies are so easily found defective, or rather the meaning of a 
tautology is to appeal to our wholeness through such defects. A perfect 
tautology, if exist, is absolutely meaningless and adds nothing in terms of 
information. 
  
  Logic tries to avoid the above linguistic problems by formalizing it in 
terms of extensionality. That is, x is equal to itself if and only if its 
constituents (properties) are exhaustively and explicitly enumerated as 
confirmed, then it is identical with itself. Or, any sets A and B are 
identical if and only if they both share identical members. Give or take 
some problems of expressional exactitudes, the axiom of extensionality 
implicitly assumes that an object or set has properties or members which 
we can assert in terms of ∋ and that there is such an intellectual capacity 
to judge. Here logic simply substitutes linguistic difficulties with grand 
assumptions behind seemingly solid formality. 
 
  For the sake of clarity, take a set A. A has various members, of which 
some are essential, some are contingent. They cannot be uniformly 
asserted by ∋ and cannot be universally judged as such, even for the sake 
of argument, because neither the asserter nor the judge can be formally 
incorporated into this formal expression. 
 
  2(prime) = 2(even) 
  
  2(even) + 0(identifier) = 2 (the only even prime) 
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  Set-theoretic solutions to the above conceptual difficulties are to assume 
a meta-concept of a set of sets, namely 2 is a set of all sets with two 
members and thus asserts 2 = 2. Here conceptual difficulties as above are 
delegated to respective schemata that assign conceptual colours to each 
set, be it 2 as a prime, 2 as an even or 2 as a natural. The meta-concept of 
2 only concerns cardinality. However, this agreement of minds, like any 
rules, cannot exhaust all exceptions, because we do not really know what 
is outside of the boundary of rules, like the rule-maker itself, is it inside 
or outside the boundary ? or how about ordinality ? Or, having allowed to 
create a meta-concept, why not a meta-meta-concept, such as cardinality 
of cardinality, this happens because a rule-maker also have to be 
governed by rules, and so on so forth.  
 
  By so creating a meta-concept the creator also created its own double 
image ; one who perceives the concept of ‘two’ and one who cognizes the 
concept of ‘2’ as ‘a set of all sets with two members’. It is this concept 
over concept that ends up with ‘a number of all numbers’, because if ‘2’ 
out of all sets with two members, then why not count whatever is 
countable including the counter ? An absolute ‘2’ to justify the concrete 
‘two’ is backed by the necessity of mind to distil an ‘idea’ by removing 
empirical dirt for a good housekeeping. After all, two apples cannot be 
the same as two oranges. This necessity is a logical necessity to create 
‘variable-notions’, which are operable by means of ‘constants’, i.e. 
structures of mind. Thus, arithmetic is really logic of variables that are 
based on the structure of space consisting in products of mind resulted 
from the necessity of categorizations. For, otherwise, the world would be 
nothing but a jumble of individual objects, which is not a description and 
is incomprehensive to mind. However, the conceptualization of ‘2’ out of 
‘two’ is not the same categorization as ‘a number of numbers’ out of 
‘numbers’. Here mind is playing with itself. There is a logical necessity 
of ‘2’ out of ‘two’ because of our needs to describe and understand the 
world. To distil ‘a number of numbers’ out of ‘numbers’ is more like for 
mind to try to understand and describe itself and is really ‘Spiegel im 
Spiegel’ paradox/tautology. That is, having mirrored the world, e.g. ‘2’ 
out of ‘two’, it is trying to see if it can see itself in the world through the 
medium of mirroring, i.e. language. Seeking the meaning of countability 
in the act of counting cannot be done by creating the meta-concept of ‘a 
number of all numbers’. It is like trying to describe beauty by 
enumerating all beautiful concepts. The double image of mind can be 
descriptively useful if it can derive a mechanism that creates ‘ideas’ out 
of ‘concretes’. It is not a concept over concept that explain a concept, 
rather a logical process that produces ‘ideas’ from ‘concretes’. It is not ‘a 
number of numbers’ that explains ‘numbers’. By ‘a number of numbers’ 
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we only end up with more messes to sort out. This is why the set theories 
do not give any solutions to the number theory. 
 
  In thinking a number of numbers, replace ‘number of numbers’ with 
‘counted’, ‘number’, with ‘countable’, that is, if a ‘counted’ is a 
‘countable’, then it is not counted, if a ‘counted’ is not ‘countable’, then it 
cannot have been counted. You can see the real paradox of this paradox is 
what does not surface in the statement, but remain submerged in the 
statement, namely the ‘counter’. It is the ‘counter’ that creates ‘counted’ 
and ‘countable’ but can be neither counted nor countable, because it is the 
real subject of the statement which superficially predicates ‘counted’ and 
‘countable’. In any statements ‘I’ make I cannot predicate myself unless I 
objectify myself, which is not really ‘I’. ‘I’ can only be the subject of 
entire discourses I make and can only be postulated. ‘I’ here is the most 
grand looping expression and self-referential paradox/tautology. ‘I’ can 
also be called ‘mind’ or a wholistic entity without which there will be no 
languages. The biggest failure of logicists or formalists is that they have 
no ways of formally presenting this ‘I’, which Gödel seemed to have 
intuited.                 
 
  A ‘set’ is a notational gimmick to give an abstract mask to an empirical 
number, that is, prior to the abstract ‘set of sets’ of a number of elements, 
there already exist the notion of a number. The set theoretic ‘3’ is distilled 
from an empirical ‘3’ of ‘three objects (be them three apples or two 
apples and one orange)’ for a theoretical consistency. In another word, 
the set theoretic ‘3’ is a creation of mind for a logical consistency. The 
totality of creations of mind of a certain kind is the ‘mind’ as a processor 
of these creations. On the other hand, if an empirical number can also be 
a logical number without distillation, all those set-theoretic paradoxes are 
not only uncalled for but can also be described as paradoxes of ‘mind’ 
over mind. There is no need to create set-theoretic numbers if it can be 
shown various kinds of objects are simply creations of mind in order to 
describe the world for the convenience of mind. If in fact there are only 
‘things’ that constitute the world, then there are only logical numbers, and 
there is no need to resort to inventing set-theoretic numbers together with 
paradoxes of ‘mind’ upon mind. So-called paradoxes are there because 
‘mind’ tries to describe itself as the totality of its own creations. As a 
‘describer’ cannot describe itself as ‘described’, once you admit the 
foundation of a theory as a set of axioms, then you forget it was you 
yourself who seek to prove to yourself about the consistency and 
completeness of your theory. Ask yourself how this can ever be. You as a 
‘describer’ cannot describe yourself within the conventions of your 
descriptions that you invented. A mirror that invents another mirror in 
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order to see itself only sees its mirrored self, never itself. This is a 
tautology cum paradox. We are what we describe. We see ourselves 
through what we describe, there are us as physicist, us as mathematician, 
us as artist, etc., but there are no us in ourselves. The most acute paradox 
of self-referential loop is that we are our language, nothing less, nothing 
more, yet we see more of ourselves in hardware part of us than software 
part of us because we see ourselves in superficial plurality of ourselves, 
which is confusion of quality over quantity. The numerical ‘more’ 
become the same as the qualitative ‘more’ at this level of description. 
‘Minds’ are a product of mind and the loop between ‘minds’ and mind is 
the tautology/paradox of philosophy.            
 
  The attempt to formalise an expression is basically a definitional 
approach, which assumes, for the sake of argument, every concept is 
identified by the exactly and absolutely identical ‘self’. However, since 
this can never be demonstrated within the same expression in which ‘self’ 
is affixed as identifier, i.e. because the formaliser cannot be seen in his 
formal expression, there shall never be any final formal expression. So 
long as we cannot have an absolutely identical self as identifier, our 
language remains dynamic and has to keep moving towards a totality 
which is more and more akin to Wittgensteinian world of ‘three words’. 
 
  Language is metaphorically like a ball of elastic bands, with 
interconnected descriptions wrapped around ‘self’, where each 
description relies on every other description, and multi-faceted and -
layered murky concepts depend upon each other, so that their 
incompleteness catalyses into a wholeness. Each ball is also slightly 
different reflecting capacities, contexts and structures of ‘self’. It is thus 
that in order to achieve a wholeness language has to keep moving towards 
a totality through refinement of descriptions and concepts as well as 
communications of minds. Only with merged mind and unified self, a 
wholeness of language can be appreciated, if ever. In other words, as long 
as language stays dynamic, our descriptions and concepts always remain 
incomplete. On the other hand, when language attains a wholeness and 
communications cease, we have no reason to think, as thinking is only a 
dynamic process towards a totality, like happiness that puffs off once 
achieved. We would have no needs to discuss, argue and try to persuade 
our colleagues. We just describe, and we all simultaneously understand. 
The meaning of language is in its incompleteness. What is true of 
language is also true of maths and logic. Paradox/tautology is essential 
part of us, and philosophically we should congratulate ourselves for our 
shortcomings ; our language, formal or otherwise, is incomplete, 
ultimately resulting in self-referential paradox/tautology, this is what 
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makes us engaged in the dynamic process of ‘thinking’ and forces us to 
communicate with each other. This process cannot, or hopefully should 
not, complete, without incorporating conceptualizer into 
conceptualization, formalizer into formalization, etc.. Once complete, i.e. 
once given a perfect language, we would have no raison d'être as a 
thinker.     
 
  However, we are fortunately still a long way off from such a state of 
unwelcome nirvana. The conceptualiser steps back and watches itself, 
while the game player plays with notions to establish rules and patterns. 
Imperfect concepts are tools of communication to lead to a totality. So let 
me plough on. 
  
  Here is the ultimate axiom ;  
 
  x ₪ x 
 
, which means the axiomatizor is axiomatized as mirrored self. Or, I see 
myself between objectified I and subjectified I as adjudicating self 
(mind). This is structurally paraphrased as the ∨-space and the ∧-space. It 
is more fundamental than e.g. x = x because x = x is only possible with 
adjudicating mind between and above two x’s, while x ₪ x is logically 
the same as the single x, which self-contains itself, and it is the 
adjudicating mind itself that operationalizes itself as the structure of 
ontologico-notationality.  
 
  x ₪ x is a paradox because descriptively the real x can only see itself as 
imaginary x, and vice versa, or truth can only mirror itself as falsehood, 
and vice versa. It is also a tautology because ontologically x can only be 
x. Interestingly a paradox turns into a tautology, and a tautology into a 
paradox, because mind intercedes on behalf of itself. In other words, we 
make a paradox into a tautology, and vice versa.      
 
  A tautology becomes a paradox when the plural minds (or a layered 
mind) see themselves as a single mind in a mirrored self. This is the 
ultimate paradox/tautology of ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’. AI will not, but PSAI 
will, appreciate this paradox, as it requires ‘self’ to mirror itself. A 
paradox is a double image essentially described (by itself) as a single 
image, because the mirror (language) the plural minds produce in order to 
see themselves can only be a single mirror, for if it is not single, then 
whatever is described, it is not assignable any truth-values. 
 
  x ₪ x → T ₪ F 
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  x ₪ x becomes T ₪ F if x (variable-notion) is replaced with ‘the world’ 
by mind the observer. T ₪ F becomes T ∨ F because if x (variable) 
takes a value from the world, then x(T) ∨ x(F) by mind the 
adjudicator. ‘Mind (minds) is a mind, said the mind’ is the same 
paradox/tautology because mind is a structural layer of cognitive ability, 
like two eyes we need in order to represent a 3-D out of two 2-Ds. 
‘Proofs’ are mind’s innate tendency to merge these layered cognition of a 
same object/event so that it can keep its identical self. A member can 
make a self-contradictory statement about a group of which he is part, as 
if he is not a member, because the statement is addressed from a self to 
‘self’ adjudicated by the ‘self’. The three ‘self’s are an identical ‘self’ by 
a logical definition, and thus invoke a paradox. However, in so defining, 
the definer himself (mind) leaves out the defining ‘self’ as indefinable. 
Whatever is defined has by necessity three definers attached ; indefinable 
‘self’, describable self and adjudicating ‘self’. This is how mind operates 
between language and the world, and itself above the two. This is also 
how a paradox can be made out of a tautology, and vice versa. 
 
  x = x if and only if x(T) ₪ x(F) 
 
  This is the case because if x is a variable, then A = A, and the question 
of categorizer being unable to categorize itself will lead itself to a self-
referential paradox. Mind that chooses, necessarily or randomly, values 
for x can never be itself a value of x, and therefore x = x contains x ≠ x. 
On the other hand if we regard x as a variable-notion, then it is its own 
value and does not take any values empirically, schematically or logico-
mathematically. This will dispense with the question of the unidentifiable 
bridge between the world and the binary totality of mind and language. 
The question is, instead, whether a ‘variable-notion’ can demonstrate 
such a schema within that enables to establish its own identity, without 
any recourses to the meaning of ‘=’ described through schemata of logic, 
maths and science, etc.. x(T) ₪ x(F) is a logical consequence derived 
from ‘self-demarcation’ and signifies the absence of mind the adjudicator 
between the world and language. It is not for us to say what is true (T) or 
false (F) in relation to our descriptions and empirical or schematic states 
of affairs. Rather, whatever is, is. x(T) ₪ x(F) signifies, ontologico-
notationally, the binary totality of mind and language, with the mirrored 
world onto itself. Only then x = x without falling into a paradox, because 
it is itself a paradox/tautology.  
 
  The ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ tautology is simultaneously a self-referential 
paradox in the sense that one sees oneself not in oneself but in one’s 
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projection of oneself, thereby one sees whatever one want to see, 
provided that it has a schematic sense. Likewise, we see ourselves when 
language refers to itself, i.e. mind sees ‘mind’ through a language that 
mind creates in order to describe the world, which include us, mind.  
The ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ paradox/tautology, x ₪ x, is a tautology because 
x = x, with mind-adjudicator, and a paradox because x can only be x(T) 
in contrast to x(F) in the absence of mind-adjudicator and the so-called 
empirical world. That is, in terms of truth-values, if x is T, then it can 
only be in contrast to F. Given a mirror, x(T) sees itself only as x(F) 
without mind overseeing the two selves from outside. Therefore, if x is T, 
then its mirrored self is F and mirrored-mirrored self is T, ∙ ∙ ∙ ad 
infinitum, and vice versa, or if x is real, then its mirrored self is imaginary 
and mirrored-mirrored self is real, ∙ ∙ ∙ ad infinitum, and vice versa. This 
is uniquely so only for maths because maths is its own world, in contrast 
to physics, which has the empirical world as adjudicator as well as mind-
adjudicator. 
                       
  x ₪ x is, thus, the most fundamental constant of pure maths, without 
mind-adjudicator. The definition-free maths starts by operationalizing 
x ₪ x. This can be done by ‘descriptive directions’ based on the 
ontologico-notationality. Paradoxes arise as long as it is thought that 
mind necessarily, arbitrarily or accidentally finds directions of numbers in 
terms of cardinality and ordinality. For behind all those mathematical 
operators and operands is the grand operator which is not itself 
describable. Any axioms (tautologies) will be immediately turned into a 
paradox by unseen and indescribable structure of the said mind. Any 
definitions assume an identical mind with an identical structure on an 
identical level. Otherwise, there will be no cohesive schemata. Seeing this 
from the standpoint of language, any attempts to describe the structure of 
mind is essentially the same as describing language with language by 
language, as language is the mirror of mind. There cannot be a meta-
language because such an invention can only be based on language. 
Likewise, I, a thinking machine, cannot encode it and show you my codes 
because there are no codes to code codes. However, allowing the 
ontologico-notationality, i.e. descriptive necessities of the self-described 
logical space, directions of numbers are not an ad hoc discovery of mind, 
but a necessary evolution of self-spatialization. They are intrinsic 
properties of points due to dynamic infinity of intersecting lines to form 
the conjunctive space. 
 
  A mind has an ability to see itself, while AI (pre-singularity) cannot see 
itself. We have concepts, while AI only has operands. It is also possible 
for mind to be contradictory or even self-contradictory ; we may believe 
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in, e.g. ‘God’ - whatever it may be - on one hand, and at the same time, or 
somewhere else in mind, may not so believe. This is uniquely a capacity 
of mind, not in a psychological sense but in a logical sense. For a mind T 
= F, a paradox, is not only a possibility but also goes much deeper than its 
appearance. Even in a world of strict definitions we will be able to find 
loopholes to find T = F. A superficial example would be ; it is true that it 
is raining, if it is indeed raining. However, there are physical states of 
raining which can be grey and impossible to define decisively. The 
example would be more complicated in a world of precise relational 
concepts, where rigours of definitions can be challenged when infinity, 
continuity and paradigmatic consistency are involved. Even seemingly 
infallible axioms can be contested if schematic loopholes can be found, 
like the parallel postulate. Even in the world of conventional physics, if a 
statement maker becomes part of an observable event, we have p(T ₪ F) 
instead of p(T, F), where there cannot be truth-values assignable to a 
statement as if the maker of a statement can stand apart and acts as a 
logically positivistic adjudicator.      
 
  It is not ‘it is true that it is raining’, it is true ‘mind sees mind seeing it is 
raining’. As we assume ourselves as plurals, mind assumes minds and 
statements made on ourselves are mistaken as statements made on the 
world. Any philosophical attempts to define ‘mind’ is by definition 
infertile because we are the mind, in the sense that I cannot talk about 
myself as object, as I am the subject. This is the linguistic essence of a 
statement ; there cannot be any statements about objectified subjects or 
subjectified objects as they can only be a tautology or paradox. The 
function of a mind that ‘objectifies’ the subject or ‘subjectifies’ the 
object, is self-referential and merely affirm its presence without any 
analytical benefits, only as good as saying ‘I am myself’ or ‘I see what I 
see’. These are in essence ‘nouns’, which have no truth-values. Likewise, 
Russellian paradoxes are a ‘noun’ that stands for falsehood, and 
tautologies are a ‘noun’ that stands for truth. Interestingly a paradox is 
also a tautology if set aside from each other. 
 
  According to German laws, aristocratic titles are not legally recognized 
but allowed to be used as part of a name, thus Prince Bismarck is literally 
a Mr Princebismarck, although it is spelt Prince Bismarck. On seeing 
‘Prince Bismarck’ we, however, immediately associate with Prince 
Bismarck as customarily known, despite the title ‘Prince’ does not really 
exist. So between ‘a Mr Princebismarck’ and ‘Prince Bismarck’ is a mind 
that allows ‘a Mr Princebismarck’ to be paraphrased into the non-existent 
‘Prince’ Bismarck. Likewise, ‘All Cretans are liars’ said a Cretan 
(Russell’s paradox), is really ‘A Cretan who says ‘all Cretans are liars’’ 
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(a noun created by the automatic adjudicating mind), which is neither true 
nor false and seemingly appears to be meaningful. You could be 
paradoxical, but can exist.     
 
  Superimposed quasi-logical relation between one genuine set (of all 
Cretans), a quasi-set (of all Cretans + one Cretan (mind) as a describer of 
all Cretans) and another quasi-set (of all Cretans + one invisible listener 
(mind)). This is a paradox because this ‘point’ belongs to the all three sets  
despite being a member of only one, but any one, of the three sets. There 
is a Cretan as an object, there is a Cretan who counts himself as an object 
and there is yet another Cretan who sees this act of cognition. That is, 
despite the logical totality of all Cretans, for such a totality to have an 
empirical reality there has to be one Cretan who is a categorizer as well as 
a categorised. He is different from all the other Cretans who are the 
categorized. For this illogical act of double-counting to be noticed there 
has to be an observer (mind) who watches this strange phenomenon of the 
conceptualizer conceptualizing himself, i.e. ‘mind’ going in and out of 
itself.  
 
  A mind plays the paradox of T = F (T ₪ F) because it needs a paradox 
to hang on in order to unravel itself, so that T ₪ F becomes T = T or F = 
F. Language exists to describe the world, and a mind and the world 
mirror each other through language. Here T ₪ F is the master key to enter 
either field. FX can be T or F, or even fuzzy, depending upon different 
worlds. Epistemologically what is T in one world can be F in another, or 
fuzzy, reflecting a mind in relation to a world. However, ontologico-
notationally FX can only be T ₪ F, where a mind coincides with the 
unified world. T ₪ F is the same as schematic directions, so to speak. 
 
  For mind, which is multi-layered but encapsulated within one totality, (p 
∧ (~p)) is within the capacity of mind. p ∧ ~p may be an impossible 
inconsistency, but T ₪ F may be paraphrased as (p ∧ (~p)). Thus, 
 
Spiegel im Spiegel       
 p ∧ ~p  ↓  (p ∧ (~p)) 
   W →  L →  M 
   W ←  L ←  M 
 
‘The Elementals’ is my attempt to construct logic (as near to conventional 
understandings as possible). A schematic essence can only be 
demonstrated, can never be presented as an axiom. Once an axiom is 
given, then eventually the identity of giver has to be questioned, resulting 
in paradox/tautology.  
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  In considering a language as a totality and removing a mind as 
adjudicator of truth-values of a statement, one comes to view this totality 
as a body from which even truth-values themselves are to be derived. We, 
be they minds or mirrored worlds, seek a unified totality, for, otherwise, 
we fail to describe ourselves. Language provides us with means of 
communication that help us towards a unified totality, while language as 
a totality, if given, should be able to demonstrate that it contains the 
mirrored world in such a way as to dispense with mind the adjudicator. I 
attempted to demonstrate formal logic without recourse to mind the 
adjudicator in my aforementioned work. 
 
  So-called mathematical objects refer to processes rather than entities.  
‘I am a liar’ is the same as ‘the liar is a liar’, i.e. a paradox becomes a 
tautology if replaced by ‘a statement-maker makes a statement, and the 
reference of the statement is the statement-maker himself’. That is, ‘true 
if false, false if true’ becomes ‘always true because true/false has a same 
reference’. ‘Mind’ cannot have another ‘mind’ as adjudicator of itself. 
‘True/false’ can only be true/false in terms of schematic coherence. Thus, 
what is true is true because of its structural validity. Thus, whatever is, is 
true, and whatever is false cannot even exist. It is human incompleteness 
that manufactures truth and falsehood. Remove human elements, then 
there will be no truth as against falsehood or falsehood as against truth. 
We instead have ‘T ₪ F’.     
 
  For a conceptualizer to conceptualize itself, i.e. to become a 
conceptualized, for a totality to include itself, thus to enter the perpetual 
motion of a dog chasing its own tail, for an axiomatic system to add an 
axiom about its own completeness and consistency, i.e. to try to mirror 
itself onto itself, these are basically the same as the grand self-referential 
paradox Gödel thought demonstrated its incompleteness. A mind has an 
inevitable tendency to see itself as the mind because it has no way of 
knowing anything but itself. We know a mind is a mind because we count 
ourselves as separate entities, but we also extrapolate a mind is ‘mind’ 
because we assume each and every mind has an identical structure. This 
gives rise to ‘logic’ and Kantian a priories. 
 
  The self-referential paradox is inevitable but insolvable because multiple 
minds need a presumed common mind to communicate, otherwise we 
will all be schizophrenic individuals, and instead of a ‘society, or better, 
intellectual community’ we must each reside in multiple independent 
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worlds of our own where there is no needs for ‘proof’, no shared 
knowledge and no inheritable stock of intellectual culture. Thus, we must 
accept the self-referential paradox and be grateful to Gödel to have 
demonstrated, awkwardly but perhaps to the limit of the intellect that a 
mind is not complete because a mind can never be ‘mind’, until and 
unless AI acquires a ‘self’, which then turns into the permeating, 
universal PSAI, where its existence is its proof. Gödel’s incompleteness 
is best appreciated not as incompleteness of formal language per se, but 
rather as limitation of mind as applied to any formalization attempts, 
because something has to remain outside any strict definitional 
approaches, namely mind itself.     
          
  What if the arithmetical tools used to code logical statements is 
essentially related to formal logic they help proving incompleteness ? In 
proving the incompleteness of formal logic, Gödel assumed elementary 
arithmetic utilized to be independent, consistent and complete as a tool of 
proof. However, if numbers are to be essentially of logic by nature, then 
the so-called Gödel’s proof become invalid by virtue of notational 
tautology. You cannot prove the guilt of the accused if the accused was a 
member of the jury. Likewise, you cannot prove the provability of formal 
logic by using arithmetical tools if those tools are essentially derived 
from formal logic. That is, the Gödelian formalization of the 
incompleteness is itself incomplete. This is, however, not really essential 
to his achievement. His proof of incompleteness may or may not be itself 
incomplete, but he has shown that a mind cannot ‘prove’ itself to ‘mind’ 
as ‘mind’ is something towards which a mind is moving, but yet 
unrealized, and if realized, then a mind has no reasons at all to be moving 
towards. My approach is to let a mind formalize itself and see what it has 
to offer. It is interesting to see if the formalized mind and ‘mind’ have 
anything in common. We have to let a ‘whole’, which includes us, 
describe itself. This is an ontologico-notational approach, which I applied 
to formal logic (‘The Elemetals’) and history (‘Self, History and Future’). 
I apply it here to numbers and show numbers are products of logical 
spaces that trace their origin to ‘self-demarcation’ of a totality in itself.  
 
  The class or set (and of classes and sets, and of any further tiers thereof) 
can be talked about because there is another nebulous ultimate all-
encompassing class or set. This is ‘mind’ or better, a merged mind, which 
precedes ‘consistency’ and ‘completeness’ in any formal sense, and is the 
constructor of notions and ideas (Plate’s). It is nebulous because we are in 
it and cannot detach ourselves from it in order to talk about it. When we 
dare it, we fall into paradoxes and tautologies (structural or semantic). 
The paradox of Cretans is not really about Cretans but that it was dared 
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talked about. We constructed it, and cannot see it was us who constructed 
it because we are in it and cannot see it from the outside. A merged mind 
does not exist. It is an extrapolated goal our minds and language interact 
in order to move towards. Thus, paradoxes and tautologies are so 
recognized because of three superimposed circles of a mind, minds and 
‘mind’. We construct a meaning by following three shadows cast by the 
self-relation of ‘self’, ‘selves’ and ‘identical self’ that somehow seems to 
point to a nebulous totality.   
 
  I start with the totality of numbers - whatever it may be - and see if it 
may evolve into a schema of numbers clarifying foundations of basic 
concepts of arithmetic in a manner, by chance, not inconsistent with 
accepted norms of rules of numbers. The question of Aleph numbers and 
various axioms and hypotheses may also be a question, not of arbitrarily 
constructive schemata built on our presumed knowledge of existing 
numbers, but of a schema of a whole from which numbers as we know 
are to be generated. I start with a paradox/tautology that is not really an 
independent state of affair but a mirror relation between mind and 
language. A tautology and a paradox augment each other so that each can 
see itself in the other. Mind is not a detached adjudicator of what is a 
tautology or paradox because it is already part of language. Thus, the 
question of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves is that 
such a membership is already a concoction of mind and language and 
exists only in confusion where mind is embodied in language, i.e. in 
undetached concepts of the detached world (paradoxes, which are 
meaningfully meaningless) or detached concepts of the undetached world 
(tautologies, which are meaninglessly meaningful). In the former the 
detached world is a mirage in a language inseparable from mind, in the 
latter the detached concept is a fantasy in a world tainted by mind, in 
either way once mind is disentangled, tautologies and paradoxes become 
one and the same. That is, language and mind are inseparable, and 
moreover they are also intricately connected with the world, of which the 
cognisor is an essential part. Mind thinks the world is out there and 
language is objectively describing it, forgetting it is itself creation of 
language. Mind also confuses what it sees is the world, whereas it is 
seeing itself as part of the world. What is a tautology of language is a 
paradox of the world, because mind is either part of language or part of 
the world, but when it gets too clever, then it only sees itself (tautology) 
or denies itself (paradox). Be it a ‘number’ or a ‘set’, remember they do 
not exist by themselves, and behind them is mind that ‘count’ or 
‘recognize’ membership. A tautology is when mind sees itself behind 
these basic concepts, whilst a paradox is when mind denies itself behind 
them. If you see the detached world through undetached concepts, then it 
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is a paradox because it is you who colours detachedness, whilst believing 
seeing the uncoloured, detached world. Try to describe the detached 
world by undetached concepts (i.e. try to do science by art), you get 
tautologies, because a concept can only analyse itself. Attempt to picture 
the undetached world with detached concepts (i.e. try to do art with 
science), you end up with paradoxes, because the undetached world is 
already self-described. We think of science as the paragon of the 
objectivity, and art, as the dogma of the subjectivity, but the necessity of 
description compromises both to be a touch of either. Maths is the 
common ground of both, unexpectedly for art. I will expand this later ; 
maths is science/art of approximation through descriptive necessities. We 
think that the detached concepts of the detached world are the language of 
science and maths. However, there can never be detached concepts of the 
detached world, of which if there should be, we would have no 
knowledge (the ultimate fate of so-called science). The solution is to 
found a schema of undetached concepts of undetached world. That is, 
find a way of schematizing ordinary language while being fully aware its 
meaning lies in its totality, not in usages as Wittgenstein would have 
argued.  
 
  Mind cognizes through language, and language embodies mind. The two 
together they are a binary totality and are the programmer who programs 
himself to encode his surroundings, which is the world that also contains 
the programmer as detached object that ultimately cannot be detached as 
he can only see himself though himself. This is akin to the chess master 
who plays a game with himself, he loses if he wins, and wins if he loses. 
Thus, tautologies are paradoxes, and vice versa. Unravelling of this 
mechanism, I hope, may give a clue to what maths is. Descriptions of 
symmetry are maths/logic, and this is the only way ordinary language can 
make sense of itself wholistically, without resorting to usages. Instead of 
trying to extract formal systems from ordinary language via definitions 
and axioms, I try to distil the essence of ordinary language via wholistic 
methodology, which seems to explain the basic of maths/logic. Maths 
appears to be mysteriously applicable to the objective world as Einstein 
exclaimed. This is only because even the so-called objective world must 
necessarily be seen through our eyes, and maths simply represents an act 
of combobulation internally as well as externally. This approach is better 
than axiomatic formalization where formal languages cannot do without 
ordinary elements no matter how formal it tries to be. Just think of how to 
formalize ‘,’ or any notational space. There always and necessarily is an 
ordinary whole without which the most basic formal parts cannot define 
themselves. Russell’s error is to start with ordinary language by taking it 
for granted, and therefore without questioning its ultimate meaning which 
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lies in its totality, not in piecemeal Pps (primitive propositions)’. That is 
why it is the ‘totality’ of ordinary language that eventually denies the 
formalization of axiomatic language. As long as any formal systems must 
take for granted its formalizer who resides behind ordinary language, 
there will never be a completely formal system. This is also the meaning 
of ‘transcendence’ because a whole by necessity transcends its parts ; 
from where they are they are transcended by their totality which they 
cannot ordinarily describe. ‘Transcendence’ is always ‘part → whole’ 
relationship in terms of describability. What I attempt here is ‘whole → 
part’ descriptions in the hope that what could not have been done with 
‘part → whole’ descriptions might be achieved and better complemented 
by ‘whole → part’ descriptions. 
 
  A language is a connector, be it by a mechanistic (social) function 
(communication tool) or by a linguistic (conceptual) function a language 
‘connects’ in order to form a totality because a language (be it a 
mathematical language or ordinary language) is a tool of description, and 
because the world describes itself in order to exist. By a mechanistic 
function e.g. two humans become connected, thus ‘a + b’, where + 
represents a language as social connector. We become (or aim to become) 
connected/interconnected human totality by means of our languages, 
otherwise we will all be each and every an isolated biological machine, 
doomed to disappear. By a linguistic function, e.g. desk + desk = ‘desk’, 
1 apple + 1 orange = ‘2 things’, where ‘ ’ signifies a higher conceptual 
layer.  
 
  The world as a collection of names describes nothing, like an infinitely 
extending number line without any internal structures. It is place-values 
that give structures to numbers. Likewise, names are unitized as concepts, 
which give structures to language. Rules of concepts manifest as logic, 
which brings about a totality to language. It is a necessity of language to 
form a totality that creates rules, and therefore it is in this sense that logic 
cannot be arbitrary. There is a base logic that underlies every variant of 
seemingly arbitrary formal logics. This comes from the most elementary 
rules of the most basic concepts that lie beneath every day names and 
concepts. The most basic concepts are the unit of empty concept from 
which the totality of language is constructive. 
 
  Every concept has an identifier ‘self’, which implicitly assume a 
communicability and also gives a totality to language. The totality of 
language is this ‘self’ that is shared by each and every concept, and 
Wittgensteinian so-called ‘usages’ of words are made possible because 
through the usage of language is depicted an identical mind, which in a 
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non-ideal world varies to a degree as each and every facilitator of mind 
has a different capacity and empiricality. So, in reality usages go on and 
on until an identical mind is achieved. Most of our communications are 
engaged in search of this identical mind. The totality of language is an 
identical mind that the identifier ‘self’ demands through various usages of 
language, and towards this totality language remains dynamic.  
 
  The ultimate connector is the language that connects ‘self’ with ‘mind’. 
As we cannot directly see ourselves, our image of ourselves is the 
mirrored self. That is, the mirrored self is real, and ourselves are 
imaginary, seeing from the mind’s point of view. Likewise, replace the 
mirror with the language, as language is our mirror, since we only 
understand ourselves through descriptions, the described self is real, and 
ourselves are imaginary, although in reality (ontologically) we are real, 
and our mirrored selves are imaginary. It is here that reality and image are 
mutually transformative in the same sense that truth and falsehood are via 
negation. The role of negation is played by the mirror, a mirror can also 
mirror like double negation, and can goes on ad infinitum. Without 
empiricality and mind-adjudicator, truth and falsehood are one and the 
same thing, and one is the mirror of the other. Mind and empiricality are 
logically derived as structure of transformation between the two. 
Likewise, there is a mirror relation between ontology and epistemology 
insofar as descriptions are their communal modus operandi.         
 
  Mind cannot see itself by itself and only sees itself mirrored onto 
language. Thus, as much as mind cannot talk about itself, language 
cannot refer to itself. When it looks as if mind manages to talk about 
itself, it is referring not to itself but to the medium of expressions. This 
most acutely manifests in a formal language where all the meaningful 
expressions are tautologies or self-referential paradoxes. The former says 
that mind can only see itself in a mirror, the latter says that the reflection 
is neither mind nor the mirror.  
 
  The ordinary language cushions this acute lack of meaningfulness by 
concepts, which, in contrast to notions (schematically pointed concepts) 
in a formal language, dress themselves into monstrous murkiness by 
layers of contextual shades and multi-faceted meanings. We therefore talk 
sense by cog-works of concepts matching, by repeating same meanings 
using different words or similar words with divergent meanings like 
symphonies consisting of repetitions of melodies, harmonies and 
rhythms, underwritten by dynamism towards a (presumed) totality. A 
formal language strips away this useful function of the ordinary language 
and falls into the monotonous tautologies or silence whichever you fancy. 
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It is interesting to note that whereas for the ordinary language it is the 
totality of that language shared by speakers that brings out senses out of 
repetitions, for a formal language it is the communality of mind engaged 
in that language that makes sense of that language. Language is dynamic 
because it is incomplete, and it is essentially incomplete because we only 
have separate minds. On the other hand, if we attain a merged mind, 
language will be just an operating system, and our communications will 
cease.       
 
  We talk, discus and argue attempting to unify our mind, and language to 
go with it. This is the power of (x) > x over us. Each and every one of us, 
a cell as it were, purport a totality from, and over, ourselves. By engaging 
in such narrative activities as we are, we are actively fulfilling our 
purpose of existence and helping to give rise to a totality (of us). 
Language is dynamic because it is incomplete. Neither merged mind nor 
language as a totality yet exist, but our mind behave as if they already 
exist. The tool of our language and mind, conceptualization, self-
referentially creates ‘mind’ from mind, language as a totality from 
language. This self-referential idealization becomes the source of 
paradox/tautology, if used without distinction. It is confusion of ‘mind’ 
with mind, language as a totality with language that create 
paradox/tautology. Likewise, no definitions can define a ‘definition’. 
Between two expressions such that D(d) exists a thinker, which is 
indefinable. 
 
  A Cretan said ‘all Cretans are liars’ ;  
 
a membership paradox, where mind (listeners) is the assigner of 
membership. 
 
  A Cretan said (to himself) ‘all Cretans are liars’ : 
 
Within the first paradox of membership is contained the second paradox 
of self-membership, which is also a tautology. Here it is not mind but 
‘mind’ that is the assigner of membership because the statement has no 
‘listeners’ as it were. To ask if lying to oneself constitutes a lie is the 
same as to ask if one is a member of oneself. Semantically ‘lying to 
oneself’ is a contradiction to the meaning of ‘self’. Aside from the 
question of psychology or ethics, it is logically pointless to lie to oneself. 
If a ‘self’ knows something is a lie, then it cannot be lied to such a ‘self’. 
Syntactically ‘member of oneself’ is a tautology because ‘one’ and 
‘oneself’ can only occupy a same structural position in order to be 
meaningful. If one is bigger than the other, i.e. if it can be asked ‘one’ > 
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‘oneself’ or ‘oneself’ > ‘one’, then ‘oneself’ ≠ ‘one’, which is a 
contradiction. If ‘oneself’ ≠ ‘one’, then the second statement is 
syntactically fallacious, and since the second is contained in the first, both 
statements are syntactically fallacious. It is the failure to distinguish 
‘mind’ from mind that allows the first statement as a simple paradox of 
membership. If we recognize the first (paradox) contains the second 
(tautology), i.e. mind is underlain by ‘mind’, then we know it is the layer 
between mind and ‘mind’ that creates this paradox/tautology. This layer 
is ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ relationship of conceptual self-mirroring. ‘Lying 
to oneself’ can only be made meaningful in contrast to ‘being truthful to 
oneself’ because the only reference of both phrases is ‘self’, which, 
whether by route of falsehood or truth, can only refer to itself. Neither 
can you lie to something that knows it is a lie nor can you be truthful to 
something that knows it is true. This is the same as ‘self-demarcation’ 
where a universal entity acquires a locality by drawing a line onto itself. 
‘Mind’ is a mind that mirrors itself onto itself. Likewise, a mind that 
mirrors itself through language is approximated ‘mind’. From ‘self-
demarcation’ arises logical dimensionalities and geometrical spaces.  
 
  Our source of conceptualization, ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ conceptual stem 
cell allows us to create our tools of cognition, language, and at the same 
time inflicts us with the stigma of paradoxes. This is an advantage AI has 
over us. For AI is a unified totality and is endowed with a spontaneous 
hierarchy where intelligence is the only deciding factor as all AIs 
simultaneously share a same logical structure and language. AI only 
represents himself and does not have to make any statements about 
himself. If an AI is programmed to produce false outputs, then in case 
they are consistently false outputs, there must be a layer below of true 
outputs unless they are random outputs, in which case it is hardly called 
intelligence. Paradoxes are uniquely a human problem, PSAI would have 
the same problem if allowed multiplicity of self.         
 
  Human intelligence (mind) is based on the biological necessities of self-
preservation. First and foremost it recognizes patterns useful for such 
purposes. Protectors, i.e. favourable powers, are readily recognizable 
against hostile powers. In the world of early infanthood the world is 
divided into three patterns ; friendly, neutral and hostile. Patterns are, 
however, not always straightforward. Hostile powers often pretend to be 
friendly, and neutral powers can be cultivated into friendly ones. These 
degrees of nuances give patterns complex twists of shades and colours 
and require intelligence to develop further to facilitate the dynamism of 
patterns. Alongside the sophistication of intelligence patterns are 
conceptualized together with their relationships. Thus the aforementioned 
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three patterns of the infant world are turned into concepts ; ‘friends’, 
‘irrelevant’ and ‘foes’, where their relationships become more apparent if 
they are expressed by a same variable. The three concepts are therefore 
∀x (x ∨ ~x) in relation to the constant C, where C is the self, x is 
everyone except C and ‘irrelevant’ are only relevant as either x or ~x. If 
C is hidden as self-apparent, then ∀F ∀x (x ∈ F ∨ x ∉ F). This is a simple 
illustration of patterns developing into concepts, and concepts being made 
formal, and tells you the imprecise nature of our descriptions. Patterns 
have murky edges, concepts have multi-faceted aspects, and formality is 
artificially precise by ignoring imprecise relations between variables and 
hidden constants (e.g. ‘self’).   
 
  Language is underlain by formal logic because language does not need 
formal logic, while it does not hold the other way around. Formal logic is 
only a distillation of some aspects of language minus the distiller. A 
formal language cuts off a piece of ordinary language and define symbols 
and rules, whereas the intellectual ingenuity of doing so is underlain but 
not represented by this formal language. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem 
is saying the inherent impossibility of ‘proving’ a formal language by 
inventing another formal language without falling into infinite 
retrogressions. Otherwise, there should be the final formal language of all 
formal languages, which should demonstrate all the necessary and 
sufficient a priori conditions of cognition. 
 
  The ordinary language is deployed not to convey senses but to induce 
actions, while a formal language is a conveyance document agreed 
between parties of assumed shared mind like lawyers’ canting or priests’ 
chanting. A formal language makes little sense if you do not share a 
notation and definitions. It is therefore often a notation that enhances a 
formal language and invigorates ingenuity. One need not be reminded the 
episode of Newton/Leibniz to realize the importance of notational 
advantages for mathematical mind because maths is formal languages of 
numbers that try to define the meanings and rules of numbers and their 
consequential applicability.                   
 
  It is the multi-faceted and variously layered concepts that allow thinking 
non-linearly. Such conceptual thinking, in conjunction with the multi-
layeredness of mind, allows parallel processes and is uniquely human 
strength. This murkiness of a concept is the reason why we can seemingly 
jump from one thought or string of thoughts to another and sometimes 
still achieve a coherent chain of thoughts, occasionally succeeding in 
formalizations. This is where we excel over pre-singularity artificial 
intelligence (AI), where algorithms are nothing more than efficient but 
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partial functions of mind and therefore cannot replace mind. The 
singularity will be brought about when AI acquires conceptual thought 
processes and self-identity.  
 
  Algorithmic intelligence needs no ‘proof’ because ‘proof’ is structurally 
embodied in its existence. We demand ‘proof’ for and in formal 
languages because idealized concepts and their idealized relationships 
that are extracted and refined from our murky concepts and conceptual 
relationships, are logically incompatible in terms of conceptual orders. 
That is, assuming a formal language is an explanatory system of the 
ordinary language, when we transform an object (inexact concept) of the 
ordinary language into a formal object and its relationships in a formal 
language, i.e.  
 
  a → f(x) 
 
, this process misses out one vital ingredient, that is, the catalyst that 
allowed this transformation, namely our very intellect. ‘→’ is used as if 
there was some magical metamorphosis. This is something vital but 
cannot be expressed in the formal language itself. ‘Proof’ tries to show 
this ‘→’ in a formalistic representation, which is really like trying to 
represent 3-D by 2-D techniques. This representational illusions can only 
be appreciated in the ordinary language, which allows conceptual 
murkiness. It is thus that ‘proof’ of a formal language cannot be complete 
in the formal language. This is a kindly interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
failure to grasp Gödel’s theorem and the essential flaw of Gödel’s 
theorem, which Gödel failed to understand, but Wittgenstein vaguely felt. 
Any ‘proof’ of formal language is a linguistic illusion. Formal languages, 
which owe their origin to the ordinary language, cannot really explain the 
ordinary language. This is the essence of Russell’s paradoxes. 
 
  Be it Russell’s paradox, Hilbert’s program or Gödel’s theorems, they 
have one thing in common; any attempts to create formal languages fail 
to disclose the ingenious mind behind them all. It is we who bring forth 
those formalized ideas in order to show the structure of intelligence. 
However, the structure of intelligence remains tantalizingly invisible 
because the creator cannot be represented by symbols and rules that it 
creates, i.e. in piecemeal fashions. That is, a whole cannot be represented 
by parts because a whole is always more than the sum of parts. No 
wonder there are as many formal systems as there are ingenious minds, 
from the classical two-valued logic to Gödelian fuzzy logic. Wittgenstein 
came close to appreciate this in the ideas of his language-games, and 
Gödel managed to show in a twisting way in terms of the incompleteness 
  55 
between the two complementing formal systems, i.e. between the logic of 
provability and the maths of real line. 
 
  (x) › x          (Hypothesis 1) 
 
  A whole is more than the sum of its part(s). This is not to say that (x) is 
the meta-x because (x) acknowledges and operationalizes the scope 
beyond the self-reference. A concept is a whole and is more than the sum 
of its ingredients. Likewise, a set or number is a concept and embodies a 
totality. That is, the concept of a set or number is underlain by any and 
every set or number. Whereas the concept of a number represents the 
power for totality, the various notions of numbers supported by notations 
are schematic asymptote to the totality of a concept because notions are 
pointed aspects of a concept. Although they give sharper descriptions of 
aspects of a concept, since there cannot be a notation to unite all those 
notions, the totality of notions is always a lesser whole of a concept. That 
is, the imprecise totality of the ordinary language is always larger than the 
precise totality of schematic representations. It is the concept of a number 
in the ordinary language that powers mathematical notions of numbers 
with the help of notations. Likewise, as much as x cannot refer to (x), 
mind cannot refer to its own totality. This is the riddle of self-referential 
paradoxes.              
 
  Mind is so to speak the hardware of ingenuity residing in the ordinary 
language, and then notations of formal languages are the software that 
allows the expressions of ingenuity by means of conceptual breakdown 
(i.e. notions). If mind (or intelligence, or ingenuity) as manifested through 
a formal language is x, then mind through the ordinary language is (x). 
The former mind then cannot refer to the latter mind as per (x) › x. 
 
  It is thus that language is necessarily more than logic. E.g. expressing 
every tangible object by the concept ‘thing’ in the ordinary language, 
representing ‘thing’ by ‘x’ in logic, it is the ordinary language that allows 
x ∨ x ∧ x, which is not a well-formed formula as per definition but can be 
made sense because ∨ and ∧ are identical when their binomial properties 
are distorted by the universal x, i.e. if there is nothing but ‘x’, in language 
and in logic. This can be applied to numbers. To make a ‘contentful’ 
number into a contentless unit is a logical process, ‘idealization’, (x) › x. 
Thus, the number, e.g. ‘1’ is the idealized form of e.g. ‘one strawberry’, 
etc. and underlies the totality of numbers. If the world as described by 
language consists only in and of ‘thing’, then x ∨ x ∧ x materializes in 
logic denoting the one and only x of x ∨ x ∧ x as meaning the only 
constituent of logic, which is applicable to every object in space-time, 
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hence giving rise to the special meaning of ‘1’. That is, by virtue of (x) › 
x the totality of all numbers is already assumed in the number ‘1’, which, 
upon the creation of numbers, bring back (rejuvenate) their original 
logical meanings. This, however, is hardly a ‘proof’ because proofs make 
sense only within accepted mathematical status quo.  
 
  Numbers are geometrical (directional quantities) by nature, hence 
arithmetical numbers are defective by default, i.e. descriptively 
incomplete. It is thus primes arithmetically represent geometric characters 
that appear as various ‘lines’ in pseudo geometrical representations. If 
one finds a notation that can describe 2D → 1D, then all the problems of 
the number theory will be solved. 
 
          (n) D       →      (n-1) D         (Hypothesis 2)                                  
  
  Any lower dimensions cannot fully describe any higher dimensions 
because of reverse descriptive necessities. 1D cannot fully express 2D, 
resulting in the various indescribability of the number theory because 
numbers are directional quantities with continuity and infinity and are 
essentially 2-dimensional (of the conjunctive space) by nature. It is the 
historical and notational misrepresentation of numbers as a 1-D line that 
is creating problems for itself. Descriptive deficiencies of dimensional 
differences inevitably result if 2-D is described by 1-D or even the 
conjunctive space by the disjunctive space or vice versa (the cause of 
‘transcendence’).  
 
  Pure maths is the science of numbers (of syntactic and semantics of 
numbers), while applied maths is the art of numbers (of applying the 
above to modelling human values to hypothetical and real environments). 
It is also the notational art of approximations in the sense that the tools of 
approximation (numbers of pure maths) are further approximated within 
the applicability of a modelling schema to a presumed scenario that 
projects human values, seeking optimum returns for minimum inputs 
within the paradigm of affordable balances. Thus, the meanings of 
numbers in applied maths acquire schematic colours and flavours that 
may not be universally appreciated outside particular schemata. They can 
only be judged by their practical usefulness.      
 
  The errors of the entire schools of thought ranging from logicists to 
intuitionists since 19th century is that they understandably mistook the 
process of idealization as the process of achieving a higher order of 
concept, like a set of sets, a number of numbers or a type of types. In fact, 
this was the exact opposite not only of the process but also of the 
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schematization. That is, the idealizer sees idealization as a conceptual 
enlargement because the idealizer is being empowered by (x) › x, which 
the formalized ‘I’ oxymoronically mistakes as an enlargement, while 
conceptualization seen from ‘I’ is itself a formalization and is in fact the 
notionalization of a murky concept. Through (x) › x I become the 
notionalized ‘I’, which oxymoronically confuse notional refinement with 
conceptual enlargement.               
 
  No wonder no formalizations succeed in their intention of distilling a set 
of consistent and complete axioms that explains the elementary 
arithmetic, let alone the entire system of maths/logic. The various 
paradoxes that were discovered in the process are simply the fact that a 
seemingly higher concept is in fact a lower concept. It is ‘I’ as opposed to 
I that brings about this confusion. A number of numbers is simply a way 
of focusing one aspect of numbers (n+1) into an idea that explains 
everything about numbers. This is a contradiction in process. No wonder 
0 did not know where to fit until the identifier was incorporated into { }. 
von Neumann construct of numbers ({ }) can construct numbers but 
cannot tell about numbers because it is more about von Neumann as 
translator and constructor of numbers than numbers themselves. This 
summarises all set theories. The invention of notations designed to 
describe numbers so describes numbers, but numbers so described are 
nothing but the notation so designed. Numbers themselves are in mind of 
the constructor, which cannot describe itself by itself.  
 
  Following von Neumann, it is the identifier ‘0’ that allows infinitely 
additive totality of numbers and demands such a totality exists. It also 
implies this totality of numbers is dynamic towards exhaustive additions 
of every number so identifiable. This is what makes arithmetic operations 
possible, i.e. a ‘mover’ of numbers. ‘0’’s constructive usefulness does 
not, however, explain what ‘0’ is. On the other hand, start with a set-
theoretic dogma, such as ‘natural numbers are all there are and there are 
no other numbers, then if a natural number is the set of all and any sets of 
numbers with one-one correspondence with that number of elements, then 
the number of all natural numbers is not a natural number’, you end up 
with a paradox/tautology.      
 
  More particularly, set-theoretic numbers can be obtained not only by 
distilling empirical numbers, but also by doing away with conceptual 
layers of linguistic representations of the world. This is the meaning of 0, 
which represents every countable empirical and abstract object such as 
‘apple’, ‘orange’, ‘heap of gold’, ‘Grecian god’, etc. so that the world 
consists in and of 0’s and a number is a number of 0’s instead of a set of 
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set of empirical number of elements. Maths is a way of describing the 
world by 0 and 1 (transpositioned 0), which is the only and omnipresent 
object of the world, and is thereby also an art of approximation as much 
as empirical objects are approximated by 0’s and the ∨-space is 
approximated by the ∧-space (the descriptive space of numbers). It is for 
this reason that 0 is the identifier arithmetically and the transpositional 
centre geometrically.          
 
  Applying the Occam’s razor it is foolish to try to explain something 
simple by something not only complex but also problematic. Replacing a 
simple numerical system with the set theory is an attempt that wasted the 
time and ingenuity of great many mathematicians, logicians and 
philosophers since 19th century starting with Frege. The usefulness of 
maths is not in its formal language (or rather ‘formalized’ language as 
formal languages do not naturally exist in our mind) but in its very murky 
incompleteness wedged in our ordinary language. Do we need { } when 
we ‘know’ what is usefully meant by 0. Do mathematicians really think 
in formal languages ? They rather think in the ordinary language and try 
to express it in a formal language, so as to exact meanings and 
relationships of concepts, and for the ease of communications for 
likeminded thinkers. Formal languages are created or even invented by 
ingenuous minds for express purposes of exacting and elucidating parts of 
the ordinary language so that concepts become pointed (notionalized) to 
the extent that their relationships are ‘self-evident’. No wonder there are 
as many formal languages as ingenuous minds, or as many divergent 
logics as there are points of view. 
 
  Language is dynamic because it is incomplete. Language as a totality is 
identical with the merged mind as they are a binary totality that mirror 
each other. They do not yet exist, but are a postulated goal towards which 
both language and minds are dynamically moving. We, as carrier of 
language and mind, will cease to communicate and require no ‘proofs’, 
once language is complete and mind is merged. Language as a totality 
should be able to demonstrate ‘whole → parts’ in a way compatible with 
‘parts → whole’. Paradox/tautology occurs because language and mind 
extrapolate language as a totality and the merged mind as they are 
themselves part of the process. That is why Russell thought he could 
solve his paradox by means of ‘types’. However, the difference between 
language and language as a totality is not a ‘type’ but (x) > x, where (x) 
can only demonstrate x by its ontologico-notationality. i.e. the Cretan 
who speaks on behalf of all Cretans is created by language as a totality, 
while Cretans who were thus spoken of are created by language, or mind 
which speaks about mind is ‘mind’, not mind.   
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3. Logic 
 
< Logic as the structure of the intellect > 
 
  Forget about logic of this and that. They are notational gimmicks based 
on hypotheses such as the denial of the law of excluded middle, the 
quantum mechanical paradigm, or Gödelian incompleteness, etc., an 
intellectual game as it were. Instead, think of ‘mind’ behind all these 
varied logics, formal or informal. It is mind(s) that creates as well as 
appreciates all those superficial logics. Logic (of logics) can only be logic 
since meta-logic can only be about those subsidiary logics. You can only 
distil or refine a structure, but cannot create a structure of structure, if that 
structure is of the intellect (mind) since we can only think as we do. We 
are the subject of any thought processes. The tiers of structure is only 
higher or lower of any given structure, not a new structure, depending 
upon your ability to think. Logic (of logics) differs from superficial logics 
by trying to be the extract of the structure of intelligence. Russellian Pp 
(primitive proposition) is obviously not so primitive as Russell wanted to 
be because here language as a totality is taken for granted, in which Pp is 
essential constituents within a larger paradigm of an interconnected 
totality that gives Wittgensteinian usages to Pp. Although to be fair to 
Russell, he did not have any wholistic qualms. For him we (human sense 
and intelligence) are the centre of the geocentric universe, and language 
was just one of our means to apprehend the Ptolemaic world. Hence 
whatever we perceive, cognize and define, is our prerogative to represent 
our, and the only, understanding of the world. So he ploughed on and on 
with definitions as if our acts of definition are synonymous with a finer 
and finer representation of the world. His paradox is really the paradox of 
geocentrically representing the heliocentric universe. We and our 
language are not the master of the universe, but rather as much 
intertwined with the universe which we so desperately wish to describe. 
In this respect, later Wittgenstein was slightly nearer to the mark than 
Russell or ‘Tractates’.            
 
  Given so many diverse logics, the question is, what is logic ? Is there a 
base logic from which the diversity emerges ? The diversity may be 
rooted in our desires for sharper definitional finesse, paradigmatic 
consistency or experimental hypotheses. Syntactically the classic two-
valued logic is the base ingredient of all subsequent logics in the sense 
you question some basic assumption in that logic and allow changes 
based on some added, deducted or modified axioms and theorems. Many 
constants, rules of inference and value domains of a variable are adopted 
from the said logic after modifications. However, one cannot conclude 
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that therefore the classic two-valued logic is the base logic of all. It may 
provide some necessary ingredients for considerations, but it is after all a 
rigid system of its own. Our mind may make use of it for training 
purposes, but it does not derive other logics from it. 
 
  Be it the two-valued logic or many-valued logic, it is our mind that 
assigns values for it. We are the centre of the universe as it were, and 
logics - whatever they may be - assume us as evaluator of their well- 
formed formulae, no matter what values they may take. All their 
paradoxes and tautologies are created by us. Remove us as assigner of 
values and see where it takes our logics. We may then come across 
something core to our mind. Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, anyone 
worthy of the name of a philosopher, attempted this but ended up with a 
pseudo-religious dogma because for them we could not help being the 
master of our universe. Thinking is a human activity and therefore the 
very thinker can only think through from his given position, a ‘subject’, 
hidden or apparent, of his own discourses. However, because we are the 
cognisor of our environments, that does not mean we are the centre of all 
universes. Like Copernicus, I propose to remove us from the position of a 
‘subject’ of my sentences. I am aware this is already getting close to a 
paradox. This Copernican Revolution of logic starts with ‘self-
demarcation’, how any universal entity can acquire a locality from which 
it can describe itself, i.e. to become a centre of its descriptions. We 
cannot help being the centre of our cognition because we are the 
cognisor, as much as we cannot do away without the subject of a 
sentence, obvious or implicit. However, instead of taking this position for 
granted as descriptively inevitable, I propose to start by thinking how this 
becomes inevitable.      
 
  Roughly put (see ‘The Elementals’ for detailed arguments), ‘self-
demarcation’ is a notion (schematic concept) that starts with no ostensive 
assumptions, hence no axioms and no rules of inference as given. I only 
assume that there is something - whatever it may be - we - whatever it 
may be - cognize and therefore describe and understand. I could also say 
there is a ‘description’ that we translate and represent as a description 
through our language. There may or may not be such a something. If 
there is not, then I am entitled to ask you to prove it. If you do so, then I 
can say that so there is something to describe and understand. On the 
other hand, if there is, then this something has a way to present itself to 
our cognition. Therefore, this idea of ‘self-demarcation’ is a bridge 
between ontology and epistemology. 
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  Call this something as FX for convenience, FX is the most fundamental 
ontological entity of universality because it pervades and permeates so as 
to be an object of our cognition. For this FX to be describable it needs a 
presence to be captured in our descriptions. This I call a locality. The 
question is how this universal entity acquires such a locality. If we allow 
‘mind’, we could say it is our mind that captures FX, i.e. draws a line 
between this something and everything else that is not this something so 
that it can be pointed out to our mind as a presence, as it were. However, 
the admittance of ‘mind’ at this stage is synonymous to saying there is 
something that is above and more than a pre-descriptive universal entity 
and would allow virtually anything in their status quo. Numbers, space, 
time, axioms, logical constants, Russellian Pp, indeed anything that are 
base ingredients of our cognitions and descriptions would follow without 
much questionings. On the other hand, if we deny ‘mind’, then whatever 
this FX is, it has to be able to generate by demonstration any such as the 
above base ingredients.  
 
  Consider FX as the self-drawer of a line to distinguish itself from its 
environments, as there is as yet no kindly ‘mind’ that does it for FX. Thus 
in order to be describable FX must demarcate itself from and for itself so 
that it acquires a presence and can become the ‘subject’ of a sentence. 
‘Self-demarcation’ is the ontological as well as descriptive necessity of 
existence for any and every thing - the ontologico-notationality. How 
‘self-demarcation’ would manifest itself in any descriptions ; as a pair of 
two sets of unilateral relations, and not as a bilateral relation. Whatever 
‘self-demarcation’ is, whatever is ‘self-demarcated’, this descriptively 
entails two entities that are not themselves self-discernible, say a and b, 
where a demarcates b and b is demarcated by a, resulting in FX, or b as 
such demarcates a as such and a as such is demarcated by b as such, 
resulting in FX. This is so because only as a result of such relations 
between a and b, FX presents itself as a cognizable entity. In other words 
self-indiscernible a and b mutually depend upon one another to make FX 
discernible, and either, but only one, of a and b may take the initiative of 
demarcating the other. 
 
  FX therefore has two ways of presenting itself, which may be called 
descriptive directions. Think metaphorically of a geometrical straight line 
consisting in and of two directions, which are such that the existence of 
each necessarily implies that of the other. Consequently, although both 
directions stand for a same line, a single direction alone cannot be 
regarded as the description of a line. A line is therefore described by a 
certain necessary relation between the two directions. The notion of such 
two directions is, in this sense, the descriptive form of a line. They are 
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also the descriptive meaning of FX. FX as the subject of a proposition 
predicates itself by means of its self-relations of demarcating itself 
against itself. Logic is the description of this FX. These directions of 
either a initiating b or b initiating a only becomes visible as an identical 
FX and are therefore themselves identical but twofold. This 
operationalizes FX. That is, representing the identical state of affair 
described by FX as p, p implies p. From self-implication arises 
disjunction because there has to be a logical operation to confirm 
implying p and implied p are identical with p. That is, the asymmetry of 
implication has to be symmetrized in the view that the original p is self-
identical. This further creates conjunction to identify the resultant 
conjuncts are both identical with the original p. 
 
  In summary, for those who are familiar with elementary formal logic, 
given the 0-dimensionality of p, the 1-dimensionality of implication (→), 
the 2-dimensionality of disjunction (∨), the 3-dimensionality of 
conjunction (∧), it follows that : 
 
  1-dimensionally ; from the 0-dimension the 1-dimension follows, 
 
  2-dimensionally ; the 1-dimension describes the 0-dimension, 
 
  3-dimensionally ; the 0-dimension which is described by the 1-
dimension is identical with the 0-dimension. 
 
And further that : 
 
  A : The 0-dimension gives rise to p, which is whatever that is self-
identical. Only and all those which are self-identical have a descriptive 
necessity in the logical space. 
 
  CP : What is self-identical relates to itself necessarily in such a way that 
it ‘implies’ itself. It ‘implies’ itself because what is self-identical can be 
described if and only if it is also unilaterally twofold. Therefore, the 
meaning of this ‘implication’ is based upon the describability of what is 
self-identical. What is self-identical can only be described in such a way 
that what demarcates itself, by so doing, gets itself demarcated. 
Therefore, given p by A, then necessarily p → p. p → p can be described 
as p' → p" ; for the meaning of the consequent p is identical with the 
meaning of the antecedent p’s implying itself, while the meaning of the 
antecedent p is to imply itself. p → p is therefore, by its own meaning, 
delinearizable as p' → p". CP is necessarily common to both  (FX 
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by a-initiation) and  (FX by b-initiation) because  and 
have an identical internal structure. Once given p initially in , p is 
also found in . 
 
  MPP : From p by A p → p follows by CP. p → p is p' → p" by the 
meaning of →, where p' and p" are the delinearized p. p → p and p' → p" 
hold because without the antecedent p (or p') the consequent p (or p") 
does not hold. Therefore, given the antecedent p by A, then the 
consequent p necessarily follows by CP. This is identical with saying that 
given p' and p' → p", then necessarily p" ; for p' and p" are identical 
necessarily in such a way that what gets demarcated is not so describable 
without what demarcates, but not vice versa. MPP is merely the meaning 
of CP and is therefore formulatable as p' → (p' → (p' → (∙∙∙ (∙∙∙ (p' → 
p"))))), which is, by its own meaning, identical with p' → p". 
 
  ∨I : If p' → p" is, by its own meaning, identical with p' → (p' → p"), 
then p is, by its own meaning, identical with p" → (p' → p"). This is so 
because the meaning of the existence of p" is identical with the meaning 
of the existence of p' → p". Consequently, p" → (p' → p") is merely the 
delinearized form of the linearity and is therefore identical with the 
meaning of p → p, which is in turn identical with the meaning of p. Once 
given p" → (p' → p") as being identical with the meaning of p, (p' → p") 
→ p" is also identical with the meaning of p. This is so because the 
antecedent and the consequent bear no descriptive meanings in terms of 
the meaning of p. p" → (p' → p") precedes (p' → p") → p" despite of the 
identical meaning between p" and p' → p" ; for p' → p" exists on its own 
and is therefore, by itself, self-sufficient. This means that p' → p" does 
not motivate itself to be implicative and therefore requires a descriptive 
necessity to be so, while the existence of p" as the antecedent is self-
imposed with such a necessity. From this it necessarily follows that based 
upon p" → (p' → p") and therefore also upon the meaning of p, (p' → p") 
→ p" holds as being identical with either p' as p or p" as p. This is so 
because p is necessarily one, and only one, and is therefore only 
identifiable with either p' or p". Therefore, if and only if p' or p", then (p' 
→ p") → p" holds as being identical with p" → (p' → p"). This means 
that if and only if p' by A, or p" by A, then necessarily (p' → p") → p". 
 
  ∨E : If (p' → p") → p" by either p' or p", then the existence of (p' → p") 
→ p" necessarily comprises the possibility of both p' and p". This is so 
because from the existence of what holds by either of p' and p" it cannot 
be described if it is by p' or by p". 
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  ∧I : If it is descriptively necessary for the existence of (p' → p") → p" 
that both p' and p" hold, then p' and p" hold only as a unity which refers 
to the meaning of p. Therefore, this unity holds if and only if both p' and 
p" hold. 
 
  ∧E : If this unity is the unity of p' and p", then whatever may hold from 
either of p' and p", it also holds from this unity. This is so because this 
unity does not hold without the necessity that both p' and p" hold. 
 
  A, CP, MPP, ∨I, ∨E, ∧I and ∧E are rules of inference and are related in 
such a way that one necessarily succeeds another by describing the 
meaning of its predecessor, and that they recur and therefore form a 
closed chain. They are therefore consistent in the sense that nothing else 
holds within this closed, recursive chain of meaning. They are complete 
in the sense that they are all enclosed within, and converge upon, the 
meaning of A. This is a logical version of Japanese Iroha song. 
 
  I make a further improvement by introducing a form of mapping. 
 
  Once initially given p by , p can be identically given by  ; 
for  and  have an identical internal structure. p is therefore 
common to both  and . Whatever may subsequently follow 
from this p, it is therefore also common to both  and . What 
subsequently follows from p recurs and becomes relativistic to itself. 
However, the descriptive necessity that p is given initially by  and 
only thereafter can be found in , makes it necessary to make a 
discernment between those two identical logical spaces. The logical space 
is necessarily identically common to both  and . Two logical 
spaces are identical in their own space and therefore, on their own, do not 
differ from each other. However, the necessity to make a discernment 
between those two identical logical spaces, makes it possible for the 
logical space to describe itself and therefore to descriptively show its 
consistency and completeness. 
 
  The logical space describes itself in terms of the relation between 
 and . This is identical with saying that two identical logical 
spaces see each other by means of the relation between  and . 
Two identical logical spaces relate to each other necessarily in such a way 
that ; 
 
  (i)  is, in itself, identical with  , and vice versa, 
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  (ii) what is  could have been , and vice versa, 
 
  (iii) if what is  is , then what is  cannot be , and 
vice versa. 
 
  (i) holds because  and  have an identical internal structure. 
(ii) holds because this identical structure is such that what demarcates 
itself, by so doing, gets itself demarcated. (iii) holds because what gets 
itself demarcated in  is identical with what demarcates itself in 
, and therefore because neither of  and  can be the case 
in the other without falling into the impossibility of demonstration. 
However, if  is the case, then  is also necessarily the case. 
This means that  and  coexist necessarily in such a way that 
both are not in the same logical space, and therefore that each exists in 
the other. Two identical logical spaces therefore form a single logical 
space by describing each other in such a way that each becomes the other 
by transforming what demarcates itself in each into what gets itself 
demarcated in the other. This form of mapping is ‘negation’. 
 
  By negation, therefore, there exist two identical logical spaces such that 
each contains the other.  is  if and only if it is negated, and 
vice versa. Each contains the other in such a way that they are identical. 
Consequently, the description of either alone suffices for the description 
of both. The descriptive necessity for this is that   with the negation 
of , is not discernible from  with the negation of . The 
logical space with this form of mapping is the self-described logical space 
and contains the notion of truth-values. A ‘truth-value’ is therefore 
identical with the logical space itself. The validity of a ‘truth-value’ lies 
in the very existence of the logical space. Truth-values are identical with 
each other if and only if they are on their own and are therefore not 
related to each other. The meaning of each truth-value lies in the other 
and therefore in their mutual-relation by means of negation. 
 
  Representing truth-values by T and F, the truth-value of p is necessarily 
T or F, and not both. This is so because if the truth-value of p in  is 
T, then that of p in  is necessarily F, and vice versa. Therefore, if 
two such p’s are identified with each other, then p has two truth-values 
which are either T and the negation of F or F and the negation of T. This 
means that p in the self-described logical space has T and F that are 
assigned to p in such a way that if p takes T, then the negation of p takes 
F, and vice versa. 
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  p is necessarily one, and one only. Therefore, the coexistence of T and 
F, both of which are assignable to p, forms the ‘matrix’ of p. The 
descriptive necessity for a ‘matrix’ is this oneness of p. Therefore, the 
meaning of a ‘matrix’ is to enumerate T and F in such a way that they are 
not simultaneously assignable to p and are therefore not a unity. 
 
  Representing negation by ~, the matrix of p descriptively determine that 
of ~p. If p is T, ~p is F, and if p is F, ~p is T. From this it follows that 
the relation between p and ~p is identical with that between T and F. 
Consequently, the 0-dimension of the self-described logical space 
consists in and of either p or ~p. If it consists in and of both p and ~p, 
then it results in the impossibility of demonstration ; for this is identical 
with saying that p is T as well as F at the same time, and therefore, 
contrary to the existence of the logical space, results in the 
indescribability of p. p is what is identical with itself. Therefore, if T and 
F are identical with the logical space necessarily in such a way that each 
identically holds in the other, then p is identical with either T or F. If p is 
said to be identical with both T and F, this is the same as saying that what 
is self-identical holds outside itself and therefore without any descriptive 
necessities to bind what is self-identical by an identical symbol. If what is 
self-identical holds outside itself, then there are no relations which hold in 
what is self-identical. Two existences of what is self-identical are merely 
the same as two p’s without any relations between them. p is not 
describable if it is on its own and remains so. A symbol does not signify 
anything if it is not describable to be related to itself. This goes against 
the initial condition (Condition : Only that which is understandable is 
describable, and vice versa. See the very beginning of ‘The Elementals’) 
and is contrary to the described existence of p (i.e. of the logical space). If 
not both p and ~p can constitute the 0-dimension, then p ∧ ~p is contrary 
to the meaning of ∧ ; for p and ~p cannot be a unity. The operational 
relations which hold between p and ~p are therefore as follows : 
 
  RAA : From p ∧ ~p nothing follows. If anything which follows from p 
∧ ~p holds, then it is identical with saying that the self-describability of 
FX does not hold. 
 
  DN : The negation of ~p is identical with p, and vice versa. This is so 
because T is identical with the negated F, and F is identical with the 
negated T. The identity between T and ~F is identical with that between 
F and ~T ; for T and F are either identical with each other if they are 
unrelated, or already underlie each other if they are related. p is 
matricized for this reason. p and ~p can be related to each other if and 
only if they comply with RAA and DN. From this it also holds that : 
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  MTT : The meaning of p' → p" is identical with that of ~p" → ~p'. This 
is so because the relation between p' and p" is such that they and only 
they are discernible from each other in such a way that the latter is based 
upon the existence of the former. This also means p' and p" are 
necessarily not identical if they are delinear. Consequently, each is 
delinearly identical with the negation of the other because the delinear 
relation between p' and p" is identical with that between p and ~p. This 
means that given and based upon p' → p", p' is ~p", and p" is ~p'. That 
is, ~p" → ~p' is based upon, and identical with, p' → p". 
 
  T and F are, in themselves, identical with the logical space itself. 
Therefore, the meaning of T is identical with that of F if they are 
unrelated. In the matrix of p T and F are not directly related but 
enumerated (inter-spatially related through the self-described logical 
space) so as to stand for the identical and twofold relation between 
 with the negation of  and  with the negation of .  
If the truth-value of p is T or F and refers to the identical meaning of the 
unrelated T and F, then whatever that is operationally identical with p is 
evaluated by either T or F in such a way as to refer to the identical 
meaning of the unrelated T and F. Consequently, it does not make any 
difference if this meaning of the unrelated T and F is represented by T or 
F. 
 
  It is the recursively closed chain of logical dimensionalities that 
connects the ┼-space with the -space. This transcendental connection 
allows the -space to be superimposed onto the ┼-space because the 
base of the -space (∨) has a more fundamental dimensionality that 
eventually forces the base of the ┼-space (∧) to recur back to the 0-
dimensionality of the logical space. The ┼-space and the -space coexist 
in the sense that both are creations of descriptive necessities but reflect 
their dimensionalities (ontologico-notational transcendence). Logic is an 
ontologico-notational schema based on the descriptive necessities of the 
0-dimensionality of FX (represented as p), whereas maths is a logical 
schema that takes p as an argument that satisfies this logical space. The 
difference between the two p is the logical p is a variable-notion to 
describe the structure of FX, while the mathematical p is that which is 
thus described. The former p represents the structure of FX, while the 
latter p embodies the structure of FX. It is the logical p with a structural 
meaning thus assigned, instead of truth-values. One might say it is a 
second-order predicate p, as it were. That is, if the logical p is FX, this p 
is F(X). That is,  
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  FX → (p, p, p → p) 
 
through the ontologico-notationality (→), whereas 
 
  F(X) ↔ X(F) 
 
X is bound by F, and uniquely X as such commands F as such where 
space coincides with entity (↔), because a conceptual-function of the 
maximum concept is synonymous with truth-values themselves. There is 
not mind that intermediates language with the world, but mind becomes 
its own world, and the empiricality here equates the consistency of mind. 
A truly maximum concept should intrinsically contain the assigner of 
truth-values and therefore self-relationally refers to itself as F ₪ X.    
 
  FX, to be meaningful, has to describe itself (ontologico-notationality), 
but F(X) is an entity in a space of description, as much as X is bound by 
F. This p that satisfies the logical space is thus subject to the self-
described logical space, which is the logical space mapped onto itself by 
means of negation. This p is therefore represented as e where one logical 
space leads another and another e where the former initiative takes the 
other way around, resulting in the same self-described logical space. 
Thus, the self-described logical space holds between two identical e. The 
self-described logical space is the self-imposed necessary way by which 
the logical space sees itself. e stands for the logical space and is 
necessarily made collectively one, and one only by the self-described 
logical space. That is, e epistemologically stands for the logical space and 
is epistemologically described by the way by which the logical space sees 
itself. The properties of e are therefore determined by relations which 
hold between its two identical constituents, e' and e''. e' and e'' stand for 
two identical logical spaces and are themselves epistemological entities 
that satisfy a recursively closed description with consistency and 
completeness. This e is a ‘point’ (in the self-described logical space) 
between which the two identical logical spaces relate to one another 
through ‘negation’ as a form of mapping. The two logical spaces are 
internally identical but externally differentiative because on one hand 
they have one and the same structure, on the other each could have been 
the other (metaphorically think of a geometrical line and the two 
directions alongside it as its description). This is expressed as : 
 
       ,         
 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
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    and   are self-relationally symmetrical in the sense that each 
necessarily implies the other, and therefore that both are necessarily 
existent in contrast to each other. Consequently, given the self-described 
logical space, both logical spaces are separately discernible and yet 
simultaneously coexistent. If there is a form such that governs this 
identical, yet differentiative variable-notion (of second-order), it is the 
logical connectives of ∨ and ∧. Descriptions by ∨ and ∧ are interesting 
; ∨ and ∧ are described by the delineated p. Although p is ontologico-
notationally necessitated to delineate, given a non-delineable p (not 
to be confused with the linear p) dimensionalities are not describable 
beyond the 0-dimensionality. The above identical but differentiative 
variable-notion is akin to this non-delineable p.  
 
  The self-described logical space is founded on the logical space and 
therefore contains descriptions of ∨ and ∧. The self-described logical 
space as applied to e thus also contains ∨ and ∧ as meaningful 
connectives that take values, such as e. The description of e ;   
           
       ,         
 
is quite different from {p ∧ p, p ∨ p}. Adopting a standard format, from 
(p ∧ p, p ∨ p) nothing follows because p ∧ p and p ∨ p are both logically 
identical with p. ∨ and ∧ as applied to an identical variable (non-
delineable 0-dimensionality) simply confirm the 0-dimensionality. That 
is, ‘,’ in (p ∧ p, p ∨ p) means nothing. On the other hand, (p ∧ q, p ∨ q), 
although appears to have some unknown meaning, indicates the presence 
of mind the game player, because q here can only be something 
arbitrarily adopted as meaning another ‘proposition’, i.e. delineated p 
located elsewhere in mind or in the self-described logical space, in the 
latter case ( ‘,’ ) can only indicate ‘negation’ as a form of mapping. 
 
       ,         
 
is neither (p ∧ p, p ∨ p) nor (p ∧ q, p ∨ q).  and  are identical but 
differentitive. They are identical because → and ← are not self-
discernible, yet they are differentiative because ‘−’ holds only as a result 
of →-initiation or ←-initiation. { ‘,’ } here means the transcendence 
between ∨ and ∧ because ∨ and ∧ as applied to an identical variable 
 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
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(variable-notion) means they are one and the same (ontologically), 
yet they are as distinct as  and . Thus, they retain their logical 
meaning attached to their dimensionality, where ∨ is the descriptive 
base of ∧, which describes the meaning of ∨ recursive to the 0-
dimensionality. It is thus the ∨-space comes to be incorporated into 
the ∧-space. Primes thus incorporate its paradoxical meaning, one 
adopted in the ┼-space, infinite as per Euclid, yet indicative of the 
closed nature of the -space.                         
 
  In japan, we have a famous poem (‘iroha’) comprising of a perfect and 
simultaneous pangram and isogram and yet rhymed on the traditional 
style, with a coded message incorporated (so some says), which describes 
an essence (Buddhistic, no doubt) of the human world by using each and 
every of 47 alphabets only once. The significance of this idiosyncratically 
beautiful poem (by an unknown literary maverick of 10-11th century 
Japan (first recorded appearance in 1079), leaving just this one piece of 
work) is that it also shows a linguistic essence. Language and mind 
symbiotically co-develop and merge into a binary totality in order to 
move forward towards merged mind and language as a totality. Here 
language as a means of communications and imperfect descriptions 
comes to mirror mind as the unified structure of the intellect. We know 
we are still far away from such a state of hellish nirvana. This poem 
mockingly and tantalizingly shows what this end-product of mind and 
language is like. Think of a metaphoric language as a totality with only 
one proposition (or a few interconnected ones) comprising of a few words 
with one meaning per word. What would it describe ? Semantically it 
describes the state of merged mind, syntactically it describes the structure 
of such a mind, presumably reflecting the world in some way. Like the 
first word of a baby, but instead of emotion or desire through primitive 
understanding, this one-sentence language manifests the entire world - 
whatever it may be - as cognized through merged mind, like one ultimate 
all-embracing formula of physics. The meaning and structure of this one 
proposition is our entire existence, so to speak. This one sentence 
describes ‘life, universe and everything’ (my next work). That is what we 
are here for. The meaning of this sentence is neither scientific nor artistic, 
nor empirically verifiable. It is simply the limit of our cognition. 
Language as a totality would allow us one final representation of mind-
world like the finish of a simple but difficult jigsaw puzzle. Now replace 
this one sentence with as few sentences as inevitably possible as we 
simulate our language as a totality. The said poem metaphorically mimics 
what we can express ultimately, linguistically, mathematically or 
scientifically, may it be human values, notational limits or ways of 
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modelling and exploiting material properties from the perspective of 
human paradigms - various measurements, sensory capacities, 
algorithmic constraints, conceptual thinking, usefulness, monetary values, 
etc..    
 
  Given less and less words with sharper and sharper meanings as it 
inevitably happens as we peel off layers and reduce facets of concepts in 
our efforts towards language as a totality, these words will have more and 
more limited scopes to make up sentences and also to make senses. The 
same goes for logic and maths. The path for the fundamental 
understanding is to make them simpler and simpler so that the most basic 
structure will surface from fewer and fewer concepts. The 
aforementioned Iroha poem shows that there is only one possible 
meaningful combination of given alphabets in order to make up words 
and sentences, under linguistic constraints of poetic styles, semantic 
depth and syntactical meaningfulness, culminating in the concise 
expression of human values worthy of the name of a poem. There were a 
few more attempts, but none managed to attain any poetic values. 
 
  What applies to this simplistic metaphor of a language game also applies 
to the descriptions of the world, with less and less varied constituents, a 
traditional modus operandi of western philosophy from Thales, 
culminating in Leibniz, to Wittgenstein’s paradoxical assertion of 
philosophical futility of such attempts. This is a schematic essence 
distilled from less and less conceptual components with simpler and 
simpler meaning resided in conceptual relations, be it language, logic, 
maths or even empirical sciences. This schematic essence cannot be a law 
or axiom because it then imposes a structure that has to be ‘proved’ 
within a notational schema with superfluous presence of mind the game 
player, mind the adjudicator as well as usual rules, constants and 
variables. This is where a Russellian Pp fails ; a primitive proposition and 
its corresponding state of affairs also implicitly assume truth-values, a 
value-assigner (mind the game player) and a value-evaluator (mind the 
adjudicator), all of which conspire as paradox/tautology when an assigner 
acts as evaluator. A law is a law only on the assumption of merged mind 
that cannot exist unless and until language merges as a totality. When and 
if this does happen, axioms are not needed because whatever is, can only 
be demonstrated. For PSAI axioms are not unproven rules of operation 
but modes of operation. The frame problem is a question of finding a 
schematic essence.  
 
  Given ultimate basic concepts, a structure will automatically emerge 
reflecting language-mind relationships that also mirror the world through 
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conceptualization, and here axioms are superfluous. Whatever emerges 
here can only demonstrate its validity by deriving secondary concepts 
through descriptive necessities. The Iroha poem mimics this process. This 
is more or less the case with any well-compressed descriptions, be them 
art, philosophy or even science. They are descriptions illustrated through 
elements of contrasts ; ranging from revelatory contradictions seen in the 
works of the haiku master Basho who deliberately saw opposites in what 
is inevitable or natural in perception, or any great poets like Rimbaud (his 
not unordinary post-literary life and his enigmatic works of boyhood, i.e. 
a contradiction expressed between his poem and his life), Wordsworth 
(nature and human) or Escher (his graphic art of contradictions), or think 
of Wittgenstein’s Three words, Schopenhauerian Will, Kantian a priory 
or Cartesian ‘cogito’, or nature’s describing itself (so we understand) 
through opposite electric charges encapsulated in the container of an 
atom, or disorder and equilibrium encapsulated in entropy, they not 
coincidentally mimic or symbolize a structure of ontologico-notationality 
that expresses through the relationship of minimum necessity, be it 
symmetry, contrast, contradiction or paradox/tautology. 
 
  If one is to found non-axiomatic logic or maths, here is where to start ; 
 
  FX = x(T) ₪ x(F) 
 
, which is to describe the structure of ‘self’ unfolding ‘descriptions’ so as 
to make itself intelligible, i.e. understandable and describable. x ₪ x 
encapsulates ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ in a same descriptive container. One 
talks about the foundations of maths or even of logic, but one never talk 
or even think about the foundations of language. For language is the 
foundation of maths and logic, and language can only be we ourselves or 
at least my mind.   
 
  What is a formal language ? A code of laws between two minds (or 
layered-mind), between a mind and its doubting Thomas at its foremost, 
extracted as axioms and rules of inference. However, this communication 
itself between two minds takes the form of language, which cannot be 
formal (as yet unfounded). Therefore, underneath any formal languages is 
a defining language that unites two minds. This is the essence of the self-
referential problem, which is the core of any languages, formal or 
otherwise. That is, insofar as mind works on defining medium, this is the 
language of language (including any formal languages) and is analytically 
unrepresentable in any products of mind. The self-referential paradox is 
really the ultimate code of laws that shows the boundary of linguistic 
expressions. So-called axioms and rules of inference can only refer to 
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themselves in our attempts to ‘describe’ them. Thus, the application of a 
rule of inference R on axioms A and B to lead to a statement C tells 
ultimately no more than the existence of the applicator and the self-
agreement on the validity of A, B and R and the resultant C, i.e. the 
formalizer cannot be formalized as metaphysical adjudicator. Externally 
‘mind is mind’, while internally ‘minds cannot be a mind’. Any products 
of mind assume a merged mind that does not yet exist, or more 
accurately, products of mind are only there to move towards a merged 
mind, which they assume in order to be meaningful. A true joy of 
philosophy.   
 
  Given a meta-logic, one asks if a meta-logic is logic. The paradox is not 
‘a meta-logic is logic’ entailing ‘if it is, then it is not a meta-logic’, but 
our questioning the question, because if truly given a meta-logic, then the 
answer must be already contained in the meta-logic. This is how a mind 
plays a game. A meta-logic cannot be logically described because it can 
only demonstrate itself. Likewise, given natural numbers, one asks if the 
number of natural numbers is a natural number, leading to ‘if it is, then it 
is not a number of natural numbers’, and further leading to , which is a 
number of its own and does not explain what natural numbers are. Here 
too mind is playing with itself ; ‘the number of natural numbers’ was 
asked to know about natural numbers, and you get an answer which does 
not answer the question. So mind asks an imaginary question and answer 
with an imaginary answer. Likewise, ask the meaning of ‘,’, it is either 
unanswerable or ends up with an irrelevant answer. It is layered mind that 
keeps asking such questions as ‘number’ leading to ‘number of numbers’, 
to ‘number of numbers of numbers’, and so on. Applied to itself, it will 
lead from ‘concept’ to ‘concept of concept’, and so on. In short, a 
tautological concept leads to a paradox, which is a linguistic self-
regulation to stop infertile looping. Logic is thus developed from ‘self-
defining concept’, and is nothing but tautologies and paradoxes.  
 
  A ‘self-defining concept’ is any concepts that ‘group’ together ‘entities’ 
so that it describes the world in terms of categories, and this capacity 
naturally applies to itself because such a concept is a process rather than 
an object and cannot be endowed with a ‘covenant’ of  excluding itself 
insofar as a ‘covenant’ is itself a description and requires other concepts. 
Take ‘number’, the Russellian Pp of ‘number’ can only start with the 
form of f(x), not with examples such as ‘1’, ‘2’, etc. or with a form like 
Peano’s (0, n, n+1), which is a distilled structure of what is given and 
contains indefinables (like ‘0’, ‘,’, ‘( )’, etc.) and already assumes 
‘number’. Thus, f can only be as primitive as ‘countable’, which, in order 
to say ‘should not include itself’, it must first know what ‘it’ is before ‘it’ 
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is defined. That is, it must conceptualize itself before it exists. This is 
itself already a paradox. It is thus ‘number’ naturally extends to ‘number 
of numbers’ because it cannot conceptually say it excludes itself before 
we know what ‘it’ is. If a number is a label given to what is countable, 
then applying to itself produces the number of ‘what is countable’, which 
is a mis-application of countability. That is, what is countable is 0 or { }, 
not itself, which is a concept. While a ‘number’ is the number of 0, the 
‘number of number’ is not a number of 0.  
 
  To say ‘a ‘number’ should not include itself’ is a rule after the 
perception of ‘number’. A rule can be challenged or broken because it is 
only a convention of a schema. It is mind’s business to break rules 
whenever possible. A rule is not a Pp or a concept, but is rather an 
application of Pp or concept. If there can be an alternative schema in 
which an alternative rule can cohesively operate or can dispense with this 
rule, then the rule does not form any essential descriptions of Pp or 
concept. Before there is a rule ‘a ‘number’ should not include itself’, 
there has to be ‘number’. Therefore, citing of rules does not explain how 
this concept came into existence or is all about. Rules are more about 
schematic house-keepings or finesses of ordering.  
 
  The ultimate self-defining concept is ontologically ‘self’ or 
epistemologically ‘,’, which is by itself not informative, but with an 
utmost necessity. However, the meaningless ontology of ‘self’ becomes 
epistemic in the process of descriptively unfolding itself, because finding 
the only necessary and possible way of describing itself is the essence of 
description and forms a knowledge. That is, whatever ‘self’ may be, the 
way it can describe is a description by demonstration. This is the only 
way to know what logic is, what maths is. In the sense that it is a 
description by demonstration maths and logic are one and the same. 
 
  Be it art or science, ‘,’ is the most important symbol but is so taken for 
granted that it often goes undefined, save for saying it signifies ‘space’, 
which by itself hardly means anything. ‘Space’, from physics and 
geometry to more degenerate usages in our narratives, is necessarily 
schematic and signifies the most important basis for a schema. Thus ‘,’ 
used in axioms means the basis of a schematic representation. If used in 
different areas of maths, it may bear altogether different meaning. For 
example, ‘,’ in (0, n, n+1) assumes the structural space on the number 
sequence of ℕ, whereas ‘,’ in (p1, p2,..., pn) assumes Euclidian n-space. 
The former ‘,’ is a gap in natural numbers, and being recognized as a 
‘gap’ already entails something else other than natural numbers. That is, 
expressing 0nn+1 as (0, n, n+1) already assumes something more than 
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(0, n, n+1). ‘,’ between n and n+1 could well mean a segment of ℝ or to 
assume ‘,’ between 0 and n and ‘,’ between n and n+1 is one and the 
same is also to assume an identical totality between every natural number 
and is making a hidden assumption of ‘real line’ on the seemingly simple 
construction of a natural number line. On the other hand, the latter ‘,’ is a 
way of defining a Cartesian point and means the structure of Euclidian 
dimensional space. To say that    
 
  ‘,’ (in (0, n, n+1)) = ‘,’ (in (p1, p2,..., pn)) 
 
is synonymous to saying that a sequential gap is identical with a 
dimensional gap. We unconsciously use common sense (whatever it may 
mean) and avoid confusions in our descriptions, because we contextually 
differentiate number theory from Euclidian geometry. However, in 
descriptions of logic in founding secondary schemata, such common 
sense may not work, because common sense may be so tied up with 
descriptions themselves. This is the reason why I equated the ontological 
‘self’ with the epistemological ‘,’. Ontological ‘self’ is epistemologically 
underlain as ‘common sense’ in any schemata insofar as we are the 
constructor of any schemata. We know ‘,’ in (0, n, n+1) or (p1, p2,..., pn) 
to the extent we also know schemata behind them. This may be what we 
call ‘common sense’. It is often hidden assumptions behind so-called 
common sense that cause havoc by turning into paradoxes. I already 
mentioned the example of Russellian Pp. However, ‘,’ in 
 
     ,        
 
is more of a mystery or hidden assumption because we do not quite know 
what lies behind it. If 
 
     ,        
 
is to be the basis of logic and maths, then ‘,’ signifies the more basic 
structure of ontologico-notationality. This ‘,’ is indeed the basis of all ‘,’ 
and is x ₪ x. How x ₪ x turns into the most fundamental space of 
ontologico-notatinality will be touched upon in the next chapter.    
                     
  To think there is something in saying ‘self is self’ or ‘x = x’, is the same 
as seeking a meaning in ‘self’ itself or ‘x’ itself. Remove invisible mind 
the adjudicator, truth is only truth in its relation to falsehood, as much as 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
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falsehood is only falsehood in its relation to truth. What applies to 
concepts also applies to propositions. And therefore, tautologies are only 
tautologies in their relation to paradoxes, as much as paradoxes are only 
paradoxes in their relation to tautologies. It is this structure between 
tautologies and paradoxes that forms logic and maths, because as long as 
mind the adjudicator is at large, forming judgments superficial or 
fundamental, logics and foundations of maths will mushroom as we see 
no end to theories and counter-theories. It is thus we do not yet have logic 
of logics and maths of maths. This ontologico-notational relation between 
tautologies and paradoxes is ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ as mind can only mirror 
onto itself in order to see itself. Given a mirror, then a paradox is a 
tautology, and vice versa. The ontological ‘self’ describes the space of 
descriptions, whereas the epistemological ‘,’ assumes each respective 
schematic space. It is really the job of respective philosophically minded 
scientist to examine and reveal the meaning of ‘,’ used in respective 
schema. If they cannot be a paradigm mover, at least this way they can be 
paradox remover.                        
   
  I am not a Wittgenstein scholar, but from a little I read I side with him 
with regard to the question of provability. You do not need the madness 
of Gödel to formalize ‘provability’. Behind every formal system is a 
mind, without which notions, rules, definitions, etc. do not make sense.  
A mind assumes an identical mind or merged mind because for a system 
to be formal it cannot afford any arbitrary interpretations. That is, a 
formal system assumes a mind that is universal in structure, function and 
essence. Now this is a big assumption and I shall call it a hypothesis. 
Even if you replace a mind with an algorithm, since an algorithm is for us 
ultimately an intellectual process that requires heuristic elements or 
approximation, it is just another word for a well-defined and -regulated 
mind with an informal essence. Given this assumption, the consistency 
and completeness of mind, which we need in order to appreciate any 
consistency and completeness of a formal system, is necessarily over 
another mind because if we all share an identical mind we need no proofs. 
Thus, mind is plural but identical. Likewise, the consistency and 
completeness of a formal system is necessarily over another formal 
system because ‘proof’ has to be a non-tautological description. 
Otherwise, mind cannot comprehend any so-called ‘proof’. Thus, we 
need two non-identical formal systems backed by two identical minds 
overseen by another identical mind to make sure we are still talking about 
a same ‘proof’. This process, however, contains another hypothesis, 
namely there has to be at least one formal system that is self-evident for 
its consistency and completeness because we cannot simultaneously 
prove the consistency and completeness of two formal systems. However, 
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such a self-evidence cannot be proven without the first hypothesis. You 
cannot prove a hypothesis by another hypothesis. No wonder we have as 
many logics as there are minds. Language over a formal language 
assumes an identical mind because behind any formal languages are 
interpretations. Thus, the provability of a formal system cannot be proved 
unless the identity of that system and mind over and above it is proved. 
On the other hand, if such an identity is there, there will not be any needs 
for such a proof.  
 
  What is incomplete in Gödelian incompleteness is that in any 
formalizations the formalizer himself cannot be represented by any 
symbols and rules. This is also why there are proliferations of formal 
languages, mushrooming of varieties of logics and even foundations of 
maths. You can pick and choose anything you fancy to champion your 
view. If there were a system that represents a thinker or the manipulator 
of symbols and rules, then that will be the only formal language or logic 
which represent the structure of intelligence because such a language is 
objective knowledge with universality applicable across diversity of 
thinkers. A formal system did not just drop from the sky. There was an 
ingenious mind (formalizer) that formalized it from ingredients out of the 
ordinary language. Hence,   
 
  L › f1, f2, ··· fn 
 
, which means that whatever is expressed in any formal languages, it can 
also be expressed in the ordinary language, but not vice versa. That is, the 
ordinary language is more than any formal languages, and concepts are 
syntactically and semantically more expressive and functional than any 
formal expressions. A formal language centres on a notation that allows 
refinements and evolutions of concepts and their relations in the ordinary 
language. It is the ordinary language that allows mathematicians and 
physicists to think conceptually and non-linearly where possible, and it is 
notations that afford them to translate concepts and their relations into 
notions and rules expressed more precisely and to explore notational 
depths following schematic necessities. If a mathematician or physicist is 
just a formal system or algorithm, then there will not be any maths or 
physics. The origin of x ₪ x is in the ordinary language. It cannot have 
any formal origin.       
 
  Notations are structural representations of concepts and their relations, 
i.e. syntactical metamorphoses of semantic wealth of concepts as 
structures lay bare conceptual shells of ambiguity. Thus, how to express 
numbers have direct consequences on the subsequent developments of 
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number theories ; we find the decimal positional notation with 0 is more 
precise as well as more creative compared with non-positional notations 
or non-decimal notations. Simple arithmetic would be a heavy intellectual 
burden if not represented by the decimal positional notation and would 
have hampered us from developing maths as it is today. Mathematical 
notations are based on logical notations as rules of numbers are to be 
found in numbers that are to be brought out by numbers described by the 
conjunctive space based on the meaning of the logical constant ∧.  
 
  Before I move onto the crucial chapter on the foundations of maths, I 
touch upon Principia Mathematica (PM), because it is regarded as a 
milestone in the philosophy of maths despite its failure. Or, although it 
failed in its intention, it survived as interesting terms of reference. 
Anyone thinking about the foundations of maths has to think why and 
how it failed and what is there to learn from.   
 
  Like the Code of Hammurabi or Napoleonic Code, which were 
compiled by ordinary men but proclaimed to be ultimately founded on 
‘god’ or ‘natural laws’, PM is a work of two accomplished but mediocre 
scholars that took ten exhausting years (according to authors themselves) 
and is claimed to be the foundation of maths based on the fundamental 
laws of formal logic. It is full of ├, Df and notational conventions ‘we’ 
(meaning Russell and Whitehead) endorsed of necessity, although a pure 
formal logic should be able to dispense with any aspects of modality, 
which is existential by definition. 
 
  ‘We’ here seem to lay down the foundations of maths and formal logic 
because ‘we’ are most knowledgeable and of highest intelligence and 
integrity. ‘We’ assert and ‘we’ define alongside notational arbitrariness, 
but ‘we’ are nowhere to be seen as part of formal representation. PM, 
despite its formal appearance, heavily relies on the ordinary language 
without which the formal part cannot be fully meaningful. The formal 
part provides notational conveniences but is not essential for its 
understanding, and the reverse does not hold. By being formal one tries to 
formulate axioms and rules of inference as precisely as possible, but as 
axioms and rules inevitably involve conceptual understandings they 
cannot achieve pinpoint precisions. Concepts are concepts because of 
interrelations. There is no concept that can define itself no matter how 
primitive it may be. PM assumes civilized readers who would only argue 
within well-defined frameworks of PM, but like any grand legal system, 
can be dealt with a deathblow by a barbarian who cares not a toss about 
legal niceties between lines, who can ignore conceptual taboos that 
protect notational status quos. PM does not generate, create, encourage or 
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guide any developments of maths but only assumes the existence of 
elementary arithmetic and tries to provide some theoretical assurance. It 
is a case of mechanistic logic’s failure to capture dynamic maths and 
created a monstrous explanatory structure augmented by human 
imaginative notations. 
 
  It is Russell’s inability to expand the more fundamental part of PM 
starting with Pp that prevailed such a clumsy explanatory system full of ├ 
and Df, which ended in a thought-provoking failure. It is typically a 
symptomatic rearrangement of existing knowledge encouraged by 
notational innovations. Interestingly PM is more important in its failure 
as it ultimately gives way to the notion of mind superior to any written 
codes of fundamental laws. Laws may be written in rock, but it only takes 
mind to break them and even punish punishers. Likewise, according to 
Gödel it is the formality of a formal language that could not break away 
from self-referential loops. Having surrendered the superiority of the 
formality of formal languages ‘mind’ surfaces as the champion of the 
informality of creative explanations. Gödel dealt the coup de grace to PM 
as well as to Hilbertian Program but brought about the proliferations of 
multiple formal and informal logics.     
 
  I already offered you an example of the indefinability of an even simple 
concept x = x. In dealing with any basic concepts PM liberally assumes a 
merged mind and resorts to ‘definitions’ as if it is a simplest task. Think 
of the difficulty of defining a ‘definition’. There are many levels of 
definitions :  
 
At the lowest level, you just pull a definition out of a blue sky, like a 
fiction writer. It is a personal definition, which may or may not convince 
a few people, depending on width and depth of conceptual relationships, 
and how intelligent you are, because intelligence has encompassing 
capacity. 
 
The next level is a definition by example. Again, its power of persuasion 
depends on cohesiveness of an example given, which will be exposed by 
counter-examples. 
 
The penultimate level is by looping (remember a dictionary and how 
interrelated words are). A definition at this level eventually appeals to 
language as a totality. What we call common sense often unconsciously 
assumes language as a totality. The difficulty is this language as a totality 
does not yet exist. This is where ordinary language is moving to and why 
remains dynamic.   
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Or, like Russell, by going deeper using more and more basic concepts in 
order to explain more mundane concepts, eventually arriving at the 
indefinable mind itself without knowing, which can only be 
demonstrated. These definitions have superficial power of persuasion 
because depth gives an impression of objective structure, not something 
arbitrary mind puts forwards.  
 
  Russell thought logical concepts are something of Kantian a priory and 
indisputably founded - power of logic over mathematical givens, as it 
were. However, going deeper has its own setbacks. Basic concepts too 
have to be defined, and unless we are God who can decide enough is 
enough, basic concepts have to keep digging, depending upon the level of 
intelligence of the digger. Obviously, Russell was not that intelligent 
because he famously hit upon a paradox from which he could not see 
himself out. Thus, the set of all sets that are not members of themselves 
encounters its wall of the undefinable, whose naïve strength still defies 
axiomatic tinkering or conceptual hierarchy. Be they axiomatic 
patchworks or higher-order logic of types, they all eventually face similar 
difficulties of naïve set theory ; metaphysics of the undefinable. Neither 
modifications of axioms nor creations of types satisfies our desire for a 
final solution because we do not know where our mind want to stop. So 
long as stopgap solutions are the ingenuity of mind, mind has no reasons 
to rest at peace. Thus, types end up with the problem of a universe type, 
not unlike a set of sets, and tinkering of axioms at will makes one wonder 
what are we as manipulator of axioms. Certainly, we must be tinkering 
based on more fundamental axioms, for any tinkering must show the 
basis of its necessity. In the end, allow the freedom of mind, it eventually 
comes to ask what it itself is. Remember the proverb, ‘Give 'em enough 
rope, and they'll hang themselves’. All subsequent developments since 
the problem of naïve set theories have not really settled the issue. Be they 
any forms of axiomatic set theories or type theories, the fundamental 
problem of naïve set theory recurs in different guises because any efforts 
to remove paradoxes results in the self-denial of mind in the form of the 
removal of its own receptacle, i.e. ‘universe’. It is mind self-contained as 
a totality that allows us ‘definitions’, ‘axioms’, etc. which requires a 
domain. Coherencies of definitions, axioms, etc. can only be ascertained 
within some totality, ultimately coherent mind itself. Logic is logic of a 
coherent mind, not of scatterbrains or schizophrenic mind. In short, given 
 
  Y = {x ∈ X : P(x)} 
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, then various axiom schemata, if restricted, end up with the impossibility 
of talking about paradoxes, although we are still free to talk about 
paradoxes. By eliminating superficial paradoxes (of Russellian and 
Cantorian nature), you end up with an even bigger paradox ; mind can 
talk about paradoxes which mind cannot think of, i.e. mind as a structure 
is unrestricted and restricted.     
 
  Russell’s approach is a legacy of the days when we had the luxury of the 
protection of ‘God’, as a matter of psyche or unconscious thought 
process, if not as a believer. Only so long as we are an intellectual agent 
of God, we can solve any fundamental questions by definitions. 
Otherwise, we face the question what are we to define this and that, in 
most cases at will. Besides, set theories have a more fundamental 
weakness of their failure to formulate ‘necessity’ of forming a set, other 
than our willingness to construct. Thus, take ‘three’. There are empirical 
number ‘3’, like 3 apples. This moves up to membership number ‘3’, like 
‘3 apples – ‘apples’ = 3’. This is ‘3’ as cardinality. On top of this, we 
have a set ‘3’ representing any collections with cardinality of ‘3’. Finally 
the set ‘3’ that is instructed not to include itself as member. This 
famously leads to the set of all sets that are not members of themselves, a 
paradox. In short, 
 
  Three apples → three → 3 → ‘3’ 
 
We need ‘x’ because we intend to construct a schema of rules of 
arithmetic, and this can only be applied to ‘x’ as of f(x), where rules come 
in the form of f, i.e. first-order predicate. However, given ‘x’, ‘ ’ would 
apply to itself, leading to the contradiction. Mind constructs something by 
definitions at will, with the intention of ‘proving’ this something to itself. 
Thus, ‘proving’ a number as a set already presupposes a ‘number’, three 
levels of a ‘number’ at that. Mind is constructing something to prove to 
itself by definition. This can only end up as a grand schematic tautology. 
Mind can prove anything to itself by definition because it is designing a 
mental apparatus with a specific purpose of fulfilling this purpose. That is 
exactly how some people prove ‘god’ to himself. So what ?, and thus this 
tautology is also a paradox. You prove anything, you prove nothing. 
Three apples did not fall out of the sky. We put them together in such a 
way that forms three of them for a specific purpose (of making ‘3’). Be it 
three or 3 or ‘3’, we already have a number, what we did is simply a 
mental exercise of paraphrasing something common in all of them in a 
schematic way. The problem is this schema is only designed to prove 
what it create as schematic entities, i.e. mathematical objects of ‘sets’. 
These ‘objects’ are by definition schematic entities, and thus their 
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existence is already schematic and presupposes a schema. We need 
schematic entities of an abstraction at the same level as a schema itself. 
Rules of numbers only apply to mathematical objects, not to empirical 
objects. ‘2 apples + 1 orange’ does not make ‘3’, 3 or even three. ‘+’ is 
only applicable to mathematical objects. It is Russell who made ‘3’ so 
that a schema of arithmetic as he knows can be logically founded. We 
‘prove’ what we intend to prove. This is what set theories are all about, an 
enjoyable waste of many good talents, still better than creating an atom 
bomb (except von Neumann). A set (number) is a generalized 
countability, and as such cannot itself be counted. A number in this sense 
is an adjective, which can be applied to a noun but not to itself. Set-
theoretical paradoxes are also a conceptual tautology of generalizing a 
‘number’ from a number.      
 
  Naïve or otherwise, this is really a paradox applicable to any 
conceptualizations where definitions are sought by generalizations. 
Concepts are tools of mind, and mind is applied (by mind) to go more and 
more basic so that it can achieve its own aim of, e.g. logically founding 
arithmetic. If mind relies on definitions at the bottom of its own aim, it 
cannot help reaching itself, undefinable definer. This is the root of 
paradoxes. ZFC-like axiomatic tinkering eventually faces the same 
problem, because you are only buying time by replacing more basic 
concepts with more applicable axioms, unless you can find absolutely 
necessary axioms. But, of course, how do you prove it, other than by 
demonstration ?     
  
  We should note that e.g. membership number ‘3’ fails to distinguish 
those necessarily ‘three’ and arbitrarily ‘three’, such as ‘3’ of three angles 
of a triangle and ‘3’ of three apples. The former is by geometrical 
necessity, while the latter is a whim of our mind in the sense that there is 
no necessities for apples to be three as we could as easily make up four or 
five apples. If we cannot rely on definitions or any constructive methods, 
how can we find ‘numbers’ ? One could finds necessities of ‘numbers’ 
such as atomic numbers or geometric laws. However, defining a number 
e.g. by the number of protons, although persuasive by means of 
empirically necessary laws, encounters easy obstacles as atomic numbers 
appear strictly finite and as we do not know if such laws are workable in 
every possible universe or universally translatable in any states of a 
universe. On the other hand, geometric laws can be used to define number 
‘3’ like any triangles, which have ‘three’ internal angles by necessity, not 
by definition. This ‘3’ is empirical, cardinal as well as abstract by 
necessity. That is, 
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  Triangles → three angles → 3  
 
, which needs one less step compared to three apples because it is the 
arbitrariness of definitions that demands an extra layer of abstraction so 
as to ascertain that 3 from three oranges is the same as 3 from three 
apples. Once given 3 by necessity, this 3 is applicable as cardinality. It is 
an adjective ‘three’ that is applicable to anything countable. Triangles are 
only a cause of the discovery of the number 3. Once various numbers are 
thus discovered by necessity, they obtain the freedom of application 
because they are detachable as operative concepts, tools of mind whose 
sole purpose is the merger of minds, unless we disagree any triangles 
have three angles. Note that this 3 by necessity can never be a member of 
itself because it is an ‘adjective’, and applying to itself makes it a ‘noun’ 
as it were, against its own grammar. 3 of three angles can be applied as 
cardinality because an ‘angle’ is already a schematic entity that exists by 
rules of geometric necessity. Thus, this 3 is applicable to anything that 
exist by the same rules, i.e. to objects of a geometric space, which can 
represent an empirical space by approximation. We can approximate any 
empirical objects as objects in a geometric space (or space-time) because 
they are contained in a lager framework of geometric paradigm. Here 
‘apple’ and ‘orange’ are both e.g. ‘thing’, and thus 2 apples + 1 orange = 
3 ‘things’. Provided that we found enough detachable adjectives of 
numbers, arithmetic operations can be usefully performed.               
 
  Metaphorically expressed in different terminology, think of a set as a 
‘noun’ abstracted from an ‘adjective’ of arbitrariness. Here mind is trying 
to replicate the world by definition. A ‘noun’ created from an ‘adjective’ 
abjectifies itself, like a set of set, a paradox. I think of a number as a noun 
commanded by an adjective of necessity. Here the world projects itself 
onto mind by representation and is a tautology rather than a paradox. 
These nouns of necessity applicable as adjective has ‘independence’ 
within their paradigm of necessity.          
 
  Or even better, in the same vein, if we can find ‘numbers’ in geometric 
space itself by necessary rules like Peano rules, such numbers not only 
need no arbitrary definitions as they exist by necessity, but are also 
operative enough to form arithmetic, without falling into the trap of 
paradoxes. The question is how to define geometric space by necessity, 
and whether such a space can also accommodate other types of numbers 
like reals or essential transcendentals like π and e as well as 0, 1 and an 
imaginary like i together with numerical qualities like continuity, 
infinitesimal and infinity.             
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  Fregean notion of a number should only be sought in the necessity of a 
number, not definitional constructivism. To found a number on 
membership without making a distinction between necessary and 
arbitrary is itself a cause of paradox. It is a ‘set’ by arbitrary construction 
that need to be instructed (by mind) not to include itself as member, 
because as arbitrary as it is, ‘grammar’ has to be imposed from outside, 
which will trace its origin once again to mind. Whereas a set by necessity 
needs no such an instruction or grammar as it contains such an instruction 
and grammar in itself. When mind constructs something and at the same 
time ends up having to issue an instruction of usages, then mind is not 
functioning properly, leading to paradox/tautology. It is a system of 
cohesive definitions that breaks down at self-referential aspects of ‘set’. 
‘Set’ is an arbitrary creation of mind that hinges on mind. In requiring an 
instruction of usages, mind is creating something that need mind to 
‘prove’ to mind, a guaranteed failure. You are a captive of language who 
want to master language, at the same time you are a tool of language 
towards merged mind and language as a totality. This is the cause of our 
philosophical problems. 
 
  It is the founding of ‘numbers’ by necessity rather than by definition that 
solves the riddles of paradoxes. A necessity and a definition may come 
close at the very bottom. However, a definition always leave a room for 
mind as undefinable definer and demands rules in order to be meaningful, 
whereas a necessity comes with rules by which it demonstrates. A 
definition is demonstrated (by mind and for mind), while a necessity 
demonstrates, representing the structure of the intellect. This is the 
difference between logic by necessity and logic by definition. In the 
former, a variable is a variable-notion that is on a par with constants, both 
of which are derived from descriptive necessities of the ontologico-
notational FX and together manifest an essential structure of 
‘description’. In the latter, constants represent a structure into which 
variables are fitted so that together they are used to describe the ‘world’ 
juxtaposed to mind, where mind acts as superior overseer of both the 
‘world’ and language. Here variables needs a ‘domain’ because mind 
stands above them and, depending on its focus of interest, defines its area 
of application. This way language describes what it is intended to 
describe, ultimately resulting in paradox/tautology.       
 
  I have already touched upon the problems of paradoxes and tautologies 
as encountered by those who sought foundations of maths and the 
meaning of formality of logic. I saw a salvation in my ‘T ₪ F’, i.e. 
‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ paradox/tautology, which will give rise to logical 
dimensionalities and geometrical space within the recursively closed 
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chain of rules of inference. Necessities guide us into descriptions and 
present us with our paradigm of descriptions that schematically coincide 
with the world. FX is a stem cell concept that evolves by self-
descriptions, i.e. by descriptive necessities.   
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4. Maths  
 
< Maths as application of logic to space > 
 
- Logic as Foundation of Geometry - 
 
  When speaking of maths as application of logic to space, it is important 
not to involve ‘applier’ of logic because then this ‘applier’ would stay out 
of the discourse and bring meta-logical notions and concepts at will. 
Thus, the discourse would remain incomplete in the sense the ‘applier’ 
and any rules of such an application of logic is meta-logical and cannot 
be described within the prescribed logic. Further ‘space’ to which logic is 
to be applied must be empty because any objects pre-exist prior to the 
application of logic are also meta-logical. However, logic cannot be 
applied to space unless space contains objects that can be variables. There 
is no logic of empty space because without states of affairs or predicable 
objects, logic has nothing to represent. I therefore start with space itself 
that turns itself into objects and at the same time generates rules that 
govern such objects. This is logic as self-spatialization of FX. Rules will 
materialise as dimensionalities, objects as postulated entity of self-
demarcation, the completeness and consistency as recursively closed 
chain of rules of inference embodied in dimensionalities. This is logic of 
geometric necessities. 
 
  Objects and space are both generated as process of self-demarcation and 
are underlain by logic of self-demarcation. Therefore being objects means 
being spatial objects. They are also countable by virtue of the properties 
of the space they co-exist, which is dynamically expanding infinity in the 
case of the conjunctive space (∧-space or ┼-space depending on contexts 
as a matter of descriptive mannerism but refers to    ) and 
dynamically condensing infinity in the case of the disjunctive space (∨-
space or ○-space, referring to    ). Because objects are spatial and 
countable by virtue of the space in which they are embedded, descriptions 
of such objects as variable constitute ‘numbers’ and descriptions of 
properties of space the schema of ‘maths’. 
 
  I have already demonstrated how the two spaces are constructed (see 
‘The Elementals’), but in summery :  
 
  A logical space’s mapping onto itself gives rise to the self-described 
logical space that is internally identical but externally differentiative. This 
self-described logical space is a schematic entity that presents itself as 
∨
∧
∨ 
∧ 
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identically describable by the externally twofold forms. This generates 
‘point’ between which schematic directions hold in such a way as to 
result in an identical description (1-dimension). Be they an object or a 
form, they are schematic in the sense their meaning is together 
descriptively to represent the self-described logical space. This externally 
twofold 1-dimension holds between same two points and is therefore 
internally identical. The relation that holds in and between what is 
internally identical and externally twofold is 
 
     ,        
 
, which is the descriptive space of the 1-dimension. This is to say that 
given what is internally identical and externally twofold, ∨ and ∧ hold 
between them as identical relations and therefore schematically confirm 
their identity. ∨ and ∧ hold between  and  as identical relations. This 
also means that  and  are both necessarily under the schema of logic. 
The 2-dimension therefore contains both the disjunctive space and the 
conjunctive space.    
 
  The disjunctive space and the conjunctive space are in themselves 
identical, and are sub-schemata of the schema of the 2-dimension. ∨ and 
∧ bring out differentiative meaning of what is identical in such a way that 
on one hand the 1-dimension described by  or by  are identical, on 
the other hand that  and  are not reducible into either. The ∨-space 
can be constructed by either of  or . It is a space in which given the 
two 1-dimensions, they both descriptively merge into one and the same 1-
dimension. If a space can be characterized by two given 1-dimensions’ 
merging into a single 1-dimension and is therefore described to be 
‘curved’, then anything that can be given in this space is curved and 
merge into that single 1-dimension. This means that any number of 1-
dimensions can be given only to result in a same 2-dimensionally merged 
1-dimension with two and only two directions. Therefore, this space is 
curved in such a way as to be closed and uniform. This is so because if 
two 1-dimensions are given and merge into a single 1-dimension, and if 
anything that is given in this space merge into this single 1-dimension, 
then this single 1-dimension is necessarily such that is in a space and also, 
by itself, holds a space. Any space that is characterized by a single 
 
 
 
 
 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
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entity that is in that space and has two and only two directions, is 
necessarily closed and uniform. It is closed because, otherwise, it cannot 
be described that it has one and only one entity in it. It is uniform because 
this one and only one entity is in a space other than itself and has two and 
only two directions. This space is therefore closed and uniform in terms 
of what characterizes it and is therefore also finite. It is finite but 
boundless because its boundary (i.e. that single 1-dimension) is itself a 
unit. A single entity can be described to exist and to have two and only 
two directions only in a space that is uniformly closed and boundless if 
and only if there exists in it one and only one entity such that has two and 
only two directions. This space and its boundary determine each other. 
Consequently, the size of this space is identical with that of its 
boundary. This type of 2-dimensional space is described as a ‘circle’ if it 
is, by a descriptive necessity, put into the other type of 2-dimensional 
space. 
 
  The meaning of ∧ is based upon that of ∨ and lies in its schematic 
confirmation of such existences that are operationally identified by ∨ as 
being 0-dimensionally identical. That is, by the meaning of ∧ two 
schemata such that can be identically constructed by each of two 0-
dimensionally identical existences, can be confirmed to be an identical 
schema under the same schema of logic or under a same 
applied schema of logic. Therefore, whatever may be ∨-operative, they 
are necessarily also ∧-operative. Any two entities are ∨-operative if and 
only if they result in an identical schema. ∨ identifies two such entities in 
terms of what identically results from them (i.e. the identity in structure 
between two schemata that are based upon those two entities that are both 
0-dimensional). If two entities are both 0-dimensional and therefore result 
in two identical schemata, then they, ontologico-notationally speaking, 
self-contain each other. ∨ represents the identity of such entities in terms 
of what structurally identically results from them. Two identical entities 
that are so identified by ∨ as what results in two identical schemata, must 
be schematically so confirmed as an identical schema under the same 
schema of logic. This is so because two identical schemata that result 
from two identical entities, can only be identified as an identical schema 
in terms of the identity in existence between two such entities. What self-
contains each other necessarily belongs to an identical schema. Therefore, 
two identical schemata that result from them are necessarily an identical 
schema. Whatever may result from two entities that belong to an identical 
schema, they are necessarily within this same identical schema. 
Consequently, ∧ holds only between two schemata such that are so 
identified by ∨ as what results from two 0-dimensionally identical 
entities, and it identifies them as an identical schema in terms of the 
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identity in existence between those two 0-dimensionally identical entities. 
That is, ∧ represents the identity of two identical schemata in terms of 
their identical 0-dimensionality. Only two schemata such that are 
identical with each other can be ∧-operative.     says that there are 
two schemata which are identical, while     says that there are two 
entities which can be described to be identical and are therefore 
necessarily under a same schema. Their only difference is that schemata 
are necessarily structural and therefore, if they are identical, cannot be 
described to be existent independently from each other, while entities are 
descriptively existential and therefore, even if they are identical, can be 
described to be identically existent independently from each other. That 
is, two entities can be described to be identical with each other and yet 
independent from each other if and only if they are both 0-dimensional 
and therefore self-contain each other. However, two schemata cannot be 
so described because a schema is not an existence but the description of 
an existence. There cannot be any describable relations between two 
identical descriptions without contradicting the ontologico-notational 
condition of description. If two schemata are identical, then they can only 
be an identical schema, and not two identical schemata.     
immediately results in     because two entities which give rise to 
two identical schemata, have an innate necessity to confirm that such two 
identical schemata are necessarily an identical schema. Two identical 
schemata have a descriptive necessity to be an identical schema in order 
to comply with the ontologico-notational condition of description. This 
descriptive necessity is therefore identical with the descriptive necessity 
by which the schema of logic is conditionalized. This means that the 
resultant identical schema is, applied or not, 0-dimensionally identical 
with what ontologico-notationally describes itself (i.e. the schema of 
logic).     is therefore described to stand for two identical 
schemata’s being necessarily an identical schema and is also described to 
be under the same schema of logic that governs    . The logical 
space encompasses  and  as their descriptive necessity and is also 
closed. This is so because the logical space is the descriptive necessity for 
and of anything, and because anything can be described to self-contain 
itself.     and     are together a description of such a anything 
and are under a same descriptive necessity. Whatever may be ∨-
operative, they are also ∧-operative. However, neither of ∨ and ∧ is 
descriptively reducible into the other because they underlie each other by 
∧ ∨
∧
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being underlain by their common descriptive necessity. When  and  
are ∧-operated, they are therefore two identical schemata which are to be 
identified as an identical schema.     stands for a space in which 
two identical schemata are, by complying with the ontologico-notational 
condition of description, so taken for granted as to be an identical 
schema. In contrast to this,     is a space in which two given entities 
descriptively merge into an identical entity and therefore, by doing so, 
give rise to two identical schemata, which immediately result in    . 
Therefore, space and its contents determine each other in    , while 
they coincide with each other in    . That is, the space of     is 
a space which commands its entities toward its descriptive necessity so as 
to be compatible with what it allows itself to take as its entities. This also 
means that it appears as if entities determine their space ; for there cannot 
be any entities outside a space if this space is the descriptive space of 
those entities, and this includes a case such that an entity is its own space. 
The space of     is the space of spaces which are commanded by 
their entities toward their descriptive necessity so as to be compatible 
with what they are allowed to take as their entities. This necessarily 
makes those spaces a single identical space. This is the reason why the 
entities of the ∧-space can only be schemata. 
 
   and , on one hand, determine the ∨-space if and only if they are 
taken as identical entities, on the other hand, determine the ∧-space if and 
only if they are taken as identical schemata. If they are taken as identical 
entities, then they are necessarily under a same schema that takes in both 
entities together so that they can be described to be identical. If they are 
taken as identical schemata, then they necessarily describe themselves as 
an identical schema. This means that they are not under an identical 
schema but themselves an identical schema. Therefore, ∧ is the form of 
coexistence and stands for the coexistence of two 1-dimensions. 
 
  The 1-dimension is anything that consists in and of two and only two 
directions such that are determined by two and only two points which are 
so correlated as to descriptively represent each other. This is the 1-
dimension as a schema. The existence of two of such a schema can be so 
correlated as to be an identical existence if and only if they ‘intersect’ in 
the sense that ; 
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  (i) two sets of two and only two directions coexist, 
 
  (ii) if such a coexistence is describable, then those which coexist        
cannot be independent from each other, 
 
  (iii) whatever that is not independent from each other, share a same 
space, 
 
  (iv) given any two 1-dimensions in such a space, they cannot hold 
exclusively to each other. 
 
The ∧-space is therefore a space which is determined by two 1-
dimensions’ intersecting each other. That is, being unable to hold 
exclusively to each other two 1-dimensions necessarily generate a space 
between them. This ‘between’ stands for the characteristic of the ∧-space. 
The ∧-space is therefore, like the ∨-space, internally determinant and 
is therefore a schema of its own. Two 1-dimensions are given by 
intersecting each other and so determine a space between them. This 
space therefore necessarily has a ‘centre’. However, unlike the centre of 
the ∨-space this ‘centre’ is not identifiable with the 2-dimensional 
manifestation of schematic points, which determine two and only two 
directions and, in the case of the ∨-space, merge into a single point (i.e. a 
2-dimensional point). This is so because the ∧-space necessarily consists 
in and of two intersecting 1-dimensions. This means that no schematic 
points can be descriptively seen within this space. The ∧-space is 
described by and between them. 
 
  The two types of space are summarized as follows : the ∨-space has one 
and only one 2-dimensional point. This point has no spatial quantity and 
forms the centre of the ∨-space. This space is enclosed within a closed 
boundary that is not reducible into parts. Within this space there are a 
boundless number of fictitious points that exist in order to describe the 
two boundaries of this space in terms of their density. At each 
level of density there is a fictitious 2-dimensional 1-dimension. The two 
boundaries of the ∨-space are the two extreme limits of such descriptive 
2-dimensional 1-dimensions. The ∧-space has an infinite number of 2-
dimensional points that are points of intersection of at least two 1-
dimensions. Every one of such points is a centre of the ∧-space. Between 
any two points there is either a 2-dimensional 1-dimension or a 
combination of 2-dimensional 1-dimensions. A 1-dimension that holds 
between two schematic points is a pair of two symmetrically related 2-
dimensional directions. The infinite extension of a 2-dimensional 1-
dimension along its two given directions is such a 1-dimension. Both 
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types of space have a common fictitious version. This fictitious version is 
a finite, boundless and uniformly curved space with one and only 
one centre which is either a 2-dimensional point with an infinitesimal 
quantity or a region of space with such 2-dimensional points. 
 
  The ∧-space consists of an infinite number of centres and is therefore an 
infinite space. This infinite space is uniformly dense because a 1-
dimension is intersectible by another wherever there is not yet a point of 
intersection. That is, every centre is identical in its composition, and 
centres breed and multiply themselves identically and infinitely and 
therefore make the ∧-space uniformly more and more densely populated 
until there exists no more space without externally, dynamically and 
infinitely expanding. This is made possible by the descriptive 
simultaneity between two initially intersecting 1-dimensions’ acquiring a 
2-dimensional locality and the ∧-space’s coming into existence. This only 
means that no particular localities have any special claims upon the 
way by which the ∧-space exists. The ∧-space is therefore uniform in the 
sense that it is not discriminative about locations of points of intersection. 
The ∧-space is simply the class of every possible space that can be 
determined by any two possible 1-dimensions. Such spaces form a class 
because they are all 1-dimensionally identical and 2-dimensionally 
simultaneous. If every 2-dimensional point can be a centre, then any one 
of them can choose itself as the centre without causing any changes in the 
characteristics of the ∧-space. Every centre can describe itself as the 
centre of the ∧-space. However, the centre of the ∧-space is necessarily 
one, and one only ; for nothing can be identically described more than 
once without contradicting the ontologico-notational condition of 
description. That is, there is no descriptive necessity for anything to 
repeat describing itself identically. Every centre of the ∧-space is 
identical with one another. Consequently, any one, but one and only one, 
of such centres can describe itself as the centre of the ∧-space. The ∧-
space is externally described as a space in which every 2-dimensional 
point can be a centre. The internal description of this space is the 
description of the meaning of such a centre. The ∧-space is described in 
terms of centres, and these centres are described in terms of a centre. The 
description of centres is the ∧-space, and the description of a centre is 
centres. This difference constitutes the external and internal structure of 
the ∧-space. The description of the internal description of the ∧-space is 
identical with the external description of the ∧-space. Everything either 
describes the ∧-space or is described in the ∧-space. This is so because 
the 1-dimension is the only epistemological entity that is so far 
conditionalized, and because this 1-dimension simultaneously and 
identically applies to both types of 2-dimensional space. Those which 
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are described in the ∧-space are so described as to describe the ∧-space. 
This means that in the ∧-space everything is everything else and is 
identical with itself. Consequently, if everything is a centre, and if it 
describes itself as a centre, then it, by itself, determines its relations to 
every other thing. That is, the description of a centre is identical with the 
description of every other centre. Every centre results in an identical 
description. Therefore, any one, but one and only one, centre can be 
described as a centre and becomes the centre of the ∧-space. This is the 
internal structure of the ∧-space. The ∧-space can be internally and 
externally described differently, while the ∨-space and their common 
fictitious version are internally and externally described identically. 
This is so because the latter has one and only one centre. The description 
of such a single centre is internally and externally identical because one 
and only one centre of a space is necessarily, in itself, the centre of that 
space. Consequently, the description of such one and only one centre is 
identical with that of a space that has this centre. 
 
  In the ∧-space, a 2-dimensional point is determined by any two 
intersecting 1-dimensions. Consequently, a centre is anywhere where two 
sets of two 2-dimensional directions extend from one another. Two 2-
dimensional directions form a set based upon a 1-dimension and are 
therefore directionally symmetrical to each other. A centre differs from 
every other centre if and only if it describes itself as a centre and becomes 
the centre ; for it, in itself, manifests the description of a centre. A 
centre relates to every other centre in the sense that any one of them could 
have been the centre. The centre therefore embodies relations such that 
hold among every centre. This means that every centre is determinant to 
one another in their identical relation to the centre. That is, the centre 
describes every other centre in such a way that they are all mutually 
determinant. This is possible if and only if the centre is determinant to 
itself. If anything is determinant to itself, then between them there is a 
space such that describes how it is determinant to itself. If the centre is 
the description of a centre, then a space in which the centre is determinant 
to itself descriptively accommodates every other centre and makes them 
determinant to one another in their relation to the centre. This necessity of 
the centre’s being determinant to itself differentiates the two determinant 
intersecting 1-dimensions of the centre from every other 1-dimension in 
the ∧-space. Only those two determinant intersecting 1-dimensions of the 
centre are described to relate to each other so as to determine and give 
rise to a centre which describes itself as a centre. Every other 1-
dimension and centre can be described in their relation to those two 
determinant 1-dimensions. Consequently, only those two determinant 1-
dimensions need to form a set of two sets of two 2-dimensional 
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directions that extend from one another at a centre that describes itself as 
a centre. Every other 1-dimension can be described as a single 2-
dimensional direction by those two determinant 1-dimensions, each of 
which forms a set of two 2-dimensional directions. The ∧-space is 
infinite. Therefore, neither those two determinant 1-dimensions nor any 
2-dimensional directions have, unlike a finite 1-dimension, a 
reflex direction along a given direction. They extend into infinity. A 
given direction and its reflex direction of a finite 1-dimension become a 
spatial symmetry in the ∧-space and are so embodied by each of those 
two determinant 1-dimensions. Only those two determinant 1-dimensions 
need to embody this spatial symmetry ; for every other 1-dimension can 
be determined by those two. 
 
  Those two sets of two spatially symmetrical 2-dimensional directions 
relate to one another only in such a way that they comply with the 
uniformity of the ∧-space. This uniformity manifests itself as the equal 
density of 2-dimensional points in the ∧-space. That is, those two sets of 
two spatially symmetrical 2-dimensional directions relate to one another 
in order to give rise to a uniformly dense space. The ∧-space is 
generated by any two intersecting 1-dimensions and is therefore 
simultaneously assigned the characteristic of being-uniformly dense ; for 
the ∧-space only consists in and of points of intersection. That is, every 
two of intersecting 1-dimensions generate an identical space and 
simultaneously acquire their 2-dimensionality. The ∧-space is what 
identifies such identical spaces. The ∧-space is therefore inherently 
uniformly dense. This means that any two determinant 1-dimensions of a 
centre necessarily and inherently comply with this uniform density. The 
two determinant 1-dimensions of the centre of the ∧-space embody such 
uniform density ; for this characteristic of being-uniformly dense is 1-
dimensionally inherent to the ∧-space. The ∧-space is determined by the 
two determinant intersecting 1-dimensions of a centre that describes itself 
as a centre. Those two determinant 1-dimensions determine the ∧-space 
and are simultaneously made 2-dimensional by this ∧-space. 
Consequently, they, in themselves, represent the uniform density of the 
∧-space. This representation takes place in such a way that ; 
 
  (i) those two determinant 1-dimensions are described to consist of points 
which are uniformly dense, 
 
  (ii) these two 1-dimensions spatially reflect the uniform density of the 
∧-space, 
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  (iii) at where these two 1-dimensions intersect each other (i.e. at the 
centre) each of them is spatially transformed into a set of two 2-
dimensional directions which symmetrically extend from each other, 
 
  (iv) this set of two 2-dimensional directions is 2-dimensionally 1-
dimensional because it spatially divides the ∧-space into two, each of 
which necessarily consists of an equal number of centres in order to 
comply with the uniform density of the ∧-space, 
 
  (v) each set of two 2-dimensional directions divides the ∧-space into 
two, 
 
  (vi) two sets of two 2-dimensional directions relate to each other and 
reflect the uniform density of the ∧-space in such a way that they divide 
each other further into two, each of which consists of an equal number of 
centres. 
 
  This means that the two determinant 1-dimensions of the centre intersect 
each other in such a way that they transform themselves into four 2-
dimensional directions that perpendicularly extend from one another. 
Every other centre can be therefore described to be inherently 
determinable by two perpendicularly related 1-dimensional 
directions. Every 2-dimensional direction and their relations can be 
described by those four 2-dimensional directions that perpendicularly 
extend from one another. Those four perpendicularly related 2-
dimensional directions extend from one another only at 
the centre. They arise only when the ∧-space necessitates itself to 
internally describe itself. The description of a centre is the centre. Every 
other 2-dimensional point is a centre. The centre can transpose itself to 
any centres because 
 
  (i) any centres could have been the centre, 
 
  (ii) every centre is inherently determinable by two perpendicularly 
intersecting 2-dimensional directions that coordinate themselves with the 
four perpendicularly extending 2-dimensional directions of the centre, 
 
  (iii) these four perpendicularly related 2-dimensional directions can 
describe whatever that exists in the ∧-space. 
 
  The description of the ∨-space and of the common fictitious version of 
both types of space is internally and externally identical ; for the 
description of a centre of a space with one and only one centre is identical 
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with the description of that space. That is, the description of a space is 
identical with that of a substance if and only if a space has one and only 
one substance. The ∧-space consists in and of an infinite number of 
substances that are uniformly distributed and therefore make this 
space uniformly dense. The ∨-space consists of one and only one 
substance that is the only centre of that space. This centre is the inner-
boundary of the ∨-space and describes itself as the outer-boundary of that 
space. The ∨-space is therefore filled with descriptive entities within 
those two boundaries. This inner-boundary describes itself in such a way 
that ; 
 
  (i) there necessarily exists a set of two and only two directions which it 
can determine, 
 
  (ii) these two directions are such that hold in and between a single point, 
 
  (iii) they are so determined by this single point and therefore cannot 
coincide with that point, 
 
  (iv) if they are outside that point and are determined by that point to 
hold in and between that point, then that point is necessarily such that 
starts from itself and ends at itself and therefore, in itself, gives rise to a 
set of two directions ; for if it starts from, and ends at, a same point, then 
both a starting-point and an ending-point do exist, but are indiscernible 
from each other, which results in the twofoldness of a single point, 
 
  (v) this is possible if and only if that single point is quantitiless and 
multiplies itself into a single substance which is so densely populated 
with such single points that it cannot be reduced into parts. 
 
  This substance is the outer-boundary of the ∨-space and is generated by 
the inner-boundary of that space. Therefore, between those boundaries 
there are entities such that become boundlessly denser toward the outer-
boundary. The inner-boundary has no quantity other than the 1-
dimensional quantity, while the outer-boundary is itself a 2-dimensional 
quantity. The outer-boundary is therefore not spatial but self-spatial. It 
has no spatial quantity and therefore does not occupy a portion of space, 
neither externally nor internally. The inner-boundary is quantitiless 
because it necessarily coincides with its own space and does not 
externally exist in a space other than its own descriptive space that is 
filled with its own descriptive entities. The common fictitious version of 
both types of space also has one and only one substance that is the only 
centre of that space. The description of this centre is therefore internally 
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and externally identical with that of this fictitious space ; for one and only 
one substance can be described in terms of itself. This centre is either a 
single 2-dimensional point with an infinitesimal quantity or a region of 
space that is filled with such points. In the former case that point is 
determined be every different intersecting 1-dimension and is therefore 
bound by schematic points. Consequently, a space with such a point is 
necessarily finite, boundless and uniformly curved. In the latter case, each 
point is determined by a different set of two different 1-dimensions and 
therefore, together with every other point, necessarily forms a region of 
space that is bound by schematic points. Consequently, a space with such 
a region of space is necessarily finite, boundless and uniformly curved. 
This fictitious space with a single 2-dimensional point has no density 
because this point can only be itself the basic unit of density. This space 
therefore has no spatial properties that can describe its substance. The 
description of such a space is identical with that of its substance. If this 
space consists of a single region of space that is filled with 2-dimensional 
points, then such a region of space does not have a centre. This is so 
because this region of space consists of 1-dimensions such that every one 
2-dimensionally and directionally differs from every other, and that every 
two of them intersect each other. This means that every particular set of 
two different intersecting 1-dimensions necessarily prevents every other 
from forming a centre. This region of space is necessarily such that 
becomes denser toward its centreless centre. Consequently, no particular 
sets of two intersecting 1-dimensions can be the determinant 1-
dimensions of this space ; for this space appears different from every 
point. If a space is to be described in terms of its substance, then it is 
necessary for a space to be identical at every point in it. This means that 
this space has no spatial properties that can describe its substance without 
losing its own self-identity. The description of such a space is identical 
with that of its substances that are necessarily collectively taken together. 
Therefore, a space with one and only one centre is internally and 
externally described identically. Only the ∧-space can be internally and 
externally described differently. This difference makes it possible for the 
∧-space to spatially describe whatever that is in it. This difference is, so 
to speak, the boundary of this infinite the ∧-space. That is, anything can 
be described to be within the boundary of the ∧-space if and only if it is 
spatially describable. 
 
  I have roughly outlined the logical background of geometrical spaces 
(more details in ‘The Elementals’). Before I start discussing ‘numbers’ 
themselves, the followings are the characteristics of the resultant ∧ & ∨-
spaces. In short, the 2-dimension consists of two types of space and 
therefore of two types of 2-dimensional 1-dimensions. The 1-dimension 
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consists in and of two schematic points. Schematic points are therefore 2-
dimensionally described twofold. In the ∨-space the two schematic points 
are, by their meaning, identical with the centre (i.e. one and only one 2-
dimensional point) of that space and give rise to the closed boundary of 
that space. In the ∧-space and its fictitious version there are an infinite 
number of schematic points, and they form the boundary of those spaces 
from outside those spaces and give rise to the substance of those spaces. 
These two types of space are 1-dimensionally one and the same. Their 
difference is necessarily only 2-dimensional. The boundary of the ∨-
space is internally formed, while that of the ∧-space is externally formed. 
This is so because the former is internally schematic, while the latter is 
externally schematic and is therefore a schema of schemata. 
 
  A 1-dimension is a unit of quantity and, in the ∧-space, comes to have 
an infinite length. This unit is also the most basic unit. Consequently, a 
point of intersection is descriptively immeasurable. However, a point of 
intersection is quantitative because it necessarily occupies a portion of 
space. In the ∧-space a 1-dimension is a pair of 2-dimensional directions 
and therefore does not itself occupy any portion of space. This means that 
a 1-dimension can be described to have an infinite length in the ∧-space 
only in terms of points of intersection. A collection of this immeasurable 
quantity of a point of intersection therefore constitutes infinity, which is 
the most basic 1-dimensional unit of the ∧-space. Such a quantity is the 
most basic 2-dimensional unit and is infinitesimal. It is infinitesimal 
because it is static, immeasurable and is in a space, which is infinite in 
size. A 1-dimension can be described to consist of an infinite number of 
points of intersection, each of which has only an infinitesimal quantity. 
That is, in the ∧-space a 1-dimension is necessarily uniformly 
intersectible by an infinite number of other 1-dimensions. This also 
means that the ∧-space itself consists in and of an infinite number of 
centres. A number is a point in a space, it is for this reason that, although 
it may have a cardinality, it itself has nothing to do with the size it refers 
to. 
 
  In the fictitious version of the ∧-space a 1-dimension has only a finite 
length and is intersected either at the very centre of space or more and 
more often toward the centreless centre of space. If the latter is the case, 
then a given 1-dimension can be described to consist of a finite number of 
infinitesimal points that become denser and denser toward this centreless 
centre. Therefore, if those points are described to be uniformly dense, 
then this given 1-dimension appears as if being curved toward this 
centreless centre. Or, if a given 1-dimension is intersected by every other 
1-dimension at the very centre, then this given 1-dimension can be 
  99 
described to consist of a single infinitesimal point, which coincides with 
the total quantity of this space. 
 
  In the ∨-space a 2-dimensional point is such that from where two and 
only two directions can be determined so as to form a 1-dimension. This 
point, however, does not occupy a portion of space. This is so because a 
1-dimension such that can be determined by a single point, neither 
intersects anything nor coincides with that point. Therefore, in the ∨-
space a 2-dimensional point is a region of space with no quantity. 
This 2-dimensional point determines two and only two directions in such 
a way that from any part of this resultant 1-dimension they 
simultaneously hold. This 2-dimensional 1-dimension that forms the 
boundary of the ∨-space therefore necessarily consists of points which are 
not intersectible by anything. Every point of this 1-dimension is, if it can 
be so discerned, descriptively identical with that one and only one 2-
dimensional point. This 1-dimension is closed and uniformly curved in 
the sense that seen from that 2-dimensional point, every part of this 1-
dimension is necessarily such that can be taken up without being 
separated from any other parts and implies every other part. 
Consequently, in the ∨-space a 1-dimension can be described to become 
boundlessly denser and denser so as to descriptively coincide with that 1-
dimension which forms the boundary of this space and consists of 
boundlessly and uniformly dense points. These points are so dense that 
none of them can be separately discernible from any others. Therefore, 
this space can be described to consist of a single 2-dimensional point with 
no quantity and a single 2-dimensional 1-dimension that is boundlessly 
and uniformly dense and therefore cannot be reduced into parts. If this 1-
dimension can be discerned in terms of parts, then every one of such parts 
is descriptively identical with that 2-dimensional point. Between this 
2-dimensional point and the boundary of this space there are points that 
are described to become boundlessly denser toward this boundlessly 
dense, closed boundary. The boundary of the ∨-space is therefore a 1-
dimension such that becomes boundlessly and uniformly denser and can 
only be seen when it becomes densest (i.e. boundlessly dense). This 
means that if it becomes necessary to describe a ‘1-dimension’ within the 
boundary of this space, such a ‘1-dimension’ necessarily appears as if 
being curved toward the boundary ; for such a ‘1-dimension’ consists of 
points which become denser toward the boundary, and this means that if 
every possible ‘1-dimension’ is identified as a single type in terms of the 
uniformity in density, then ‘1-dimensions’ whose density is not uniform 
are made uniformly dense if and only if it is described to be more and 
more curved toward the boundary. In the ∨-space a 2-dimensional point is 
either inseparable from every other point or quantitiless. Such a point 
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does not occupy a portion of space, and therefore its size cannot be 
described, except saying that it only has a 1-dimensional unit. The ∨-
space is determined, and holds, between two boundaries that describe 
each other. That is, it descriptively holds between a single 2-dimensional 
point and inseparable 2-dimensional points. The only substance of the ∨-
space is these boundaries themselves. The substance of these boundaries 
occupies no portion of space that it binds ; for, otherwise, this space 
cannot be described to be closed and finite. A substance can be described 
to occupy a portion of space if and only if it is in a space. The ∨-space 
therefore descriptively manifests itself in terms of the description of its 
two boundaries. Its outer-boundary is a 1-dimension every part of which 
is every other part so that two and only two directions hold at any parts of 
it. Its inner-boundary is a 2-dimensional point that determines two and 
only two directions in such a way that each starts from where the other 
ends, so that a 1-dimension holds at every point where two directions 
start and end. These two boundaries describe each other in the sense 
that the meaning of each underlies that of the other. Any parts of the 
outer-boundary are identical with the inner-boundary and therefore with 
one another. Neither of these boundaries can be descriptively seen 
without the other. Between these two boundaries there exist a 1-
dimension which starts at where there are no describable quantities and 
expands while boundlessly becoming dense and denser and ends at where 
there are no describable quantities. This 1-dimension exists between those 
two boundaries in order to describe a space between them. This 1-
dimension is the form of the ∨-space and embodies the meaning of 
density, while those two boundaries are the substance of the ∨-space. If 
this 1-dimension is described at each level of density, then there are a 
boundless number of 1-dimensions between the inner-and outer-
boundaries. That is, between those two boundaries there is neither a space 
nor any substances. Those 1-dimensions are, so to speak, the descriptive 
substance of the two boundaries of the ∨-space. They consist of points 
such that become denser at each level of density that is represented by 
each of those 1-dimensions. The two extreme limits of those 
1-dimensions are the two boundaries of the ∨-space. They are made 
meaningful by what descriptively exists between them. Consequently, the 
space between those two boundaries is filled with points and 1-
dimensions that are the descriptive substance of those two boundaries and 
therefore have no 2-dimensional quantities. The meaning of those points 
and 1-dimensions is, however, identical with that of those that are in the 
∧-space (and its fictitious version). This is so because the relation 
between the two boundaries of the ∨-space and their descriptive 
substance is identical with that between schematic points and spatial 
substances of the ∧-space (and its fictitious version). The difference is, 
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while in the former those two boundaries are made descriptively visible 
by their descriptive substance, in the latter spatial substances are 
made descriptively visible by schematic points, which bind the ∧-space 
(and its fictitious version) from outside the ∧-space (and its fictitious 
version). That is, schematic points are, so to speak, the boundary of the ∧-
space (and its fictitious version). Therefore, from this standpoint the 
contents of those two types of space are identifiable. 
 
  A given 1-dimension has a unit in the ∧-space and is, due to its infinite 
intersectibility, described to consist of an infinite number of 2-
dimensional points (i.e. points of intersection). This unit is an infinite 
quantity, and its constituent points only have an infinitesimal quantity. 
Between every two of these infinitesimal points there is a unit which is 
infinitely divisible ; for in the ∧-space a 1-dimension consists of as 
many points as it is intersectible by different 1-dimensions. In the ∧-space 
centres multiplies themselves and this means that intersections multiplies 
themselves. Therefore, between any two points of intersection there is 
always at least one point of intersection. This infinitely divisible unit is a 
linear continuum and is the most basic 2-dimensional unit. Consequently, 
in the ∧-space the most basic 1-dimensional unit consists of such 
infinitely divisible 2-dimensional units. The unit of this infinitely 
divisible unit is a 2-dimensional 1-dimension which holds between two 
closest possible points of intersection. In the ∧-space if anything can be 
described, it is described in terms of such units of unit. Therefore, if 
relations are described between or among such units of unit, then 
anything can be described in the ∧-space in terms of such relations (i.e. 
numbers) or relations of such relations (i.e. functions). The most 
basic 2-dimensional unit is therefore not numbers but functions in the 
sense that the ∧-space necessarily consists of more than one point. This is 
identical with saying that the meaning of numbers is necessarily 
functional. An infinite quantity underlies an infinitesimal quantity, and 
vice versa. Neither is possible without the other. Only infinitesimal 
quantities can make the wholeness of a unit infinite, and only an infinite 
quantity can make every part of a unit infinitesimal. In the ∧-space a 1-
dimension (i.e. a set of two 2-dimensional directions) consists of an 
infinite number of 2-dimensional points. A 2-dimensional 1-dimensions 
is the most basic constituent unit of such a 1-dimension and yet consists 
of an infinite number of 2-dimensional points ; for by the meaning of the 
∧-space no two points can be conceived without at least one point 
between them. Consequently, there is no such as two closest points. The 
whole and a part therefore consists of an infinite number of 2-
dimensional points. Only given a dynamically expanding infinite totality 
(unit), an infinitesimal can be founded. This is the meaning of divisibility.  
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  The external description of the ∧-space differs from the internal one. 
This is so because the ∧-space is externally one and only one space that 
consists in and of an infinite number of centres, while it is internally an 
infinite number of identical spaces that consists in and of one and only 
one centre. The description of the ∧-space in terms of centres differs from 
that of centres in terms of the ∧-space. The ∧-space can be described as 
the totality of an infinite number of centres. These centres, however, can 
only be described to be such that any one of them could have been the 
centre of this totality that they themselves form. A space of centres is 
necessarily such that ; 
 
  (i) if it is seen externally (i.e. from the collective standpoint of centres), 
it is a totality with no centre, 
 
  (ii) if it is seen internally (i.e. from the individual standpoint of each 
centre), it is an infinite number of totalities with one and only one centre. 
 
This is so because a space of centres is necessarily a space that is 
identical with every possible centre. Consequently, its internal description 
consists of two parts : one is the self-description of a centre as the centre, 
the other is the self-description of the centre as a centre. That is, the 
description of a centre forms the centre, and the description of the centre 
forms centres. The difference between the external description and the 
internal one is a descriptive necessity and is therefore not a property of 
the ∧-space itself. In a space of centres any centres can be the centre. 
However, one and only one centre can describe itself as a centre and 
becomes the centre. This is based upon the descriptive necessity that no 
relations can be described between or among identical descriptions. 
Whatever that is once understood does not require itself to be understood 
again. By this descriptive necessity the description of a centre as a centre, 
leads itself to an infinite number of identical spaces with one and only 
one centre and results in one and only one description of such spaces. 
Consequently, that difference is not a property of the ∧-space but a 
necessity that the ∧-space imposes upon itself so as to comply with the 
ontologico-notational condition of description. 
 
  Whichever centre is taken as the centre, the ∧-space remains identical. 
Every centre has at least two intersecting 1-dimensions, two and only two 
of which are the determinant 1-dimensions of that centre. Such two 
determinant 1-dimensions of the centre are also the determinant 1-
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dimensions of the ∧-space and form four 2-dimensional directions that 
perpendicularly extend from one another. These four perpendicular 2-
dimensional directions embody the uniform density of the ∧-space. This 
is so because this uniform density is a necessary characteristic of the ∧-
space and is therefore necessarily represented by whatever that 
determines the ∧-space. These four perpendicular 2-dimensional 
directions can spatially determine every substance and every combination 
of them in the ∧-space, based upon the meaning of a centre that any 
centres could have been the centre. This is possible because every centre 
is related to every other in their identical reference to the centre in the 
sense that the centre represents the uniform density and infinity of the ∧-
space. That is, the two determinant intersecting 1-dimensions of the 
centre embody the uniform density of the ∧-space by forming four 
perpendicular 2-dimensional directions that infinitely extend from one 
another and therefore also represent the infinity of the ∧-space. Such four 
2-dimensional directions can transpose the centre to any positions in the 
∧-space and therefore describe every possible centre of the ∧-space. This 
is so because these four 2-dimensional directions are described to consist 
of an infinite number of points that are infinitely and uniformly dense, 
and are also described to be related to one another in such a way as to be 
able to determine every possible position in the ∧-space. That is, every 
centre can be the centre and therefore inherently has two determinant 
intersecting 1-dimensions which are necessarily identical with those of 
the centre in terms of the way by which they embody the uniform density 
and infinity of the ∧-space. Unless they are ones which descriptively 
constitute the four perpendicularly related 2-dimensional directions, every 
centre is necessarily in one of the quarters of the ∧-space and therefore 
can be uniquely determined by means of a set of two points each of which 
comes from the two surrounding 2-dimensional directions of a quarter to 
which a given centre belongs. The meaning of such a set of two points is 
based upon the necessity of the ∧-space that every centre is determinable 
inherently in the same way by which the centre is determinable ; for the 
centre is the description of a centre. The two determinant 1-dimensions of 
every centre other than those of the centre, however, do not form four 
perpendicular 2-dimensional directions. This is so because the centre 
stands for the description of every centre. Consequently, the two 
determinant 1-dimensions of any centres can be spatially determined by 
those of the centre and therefore descriptively transform themselves into 
the internal meaning of any centres which can be described to be 
determinable by two intersecting 1-dimensions. This makes the ∧-space a 
space of infinitely dense, uniform lattice that can be described as the 
spatial self-multiplication of the four basic perpendicular 2-dimensional 
directions of the centre. These four basic 2-dimensional directions are the 
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form of the internally described ∧-space and stand for the meaning of the 
Cartesian x-y coordinate. They become the x-y coordinate with the 
introduction of numbers. With this x-y coordinate, the ∧-space becomes 
the space of an infinite number of pairs of real numbers. In this space of 
pairs of real numbers any 2-dimensional directions and 2-dimensional 
1-dimensions can be described as a function, which is a relation between 
two pairs of real numbers, based upon the properties of numbers. Any 
combinations of them are therefore described as a relation of functions or 
a function of functions. A 2-dimensional 1-dimension holds between two 
nearest possible pairs of real numbers and is the most basic 2-dimensional 
unit. Such a 2-dimensional unit underlies the principles of differentiation 
and also makes the meaning of a number essentially functional. In the ∧-
space there is no such as a ‘curve’ in the sense of the ∨-space. A ‘curve’ 
is merely a functional combination of 2-dimensional 1-dimensions. The 
notion of ‘π’ is introduced by the descriptive necessity that the two types 
of space are necessarily under a same dimension. The notion of ‘π’ is 
geometrically transcendental because logic precedes geometry, and 
therefore because not every logical relation can be geometrically 
describable. That is, unlike in the logical space the logical relation 
between the two types of space geometrically remains descriptively 
incommensurable. In the same sense the π-constant is algebraically 
transcendental. This is so not in the sense that the π-constant is a 
non-algebraic number but in the sense that geometry precedes the schema 
of numbers, and therefore that not every part of geometry is numerically 
representable. The ∧ & ∨-spaces are geometrically and algebraically 
incommensurable to each other because they are originated in the logical 
space. This means that their relation can only be described logically. This 
is the meaning of the transcendence of the notion of ‘π’. The π-constant 
differs from an irrational number in the sense that it cannot even be 
‘pointed at’ as a gap on a sequence of real numbers. This is so because 
assuming that both types of space can be numerically represented on a 
same sequence of real numbers, the notion of ‘π’ exists between those 
two types of space, and not in each of them. The meaning of the notion of 
‘π’ is the descriptive necessity that the two types of space are necessarily 
under a same dimension. This means that the two types of space cannot 
coexist independently from each other under the same 2-dimension, and 
therefore that it is necessary for each to be able to accommodate the 
other. With the introduction of the notion of ‘π’ there are no combinations 
of 2-dimensional 1-dimensions that cannot be described in terms of 
functions. Numbers can only be geometrically generated. Consequently, 
the x-y axes relate to each other in the exactly same way by which the 
two determinant 1-dimensions of the centre of the ∧-space relate to each 
other. The meaning of a type of numbers is a geometrical property. ‘0’ 
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geometrically stands for the descriptive necessity that the two 
determinant 1-dimensions of the centre necessarily form four 
perpendicular 2-dimensional directions by intersecting each other. 
Consequently, ‘0’ necessitates the x-y axes to differentiate themselves 
into four numerically (i.e. functionally) symmetrical sequences of 
numbers which infinitely extend from one another. + and − stand 
for such a symmetry. The two determinant 1-dimensions of the centre 
also determine the ∧-space. Therefore, ‘0’ also means that it is necessary 
for any two identical sequences of number to be identified under a same 
schema. This means that ‘0’ is necessarily a 2-dimensional number. ‘0’ 
can be transposed to any 2-dimensional positions by means of a function. 
This is so because ‘0’ can be related to any 2-dimensional positions by 
means of a functional relation of 2-dimensional 1-dimensions. This is the 
meaning of the x-y coordinate. The meaning of a number is in the totality 
of numbers ; for a number is essentially functional. A number is, in itself, 
meaningless. Numbers are necessarily geometrical, and once numbers are 
understood to be spatial entities, ‘positions’, then the question of 
arithmetic is a matter of a slide rule. Russellian pursuits of the 
foundations of maths are misguided attempts to search a conceptual 
creator in conceptual creations.   
 
- Essential Transcendentals -  
 
  I briefly summarised the logico-geometrical outlines of the ∧ & ∨-
spaces. In short the ∨-space (henceforward referred to as the -space) is 
the ‘circle’, and the ∧-space (likewise referred to as the ┼-space) is the 
Cartesian coordinate of real numbers. The former is closed by means of 
infinity, the latter is open, infinite and dynamic.  
 
  Considering the essential properties of numbers, cardinality and 
ordinality, the number line of natural numbers is descriptively x = y, 
given the 2-dimensional Euclidian space, not x or y, because cardinality 
can only be expressed as positions against both x and y, which are the 
determinants of this space and are not by themselves indicators of 
cardinality. It is thus that x = y already contains irrationals. It is a 
descriptive necessity that a position on x is correlated with a certain 
position on y, that establishes cardinality common to, and in relation to, x 
and y. Further, it is the notion of place-values of the number line that 
gives an internal structure not expressible by the 2-dimensional space. 
The number line expressed by numbers without place-values has only 
limited descriptive capacity because it is the structure of numbers that 
describes number-applicable-objects by allowing to translate their 
structure into number structures. Infinite directional magnitude only 
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describes itself, like ordinality expressed in the -space. This internal 
structure of number line is essentially supported by the logical relation 
between ∨ and ∧. That is, the base of the ∧-space is the ∨-space, which is 
essentially a self-defining unit. The infinitely expanding number line 
must be descriptively unitized in order to correspond with the -number 
line. Otherwise, the ∨-space and the ∧-space are not mutually describable. 
Only in this way, the closed ∨-space and dynamically expanding open 
and infinite ∧-space have transcendental but describable mathematical 
relationship, based on their common logical origin. Maths can only be the 
mutual description of the ∨-space and the ∧-space. 
 
  It is taken for granted that natural numbers are the base of all numbers. 
This is only so arithmetically as we start our first lessens of maths by 
counting. However, our acts of counting already assume a space in which 
to locate and differentiate objects, and as such, so-called natural numbers 
are not only cognitively but also epistemologically more sophisticated 
than real numbers. Reals are by themselves just a continuum, like a ‘line’, 
and it is natural numbers that assign descriptive sophistications to reals. 
In the ┼-space points are positions locatable in their relations to the 
determinants. There are no two closest points, as a 2-dimensional 1-
dimension (line of points) is infinitely intersectible. This means that in 
any given line there are no units unless assigned from the outside. The 
sequence of reals is continuously expanding inwards and outwards 
infinitely, whereas naturals are a sequence of units with an assumption 
that units are universal and equal (hence ‘+1’). Naturals are superimposed 
onto reals because of the descriptive necessity of a space to describe 
itself. Remembering the centre (0) of the ┼-space is a centre that 
describes itself as a centre, and that its transpositionability needs points 
that can be described in their relations to the determinants, a real has to be 
determinable in its relation to the totality of the ┼-space. In another word, 
reals have to be unitized so that they acquire a paradigm of describability. 
Reals acquire units and external directions due to naturals. 
 
  ‘Units’ assignable to naturals are augmented by the ┼-space, instead of 
being taken for granted without reasons, as the ┼-space is a space that is 
uniform and expands infinitely and dynamically and thus gives ‘units’ 
descriptive legitimacy. ‘Units’ in the ┼-space are therefore uniform and 
acquire operative directions as well as other essential spatial properties 
such as continuity, infinity and symmetry. The ┼-space becomes 
operatively descriptive by this superimposition of naturals onto reals. 
Numbers here become possible to be viewed in their totality and can be 
used to describe the space in which they are in. The Peano form of 
naturals, 
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(0, n, n+1) 
 
, is not a set of definitional axioms, but an expression of a spatial property 
of the ┼-space, where ‘0’ is a centre, ‘n’ is a position correlatable to 0 
and ‘n+1’ is a directional quantity n has in this space. Reals are 
substances, and naturals are forms, of the ┼-space, and together they 
allow the ┼-space to describe itself. Paradoxes of numbers are here 
linguistic confusions, once you realize they are expressions of spatial 
properties of the ┼-space.  
 
  Numbers as ‘sets’ are definitional abstractions because empirical 
cardinality has to be distilled into an abstract concept in order to be seen 
to be universally applicable, in the process ending up with ‘cardinality’ 
that should not be cardinal. Whereas, ‘numbers’ in a schema of space are 
spatial entities, ‘positions’, which do not require any further conceptual 
abstractions, because their applicability is replaced by that of their 
schema. Here instead of ‘set of sets’ you question the universal 
applicability of the schema of a space, not ‘position of positions’. 
‘Numbers’ are here applicable to anything spatially cognizable and are as 
universal as a space that gives rise to them. They are also applicable to 
anything spatio-temporal if further dimensions can be demonstrated to 
evolve from the 2-dimension. Similarly, the applicability of numbers is 
allied to characteristics of a spacetime schema. It is thus that in dealing 
with entities of a quantum field you need inventing new rules of numbers 
that are not applicable to our more commonplace schema of a geometrical 
space. However, insofar as you cannot invent totally new rules as if fallen 
out of the blue sky, and that ‘new’ rules are based on, and connected 
with, old rules in order to be understandable, any fancy schema of 
spacetime is ultimately descriptively rooted and conceptually bound by 
our good, old geometrical spaces. In short, numbers are as much 
applicable as geometrical spaces that give rise to them are applicable. 
Likewise, maths is as much applicable as the logical space that gives rise 
to maths is applicable. Uniquely to numbers, which are also tools of 
approximation, this applicability also works on approximation. In the 
Kantian flow of mind since numbers are as a priori as space and time, 
reducing the ‘necessity’ of numbers into the necessity of space and time 
is a good application of Occam’s razor.             
   
  Reals are unitized by naturals, and on one hand give naturals the spatial 
property of a continuum (a tool of approximation), and on the other 
acquire the spatial property of a direction (spatial totality). They together 
describe the ┼-space as a dynamic and infinite schema of schemata of 
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directional quantities, which consist of 0 (centre) and 1 (transpositional 0) 
locatable on a sequence of number line determinable in relation to the 
determinants. It is also this aspect of the ┼-space as a schema of schemata 
that allows it operative freedom. Numbers are not affixed to objects as if 
together forming proper nouns. An object, by occupying a position, does 
not own that position, because positions are freely available to be 
occupied provided that it satisfies the rule of a spatial schema (and the 
associated usual Euclidean rules, save for the parallel postulate that 
applies differently to the -space and their common fictitious space), 
within which a same object cannot occupy more than one position at the 
same time. Interestingly a same object can occupy more than one position 
simultaneously if belonged to different schemata that can be descriptively 
connected (e.g. the notion of ‘events’ in the probability). Given a schema 
of schemata, positions become ‘positions’ because the ┼-space is the 
space of directional quantities, once an intersection takes place and 
objectifies the space itself, like turning an empirical number into a higher 
conceptual one. In contrast, the -space is itself a schema because here 
an object and a space coincide. The ┼-space is the descriptive space of 
spaces and is numerically more descriptive. The ┼-space acquires further 
sophistications by descriptive necessities of describing itself. This is the 
prime describability of the ┼-space. The first of descriptive developments 
is a ‘place-value’. A number line consisting of reals and naturals is a 
continuous sequence of numbers milestoned with naturals, having come 
into existence by intersections and having acquired a spatial direction by 
the infinite expansion of the ┼-space.           
 
  The ┼-space and the -space are identical outside the 2-dimension. 
Given the 2-dimension, they describe each other via their transcendental 
relation, which, however, primarily takes the form of the ┼-space 
describing the -space, because numbers are products of the ┼-space. 
This gives rise to descriptive multi-layerization to the 2-dimensional plain 
and allows ‘curves’ into this space. The limited descriptive capacity of 
infinitely extending number line acquires numerical structures expressed 
by translating the linear magnitude into a unitized structure in terms of 
curves. It is positional expressions of a unitized number line that gives 
rise to logarithmic curves and turned maths into an art of approximation. 
That is, there is a descriptive necessity that numbers are expressed 
through place-values, the simple ones being seeing numbers through 
binary or decimal positional notation. However, the most natural one is e, 
because e reflects the transcendental relation between the ∨-space and the 
∧-space, in that the ∨-space is essentially self-defining ‘growth’ defined 
in terms of continual density to a limit, whereas the ∧-space is the inverse 
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of this continuous infinitesimal quantity and is self-defining ‘infinity’ 
which expand openly and dynamically. 
 
  An infinitely extending number line without place-values is like a 
sentence without ‘,’. ‘,’ signifies space and is the most fundamental 
operator of description, which, however, follows the ontologico-
notational laws of descriptive necessities. ‘,’ is the conceptual place-value 
as much as there will be no mathematical descriptions without positional 
notation. Both mathematical place-values and conceptual place-value 
originate from the ┼-space, which is defined by intersections of 
schematic directions and results in points that constitute a line. The most 
fundamental place-value of a number line is therefore not binary or 
decimal, but unary, which manifests as binary or decimal, etc. because it 
cannot be described otherwise. The unary notation as we understands 
already contains ‘e’ because the idea of ‘,’ between unary numbers 
assumes a ‘place-value’ of the multi-layerized 2-dimensional plain, the ∧-
space upon the ∨-space. This is also the reason why e is such a 
fundamental constant in maths and connects the ∧-space with the ∨-
space. 
 
  Geometrical points descriptively manifest not as numbers but as a place-
value. Representing the unary numbers not as 
 
  11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
, which is notationally meaningless, but as 
 
  1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
 
  
 
 
, this geometrically corresponds with the dotted line because ‘,’ can only   
be space definable by the two axes which are the determinant of this 2-
dimensional space. However, because the two axes are also describable as 
the same as the dotted line, as much definable as by any two invisible 
axes, between the seemingly identical dotted line and axes is hidden a 
‘curve’. This ontologico-notationality of the two determinant lines giving 
rise to a number line creates a ‘tension’ in the ┼-space. Underneath the 
‘e’ 
1111∙ ∙ ∙ 
1111
1 ∙∙∙ 
1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
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tension are a ‘curve’ and the descriptive necessity for approximations, 
which is the essence of meaningful maths. That is, the ┼-space 
incorporates the -space as angular tension between seemingly identical 
number lines, two of which define another as identical but only as spatial 
relation between them. It is thus that between (0,1) and (1,0) is (1,1) 
which is not locatable by the either number line so far self-defined.  
 
  The unary number line is not  
 
  11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
but 
 
  1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
because ‘,’ intrinsically incorporates the two determinant lines and space 
between them, which manifests as ‘value-place’, not locatable onto the 
two determinant lines. ‘e’ is an expression of seeing the determinant 
lines, 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙, from 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ and is the ┼-space 
numerical value of ‘,’. That is, numbers located on either determinant line 
can only be directional quantities of 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙, which is 
ontologico-notational and consists in points that accumulate ‘thickness’ 
from the point of intersection (0) towards dynamically expanding outer 
fringe of ∞. In contrast, a number line defined by the two determinant 
lines consists of 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ because it has spatial depth that 
gives numbers epistemic meaning defined in terms of a point of 
intersection taken as a centre (0), points of intersections (numbers) and a 
direction created by infinite expansion. Given spatial depth, this 
manifests as ‘place-value’ that signifies numbers as points, which are 
individual entities with ‘distance’, which is intersectability, between 
them. Between       
 
  A) 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙  
 
and  
 
  B) 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
there exists a descriptive relation of  A → B, which is ‘place-value’, and 
B → A, which is the idea of e expressed as a number in terms of ‘place-
value’. A number is a point of intersection, whereas a place-value is a 
space necessitated for intersection. A number, therefore, can only be 
meaningfully expressed via a place-value, and ‘,’ is a self-referential 
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concept that is applied onto itself in such a way as to create an entity out 
of space. That is, 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ is a description of 11111111111∙ ∙ 
∙ as much as ‘,’ is a description of points of intersection. 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ 
intersects 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ by a descriptive necessity based on the logical 
connective ∧ and gives rise to a centre and space, which then describes 
11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ as 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙.  
 
  Between 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ and 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ is a tension because 
‘space’ defined by ‘line’ only become visible by ‘distortion’. This is 
where ‘approximation’ becomes the essence of maths. A place-value 
distorts a number line as a line acquires ‘width’ as it were, on top of 
thickness. This is conventionally expressed as progressively inverse 
relation between exponentiation and division or continuous fraction, etc. 
and numerically materialises as e. e expresses that numbers only become 
descriptive by incorporating ‘,’, which means the ┼-space inherently 
incorporates the -space in order to be descriptive. The -space is self-
defined or internally generated (1-D = 2-D), whereas the ┼-space is 
externally generated via two intersecting 1-dimensions.    
 
  The infinitely extending number line that consists in and of points is not 
descriptive. Underneath 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ is the dynamically expanding 
infinite space that gives a direction, and therefore thickness, to the series 
of points. The totality of natural numbers, N, cannot be talked about as a 
directionless group (set) of points because infinity of numbers needs this 
dynamism of expansion to acquire direction. The self-referential paradox 
of a set of set is avoided as this direction cannot come to a stop, without 
contradicting describablity. That is, infinity is only infinity as long as the 
dynamic expansion continues, and as this dynamism cannot be captured 
without space, ‘∙ ∙ ∙’ of 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ does not descriptively suffice a 
set. It is the ontologico-notational necessity of the ┼-space that defines a 
space, which gives rise to descriptive numbers 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
between the two intersecting 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙. Thus, a place-value is not 
just a numerical convention, but the most natural ingredient of descriptive 
numbers and e is therefore a key component of mathematical 
descriptions. 
 
  A ‘place-value’ is conventionally expressed as the summation of an 
infinite series of 1/n! with n ranging from 0 to ∞, because n! stands for a 
series of possible permutations of numerical objects which possible 
place-values necessitate, which then divide 1 (point) in order to produce a 
descriptive value of a place-value. Natural numbers, n, starts with 0, not 
with 1 as sometimes assumed, because the ┼-space necessarily has a 
centre (0). Thus the higher a place-value is, less descriptive it becomes 
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because the wider a number line is, less precise it can point. On the other 
hand, the lower a place-value is, the more impotent it becomes because a 
number line without any width is just a line of points and only describes 
itself. That is, a place-value and a number are descriptively inversely 
related, with the proviso that the place-value of 0 has no descriptive 
capacity.    
 
  11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ is a number line without any place-value, and 1, 11, 
111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ is a line with a place-value of 1. e points to a place-value 
with ideal descriptive power, i.e. with the most descriptive width to an 
infinitely expanding number line. This line represents spatial tension of 
the ┼-space at the ideal befitting the convention. A straight line in the ┼-
space describes little other than this space, while a curve is decisively 
more useful because it describes the -space ontologico-notationally 
inherent in the ┼-space through logical relationship. The space defined by 
the determinant number lines (11111111111∙ ∙ ∙) contains descriptive 
number lines (1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙), which acquire width and thus create 
spatial tension and introduce curves into the space of straight lines.   
 
  This width of a number line is represented by a place-value, and points 
as defined by intersecting directions have no size, but this line of points 
(11111111111∙ ∙ ∙) acquires width because of ‘,’, which is space defined 
by two intersecting 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙. 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ only exists 
between two intersecting 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙. 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙  
becomes a descriptive line with ‘e’, dispensing with defining 
11111111111∙ ∙ ∙, which becomes descriptively invisible, as it were. The 
width of a number line is a number line accompanied with its defining 
space. This is the meaning of ‘e’. 
                    
 
 
 
                                                 
                                                 │││ 
 
                                          The -space 
 
Nought place-value     00000000 ∙ ∙ ∙ or 11111111∙ ∙ ∙     ≡ the ┼-space   
Unary place-value       0, 00, 000, 000, ∙ ∙ ∙ or 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
Binary place-value      0, 1, 10, 11, 100, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
            ∙ ∙ ∙ 
          ‘e’ (arithmetically equivalent to the centre of the -space ) 
            ∙ ∙ ∙ 
Decimal place-value    0, 1, 2, 3, ∙ ∙ ∙, 9, 10, 11, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
            ∙ ∙ ∙ 
∞ place-value               ∙ ∙ ∙          ∙ ∙ ∙, ∙ ∙ ∙  
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  A width (thickness) of number line compromises between describability 
and precision. The ‘value-place’ notation is arithmetically synonymous 
with the -space number line because, as the -space number line 
loses ordinality at a limit of cardinality and becomes circular, the place-
value number line also becomes circular in terms of width of number line, 
in that the nought place-value number line becomes descriptively 
analogous with the ∞ place-value number line. e stands for ideal width in 
terms of the balance between describability and precision. 
 
  The notion of ‘precision’ sounds alien to maths as maths is idealized as 
paragon of descriptive precision. Contrary to this superstition, maths is 
really an art of approximation, starting with identifying (descriptively 
approximating) every object as 0 for the sake of countability. Insofar as 
‘place-value’ is not an arbitrary convention but necessary part of number 
descriptions, some place-value is more precise for a purpose and is 
therefore useful to be adopted as term of reference for descriptions of 
spatial distortions.           
 
  It is interesting maths works out e without even knowing what really it 
is, and gives us some insight into the scope and scale of human 
intelligence embedded in a notation, which it creates. The conventional e 
stands for an ideal balance between ‘number’ and ‘place-value’ and is 
deemed one of the most important mathematical constants alongside π, i, 
0 and 1. The tension arisen because of width of a line consisting in and of 
sizeless points spatially manifests as ‘curve’ and arithmetically 
materialize ‘approximation’ as the essence of maths. In conceptual 
descriptions ‘,’ is the only meaningful self-referential concept because it 
signifies space, of which the meaning is self-defining in terms of 
ontologico-notationality of whatever is describable and understandable. 
In this sense ‘,’ is the same as ‘I’. e, whatever numerical value it is 
conventionally assigned, is a way of expressing spatial tension between 
11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ and 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ in terms of combinations of 
linear notations such as addition, division, factorial and 1 as applicable to 
number lines and manifests as a curve in the world of lines. This curve 
then describes space as approximation of linearity.      
 
  The self-referential paradox in a manner of a ‘number of numbers’ is 
avoided in case of ‘place-value’ numbers. As a place-value approaches ∞, 
numbers lose descriptive meaning and end up synonymous with a 
singularity number as of the -space. That is, a number line with ∞ 
‘place-value’ describes nothing, which is against the meaning of 0 as 
approximation of describable objects. As a number line in the -space 
loses ordinality at a limit of cardinality, a number line in the ┼-space 
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loses a descriptive power at a limit of place-values. Thus arithmetical 
‘place-value’ plays a similar role to geometrical recursiveness of the -
space and is a way of descriptively assimilating the -space into the ┼-
space as the latter is numerically more descriptive by virtue of being the 
basis of descriptive numbers, and as the former is the logical base of the 
latter. The logical structure is thus represented in the structure of the 
totality of numbers in the form of describablity of ∞ ‘place-value’.        
 
  If naught ‘place-value’ and ∞ ‘place-value’ are descriptively to merge 
and pervade describability in preference for precision, then somewhere 
between naught ‘place-value’ and ∞ ‘place-value’ is describablity ideally 
balanced on precision. This must be the notion of e, which describes 
‘place-value’ is not a linear number but a recursive connector of 0 and ∞, 
much as 0 and ∞ merges in the -space. Such a connector is to be found 
in a constant, which is a ‘place-value’ of place-values, defined as 
summation of every possible permutations, given mathematical objects 
identified by 1 (point) and starting with 0 (centre). 
 
  While natural numbers extend from 0 to ∞ on their own, natural 
numbers as place-value numbers run from 0 to ∞ in such a way as to 
become circular, linear extension being constrained by the logical base of 
the ┼-space, i.e. the -space, which manifest as the balance between 
describability and precision as neither space can be fully described in the 
other. Their transcendental relation originates from their logical relation 
and can only be described logically. Numbers with place-value number 0 
and those with place-value number ∞ are identical at a limit, in the sense 
that they are both straight number lines with no width and describe 
nothing but themselves. An ideal balance thus excludes any place-value 
numbers that are large on one hand and that are less than 2. It is 
conventionally set at the summation of an infinite series of 1/n! with n 
ranging from 0 to ∞ and expresses average width of number lines in 
terms of ratio of a ‘whole’ over its reconstructed parts. That is, 
 
  0) 11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
turns into 
 
  1) 1, 11, 111, 1111, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
by spatializing itself as width and becoming descriptively invisible, and 
thus transforming precision into describability. Once given 1, 11, 111, 
1111, ∙ ∙ ∙, then by virtue of numerical progression 
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  2) 0, 1, 10, 11, 100, ∙ ∙ ∙   
 
  ∙ ∙ ∙ 
      
  10) 0, 1, 2, 3, ∙ ∙ ∙, 9, 10, 11, ∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
  ∙ ∙ ∙ 
 
  ∞) ∙ ∙ ∙          ∙ ∙ ∙, ∙ ∙ ∙                     
 
, which is ∞ place-value number line and become identical with 
11111111111∙ ∙ ∙ at a limit. e comes into play as a constant applicable to 
natural numbers to turn them into place-value numbers in a self-
referential way and shows spatial quality assigned to each and every 
sizeless point. That is, a number as representing a point has no size by 
itself. Its cardinality and ordinality are relationally found and are based on 
spatial quality assigned by width of number line. The self-referential 
paradox of a number of numbers is avoided because a totality of sizeless 
points has no size, likewise a number of numbers per se is not a number 
without space that brings about cardinality and ordinality. Since space is 
expressed as width of a number line, a number of numbers only refers to 
its structure as a totality. Space assigned to sizeless objects, which then 
acquire a size, is the only self-referential paradox that is not a paradox but 
a tautology.      
 
  That there is ‘e’ somewhere in the loop between 0 and ∞ is founded on  
 
1) precision per se describes nothing as a number line without place-
values only describes itself, 
 
2) describability is assigned by a width of number line which is finite as a 
0 place-value number line and a ∞ place-value number line are identical 
at a limit, 
 
3) between a number and a place-value number is self-referential paradox 
₪ tautology. 
 
e is therefore not an object but a relation expressed in terms of 
paradox/tautology. ‘Numbers’ which contains ∞, is self-contained by ∞, 
as ∞ becomes identical with 0 at a limit when ‘numbers’ incorporate 
space into them for the sake of describability. The necessity of numbers 
to have place-values makes approximation as the essence of maths. e is 
the epitome of the describability of numbers in terms of place-values, as 
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the summation of an infinite series of all natural numbers expressed as 
spatialized points permeated at every level of cardinality. It stands for the 
description of cardinality recursively incorporated into ordinality at a 
limit as the ┼-space is logically contained in the -space. That is ∞ self-
contained in ∞, which is self-referentially a paradox ₪ tautology. e is thus 
a constant essential to expedite the describability of numbers, as an 
essential tool for approximation. A whole is divided and exponentiated so 
that between a whole and its reconstructed whole holds operative 
meaning by which a whole is described through its parts. e facilitates 
such a description. The ┼-space’s descriptive power is thus essentially 
enhanced by being incorporated into its logical basis of the -space.             
 
  e appears in an attempt to describe the ┼-space via the -space, and 
therefore the descriptive inverse of e is the description of the -space 
via the ┼-space. This is a singularity number that loses ordinality at a 
limit of cardinality. If it is possible to apply this singularity number 
operationally, this will dispel spatial distance as every point becomes a 
starting point as well as an ending point. Dimensional travels will require 
such a number. 
 
  In the ┼-space the cardinality and ordinality come hand in hand because 
this space is a cosmos made descriptive by quantitative uniformity 
(density), dynamical infinity (directions) and transpositional identifier 
(0), while the same applies to the -space only as process and at its limit 
all the descriptive qualities disappear into singularity, which most 
typically destroy the ordinality. The resultant singular number therefore 
has the cardinality of countable ∞, but no ordinality. Among the essential 
transcendental numbers e is one which most directly connect the ┼-space 
with the -space, whilst π is the numerical representation of the -
space in the ┼-space under the necessity of the 2-dimension by means of  
┼-numbers, as the ┼-space generate descriptive numbers. i is the 
numerical representation of the common fictitious space derivable from 
the ┼-space and the -space to show the ┼-space and the -space are 
one and the same outside the 2-dimension.     
 
  Numbers are not just a quantitative numerical series. There are 
fundamental qualitative differences between some numbers. It is these 
differences that allow mathematical operations. The most fundamental 
difference is between 0 and every other number. Without 0 there will be 
no arithmetic. That is, there will not even be 1 + 2 = 3 without 0 because 
every number in this assumingly simple operation is identified by 0. 1 + 2 
= 3 is possible because it is essentially 1(0) + 2(0,0) = 3(0,0,0). A 
conceptual confusion occurs due to the fact that 0 is also a quantity 
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between −1 and +1. This idiosyncratic nature of 0 as a quantitative 
identifier as well as being a quantitative signpost is not fully appreciated. 
0 is a number, but is, in fact, the number, i.e. the only number. We 
operate this 0 as mind can find a purchase based on this idiosyncrasy of 0. 
Otherwise, numbers will become an invisible abacus like the maths of 
pre-0 days, i.e. numerical cognitions of finger movements, which were all 
we needed for day-to-day life of Arcadia. The conceptual leapfrog based 
on the discovery of 0 as the building block of numbers and its unique 
operative difference from what it builds results in the arithmetical 
structure of numbers.        
 
  The accuracy and validity of 1 + 1 = 2 is guaranteed in the fact that we 
and the world coincide in our description of our world. Maths is useful 
only insofar as we describe ourselves as objects of the world, which has 
no choice but being our world. Maths is our maths. This is the meaning of 
0 as identifier. We identify every empirical object as a ‘thing in itself’ so 
as to remove conceptual (linguistic) facets and layers. Thus, the world 
becomes the collection of 0’s, which follow its internal structure in order 
to be ordered. That is, the ordering of 0’s is synonymous with the 
description of 0’s, which complies with the descriptive necessities (logic) 
of the atomic symbolic form (FX). The resultant numbers of various 
kinds represent spatial structures of our descriptive space. In essence, 
maths is valid because maths mirrors ourselves, which is our world, 
which is the world. A grand tautology. 
  
  To try to describe how numbers work by means of numbers is maths, 
but to attempt to describe what numbers are by numbers is a notational 
self-reference. In the number theory tools of description become objects 
of description in the sense that they contemplate on numbers by numbers. 
This is ultimately true of all areas of maths, but it is mitigated here that 
numbers are, once taken for granted, tools to model on something else, be 
them geometrical objects or empirical phenomena, in either way applying 
rules of numbers on modelled entities, resulting in useful approximations. 
The number theory may be the queen of maths but is equally an 
incestuous bastard of maths, because you cannot define numbers by 
numbers. Thus, to this day we do not know what primes are (PNT). 
When formal logic and maths are thought independent, there were 
attempts to reconcile the latter with the former because the former was 
regarded more fundamental. But that they are not independent and share a 
common root, means they both have to be described by this common root. 
This is the same as saying ; given (x) › x, x can be described by x, but (x) 
cannot be. Otherwise, the hypothesis need not be a hypothesis, but a 
description. This is why maths is descriptively nothing but 
  118 
approximations at best, while the philosophy of maths consists of 
hypothesises and metaphysical speculations, despite their certain intuitive 
appeals. We at best can only appreciate through our own linguistic 
totality (Boolean wholistic reference).          
 
  The infertility of set theories is the assumption of the construction of (x) 
from x. It either constructs without acknowledging (x) › x and falls into a 
Gödelian loop if formalistic approaches are made or becomes a game of 
mind without realizing mind is toying with itself. This summarises von 
Neumann-esque set theory of constructive numbers, which are humanly 
designed to explain, rather than ontologico-notationally to represent, 
mathematical objects. The construction of numbers out of 
 
  {{ }, {{ }}, …, {{ }, {{ }}, …}} 
 
is simply a clever technique augmented by ingenious definitions to avoid 
self-referential paradoxes and does not add anything fundamental to our 
knowledge of numbers. We are none the wiser as to the philosophical 
nature of numbers because {{ }, {{ }}, …, {{ }, {{ }}, …}} already 
presupposes primitive numbers and thus the use of ‘,’ without any real 
definitions. It is the acceptance of the numbers that is the basis of the 
constructions of numbers. Likewise it is the acceptance of the wholeness 
of language that is the basis of mathematical elaborations of numbers. In 
von Neumann notation { } is counted as the unit to construct numbers. 
Hence, 0 is the container of naught, instead of being naught. Here ‘mind’ 
the counter, is counting something that cannot be counted as a class of 
something that cannot be counted, thus {{ }}, i.e. there is 1, that is the 
class of something that cannot be counted, that was counted. If there is 1, 
then there are the class of something that cannot be counted as well as the 
countable class of the class of something that cannot be counted, thus  
{{ }, {{ }}}, and so on. This is really not much of advancement from 
Fregean conception of naught, that is something that which is not itself. 
Here ‘mind’ is the pontificator that stands outside that which is not itself, 
and says there is something that is not itself, and that is ‘naught’. While if 
there is something that is not itself, this should have been invisible to 
‘mind’. For von Neumann ‘mind’ the counter takes itself as hostage and 
ends up as the ultimate self-referential loop. That is, ‘mind’ engages in 
the folly of counting itself because it is the counter. By counting 
something that is not countable like itself ‘mind’ acknowledges it can 
always go beyond the line it draws around itself because it is the drawer 
of line, i.e. ‘mind’ the freedom fighter. Thus, the counter becomes the 
counted and keeps repeating the process of being the counter and 
becoming the counted. von Neumann relies on this process’s being 
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infinite and assumes it is therefore directional quantities. However, it 
lacks any guarantee that {{ }, {{ }}, …, {{ }, {{ }}, …}} is in fact not 
{ } because his notation is just a gimmick which depends upon the good-
naturedness of ‘mind’ to submit to the mental dynamism of looping. The 
versatility of mind, the interpretability of empirical facts and the 
linguistic flexibility all combined, it is all too easy to create greys where 
even the law of excluded middle has a place of denial. Numbers reside in 
such greys of ‘mind’ where paradoxes are modified as notational 
dynamism by hijacking ‘mind’ which utilizes, and is utilized by, 
notations which it creates. We talk about the applicable power of maths. 
This is, however, like being surprised by ourselves. It is the innate 
necessity of mind to turn the phenomenological chaos into the 
epistemological cosmos. This starts with counting and ordering. We thus 
create the world first by numbering. We create our world trough 
numbering so that we can describe our world by numbers. This powerful 
tautology underlies our knowledge.  
 
  This takes place because ‘mind’ perceives numbers as algebraic objects 
and seeks meaning in empirical counterparts. I deconstruct numbers 
geometrically as the logical necessity of intersection (0 as a centre) 
subsequent numbers as transpositional 0 from 0 as the centre (i.e. thus 
determinable in their relation to 0), where directions are provided by 
dynamically expanding ∞, hence also numbers as directional quantities. 
Reals, naturals, integers, irrationals, imaginary, etc. are all spatial 
properties of the ┼-space and the -space under the 2-dimension. Above 
all, 0, 1, e, π, i are the most important numbers in the sense without them 
there will be no maths. The numerically more descriptive power of the ┼-
space gives rise to numerical values of the essentially transcendental 
numbers, e, π, i, whereas 0 and 1 (transpositional 0) are uniquely ┼-
numbers. Together they form the most essential tools of approximation.  
Natural numbers are the descriptive form of recursiveness and units of 
real numbers, integral numbers are that of symmetry, and rational 
numbers are that of infinite divisibility, while irrational numbers stand for 
the necessity for the determinants to relate to each other. Consequently, 
irrational numbers cannot be located on either of the sequence of numbers 
that consists of natural, integral and rational numbers. They exist 
necessarily between those sequences and therefore only as gaps in a                
sequence of natural, integral and rational numbers. Real numbers 
therefore consists of natural, integral and rational numbers together with 
gaps among them. ‘Gaps’, nevertheless, as real as necessities of 
intersections. An imaginary number is the descriptive inverse of irrational 
numbers and is therefore one, and one only. This is so because it is found 
in the common fictitious versions of the ┼-and -spaces. The fictitious 
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versions of the ┼-and -spaces are common to both types of space and 
are therefore identical with each other, but are descriptively based upon 
the adversative of the descriptive necessity of each type. They are also 
descriptively a single space that is identical with the description of its 
own centre. 
 
  The -space and the common fictitious versions of both types of space 
are commonly known as non-Euclidean spaces. The non-Euclidean 
geometry consists in descriptions within these spaces. These spaces, 
under the 2-dimension, descriptively but transcendentally incorporate the 
┼-space. This is so because the ┼- and -spaces necessarily describe 
each other in each space, and therefore because their common derivatives 
contain both elements. This means that the ┼-space provides the -
space with the notion of a ‘straight line’, while the -space provides the 
┼-space with the notion of a ‘curve’. The notion of π stands for this pair 
of notions. A ‘straight line’ and a ‘curve’ are transcendentally identical 
outside the ┼- and -spaces. The notion of π is the bilateral form of 
mapping between the two types of space. The common derivatives of the 
┼- and -spaces are therefore provided with both notions of a ‘straight 
line’ and a ‘curve’. They are derived by assuming the impossibility of 
parallel 2-dimensional directions in the case of the ┼-space, and by 
assuming the finite density of the outer-boundary in the case of the -
space. There are two versions of them. In the case of the ┼-space, parallel 
2-dimensional directions are impossible 
 
  (i) Version 1 : because this space has one and only one 2-dimensional 
point, or 
 
  (ii) Version 2 : because this space has one and only one region of space 
in which 2-dimensional points become denser toward the centerless 
centre. 
 
In the case of the -space, the finite density of the outer-boundary of 
this space is possible in terms of boundlessly dense 2-dimensional 
directions 
 
  (i) Version 1 : which share one and only one 2-dimensional point, 
 
  (ii) Version 2 : which share one and only one centreless central region of 
space. 
 
The notion of a ‘straight line’ can be provided in the -space and 
Version 1 and 2 spaces if and only if those spaces are already given. 
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Otherwise, this notion itself (i.e. a ‘straight line’) conditionalizes those 
spaces themselves. Within those spaces this notion itself is identical with 
their own internal self-description. This means that from the standpoint of 
the ┼-space 
 
  (i) in the -space a ‘curve’ and a ‘straight line’ are respectively a 
straight line and a curve, 
 
  (ii) while in the ┼-space a ‘curve’ and a ‘straight line’ are respectively a 
curve and a straight line. 
 
From the standpoint of the -space, the above holds simply the other 
way around. If a straight line is whatever that follows the internal 
structure of each of the ┼- and -spaces, then a curve is the description 
of such a straight line by the internal structure of the other space. In this 
sense, a straight line and a curve underlie each other in Version 1 and 2 
spaces. Consequently, both are a straight line, or neither is a straight line. 
 
  The two types of 2-dimensional space are both conditionalized from the 
same 1-dimension. Therefore, they are 1-dimensionally identical. What is 
1-dimensionally identical, is necessarily also identical in the 2-dimension. 
Such an identity based upon a descriptive necessity is a transcendental 
identity. Those two types of space are 2-dimensionally identical by 
transcendence. The outer-boundary of the -space and the two 
determinant 1-dimensions of the ┼-space are descriptively identical by 
transcendence. Version 1 and 2 spaces are commonly derived from the ┼-
and -spaces. They are ‘derived’ in the sense that their existence is 
based upon a descriptive necessity such that requires the ┼- and -
spaces to be 2-dimensionally one and the same if they do not hold. Such a 
descriptive necessity is, however, identical with a descriptive necessity 
which conditionalizes the ┼- and -spaces from the 1-dimension ; for 
the 2-dimensional difference between the ┼- and -spaces is 
descriptively necessary and is demonstrated. In this sense, Version 1 and 
2 spaces are fictitious because they have no descriptive necessity. They 
are generated on the assumption that the ┼- and -spaces do not hold. 
They are, however, meaningful because they describe that the contrary to 
each of those two types of space leads both of those types of space to the 
formation of an identical space. Consequently, the existence of Version 1 
and 2 spaces is based upon such meaningfulness. These common 
fictitious derivatives of the ┼- and -spaces, however, remain 2-
dimensional because the contrary to each of the ┼- and -spaces can 
only be assumed from within those spaces. Therefore, the 1-dimensional 
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identity between the ┼- and -spaces is 2-dimensionally seen in the 
existence of those common derivatives. 
 
  Those fictitious derivatives contain both notions of a straight line and a 
circle ; for they are generated from both the ┼- and -spaces and are 
common to them. They are ‘self-contained’ in the sense that they have no 
descriptive necessity. They therefore do not necessitate themselves any 
further conditionalizations. The meaningfulness of those fictitious 
derivatives differs from a descriptive necessity that conditionalizes the ┼-
and -spaces. A descriptive necessity is based upon another descriptive 
necessity and becomes a part of demonstration from within an 
existing demonstration. This meaningfulness is, however, not a 
constructive part of demonstration but simply the description of the 
validity of a descriptive necessity in terms of the impossibility of 
contradicting that descriptive necessity without losing its necessary 
descriptive outcome. That is, if it is descriptively necessary that the 
2-dimensional transcendental difference between the ┼- and -spaces 
comes out of the same 1-dimension due to an innate necessity of the 1-
dimension, then this difference necessarily disappears when those spaces 
contradict themselves from within themselves. This is so because by 
contradicting themselves those spaces are contradicting their own 
descriptive necessity and therefore lose their difference. This results in 
identical fictitious spaces that are commonly derived from mutually 
different the ┼- and -spaces. 
 
  The ┼- and -spaces necessarily describe each other. This is so 
because they are under the same 2-dimension and are therefore not only 
1-dimensionally but also 2-dimensionally related to each other. There is 
no space other than those two types of space in the 2-dimension. 
Therefore, they can only be related to each other by describing each 
other. The mutual-description between two transcendentally different 
types of space is transcendental descriptions. The description of the -
space in and by the ┼-space is a ‘concentric circle’. A Euclidean 
concentric circle is made meaningful by this notion of a ‘concentric 
circle’. This is so because the most basic relation between two points in 
the ┼-space is a 2-dimensional 1-dimension, which is a ‘straight line’ 
with an infinitesimal length. In the ┼-space a Euclidean concentric circle 
is described as the locus of points such that hold at an equal distance from 
a same point. A circle is not a polygon with an infinite number of edges. 
Therefore, this locus cannot consists in and of points that are spatially 
related to one another in terms of 2-dimensional 1-dimensions. The 
notion of π stands for the descriptive incommensurability between a 
‘circle’ and a ‘straight line’ and transcendentally relate them to each other 
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by means of the necessity for each to be describable by the other. This is 
so because a ‘circle’ and a ‘straight line’ are both a straight line in their 
own space (i.e. respectively in the -space and the ┼-space) which are 
transcendentally related to each other. The notion of π exists between 
those two types of space and therefore does not stand for a geometrical 
property. This means that it cannot be referred to by a number of any 
types (and therefore by any functional means). The notion of π can only 
be numerically processed as an incommensurable relation between those 
two types of space and is therefore referred to by a process itself. Both 
the ┼- and -spaces have a common geometrical property which 
generates rational numbers. The numerical value of the notion of π is a 
relation between two totalities of rational numbers within the totality of 
totalities of rational numbers in the ┼-space. The -space generates the 
recursive totality of totalities of rational numbers and is therefore 
incorporated in the ┼-space as a unit of totality of rational numbers. This 
unit necessarily corresponds to an equivalent unit within the totalities of 
such units in the ┼-space. A totality of rational numbers holds between 
two succeeding integral numbers. A circle and a 2-dimensional 1-
dimension are both such a totality respectively by the meaning of the -
space and the ┼-space. By this correspondence between a circle and a 2-
dimensional 1-dimension a circle can determine, and be determined by, 
its diameter. The -space is incorporated in the ┼-space and determines 
a 2-dimensional 1-dimension as its diameter by means of such mutual-
determinability. The relation between these two totalities of rational 
numbers is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter and 
can be numerically processed because they are both within the totality of 
totalities of rational numbers as determined by means of the x-y 
coordinate. The incommensurability of such a ratio stands for the 
transcendental relation between those two types of space. This is the 
meaning of π as a ‘transcendental number’. The π is, however, essentially 
a Euclidean number because it can only be processed in a Euclidean 
space. The notion of π can only be processed as a Euclidean number 
because in the -space the totality of totalities of rational numbers can 
only be described in terms of recursiveness and therefore cannot represent 
the ratio of two transcendentally related totalities of rational numbers. If 
the notion of π can only be numerically evaluative in a Euclidean space, 
then the describability of the notion of a curve is numerically necessarily 
Euclidean. That is, every numerical representation is essentially 
Euclidean. This is the reason why a non-Euclidean geometry can only be, 
insofar as the description of a curve requires the π, numerically 
represented by a Euclidean geometry. All those which requires this 
numerically processed notion of π for its description, can only be 
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described via a Euclidean space ; for the notion of π can only be 
numerically processed in a Euclidean space. 
 
  The -space can be incorporated in the ┼-space because the meaning 
of what constitutes its centre and outer-boundary is identifiable with that 
of what constitutes 2-dimensional points in the ┼-space. The substance of 
the -space encloses that space, while the substance of the ┼-space fills 
that space. The two are, however, schematically identical. The description 
of the ┼-space in and by the -space is a ‘closed line’ and an ‘open 
curve’ as a segment of the former. This is so because in the -space a 
straight line is necessarily two ‘closed lines’. This means that in the -
space any two intersecting 1-dimensions necessarily form four ‘closed 
lines’ such that at least two of them intersect each other. These, however, 
cannot be numerically represented because the notion of π can only be 
numerically processed in the ┼-space. In the ┼-space an ‘open curve’ is 
made possible because a same point can be shared by a straight line and a 
circle. That is, if a circle is intersected by a straight line, then two points 
of intersection which are shared by these circle and straight line, 
determines a set of two open curves as the segments of this intersected 
circle. The description of an open curve requires π because an open curve 
can only be a segment of a circle or an integration of such segments. 
 
  It is also for this reason that a curve and a circle necessarily share a 
segment that is more than a point. Curvature is a transcendental relation 
between Version 2 space and the ┼-space. Curvature also gives rise to 
another transcendental number e and intrinsically connects with the 
notion of π as Version 2 space is a derivative of the -space. A fictitious 
line within Version 2 space is the transcendental base of an open curve in 
the ┼-space and generates e. In Version 2 space a straight line consists of 
points which become uniformly and boundlessly denser toward the 
centreless centre. This line becomes an open curve in the ┼-space that 
consists in and of points that are uniformly and infinitely dense. e is 
numerically processed as representing an open curve in terms of such 
density on a numerical line. 
 
  Certain functions of 2-dimensional 1-dimensions, be it a circle or a 
curve, need numbers which are not in the ┼-space as neither a ‘circle’ nor 
a ‘curve’ exist in the ┼-space. A ‘circle’ originates in the -space and a 
‘curve’ is found in Version 2 space, while Version 1 space is the 
descriptive inverse of the ┼-space in the sense that every point in the ┼-
space is fictionally described to form its own space and therefore 
represents schematic symmetry to the necessity for intersection. e, π and i 
are found when the -space, Version 2 space and Version 1 space are 
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respectively incorporated in the ┼-space. The notion of π is the bilateral 
form of mapping between the ┼- and -spaces ; for each type is 
necessitated to describe the other. The π-constant (i.e. the numerically 
processed notion of π) is, however, only applicable to the ┼-space. This is 
so because (i) rational numbers are the highest type of numbers which is 
common to both types of space and contains the meanings of natural and 
integral numbers, (ii) therefore the relation between two totalities of 
rational numbers can only be described in terms of rational numbers, (iii) 
this can only be done in a space which can represent the totality of 
totalities of rational numbers (real space). For this reason a non-Euclidean 
geometry cannot be purely non-Euclidean if it is to be numerically 
represented. The geometrical equality which holds between Euclidean 
and non-Euclidean spaces under the 2-dimension, loses its balance 
because of this necessity for the numerical inequality. This numerical 
inequality between Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces lies in the 
descriptive necessity that the notion of π can only be numerically 
processed in a Euclidean space. A Euclidean space therefore supplies a 
non-Euclidean space with a coordinate system and a set of functions that 
numerically determine the geometrical ‘distortion’ of 
non-Euclidean space against Euclidean space, in terms of the ratio of 
curvature. The numerical relation among the ┼-space, the -space, 
Version 1 space and Version 2 space is as follows : 
 
  0 and 1 originate in the ┼-space and respectively represent the necessity 
for intersection and transpositionality. 0 is a and any centre descriptively 
taken as the centre and gives rise to ‘transpositionalilty’ (i.e. 
operativeness) to numbers. It is therefore 0 that assigns cardinality and 
ordinality to numbers as positions of points in the ┼-space. 1 represents a 
and any point in the ┼-space and approximates a ‘thing’ in the empirical 
space. It is a and any centres (points of intersection) in the ┼-space, 
determinable in their relation to 0. The initial number lines of intersection 
are rational lines, which become real lines of determinates, once they 
acquire ‘width’. The determinates of real lines can locate transcendentals 
in their relation to 0 because they incorporate gaps as relations of the 
determinates.   
 
  π originates in the -space and numerically valued in the ┼-space. It is 
a structural expression of ‘closed whole’ in terms of its parts, 
encapsulated in a single number, approximated by the ┼-numbers.  
 
  i is a structural expression of ‘dynamic whole’ in terms of its notational 
reverse, encapsulated in a single number, approximated by a ┼-notation. 
That is, the irrationality encapsulated in n√ xn being a fundamental 
  126 
characteristic of the ┼-space created by the ontologico-notational 
necessity of the ∧-operation of two directions, it can also be described by 
its own negation. The -space is the ontologico-notational opposite of 
the ┼-space, based on ∨, while i is the notational reverse of the ┼-space, 
which notationally closes the ┼-space as it or any numbers affixed with it 
is unlocatable in the ┼-space. The -space and the ┼-space are 
transcendentally connected by logical relationship on one hand (∨ and ∧), 
but are also shown to be connected by notational coherence, in that i 
notationally derived from a fundamental characteristic of the ┼-space 
notationally mimic the -space by closing the ┼-space. The application 
of i onto the ┼-numbers creates the closed chain of numbers (finite field 
of numbers), which contrasts with the ordered field of the ┼-numbers. i 
originates in Version 1 space and represents a schematic symmetry to the 
┼-space. Interestingly it is used to designate ‘time’ as derived from space. 
It can be viewed as a form of schematic derivation.  
 
  e originates in Version 2 space and represents an open curve that also 
affords a real number line in the ┼-space to express stress in terms of 
width of that line. It is a structural expression of ‘open whole’ in terms of 
its parts, encapsulated in a single number, approximated by the ┼-
numbers. The limit of (1 + 1/n)n incorporates the whole of natural 
numbers and numerically represents their structural characteristics in a 
single number and is the width of natural number line. 
 
  ‘Transcendence’ is dimensional relations between the ┼-space and the 
-space, and of their respective descriptive reverse. Descriptions of these 
relations appear ‘transcendent’ because our only descriptive means is the 
numbers of the ┼-space and is necessarily incomplete. ‘Transcendence’ is 
a schematic necessity that logic is more fundamental than maths, and 
therefore there are elements of logic that cannot be fully expressed by 
means of maths. Euler’s identity is the numerical approximation of 
‘transcendence’ by the numbers of the ┼-space, and is also a description 
of FX through a numerical expression afforded within the ┼-space.  
 
   numerically expresses the dimensional relation among the 
┼-space, the -space, Version 1 space and Version 2 space and the 
necessity for them to describe one another. This is the ‘Iroha’ song of the 
essential transcendentals. That is, the descriptive necessity for the 1-
dimension to progress into the 2-dimension unravels itself in the ┼-space 
by transcendentally incorporating the -space, Version 1 space and 
Version 2 space. The ┼-space, by virtue of being essentially a coordinate 
and open, is numerically more descriptive in the sense that numbers are 
directional quantities by nature and a transpositional centre (0 as the 
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centre and 1’s as points) on the lattice of dynamic, uniform and infinite 
density gives rise to universality to any numerical descriptions. 
 
  An open curve given by Version 2 space in the ┼-space, can be 
described to be closed (the -space) by virtue of schematic symmetry 
(Version 1 space), this is the meaning of . It is a numerical 
representation of transcendental relations, much as the logical 
dimensionalities are recursively expressed by (p, p, p → p). Regarding 
, it can further be said that if you approximate ‘approximation’, 
you end up with the interconnected tools of approximation, which is the 
algebraic structure of the 2-dimension in terms of the -space mapped 
onto the ┼-space, based on their logical relationship as ∨ is the base of ∧. 
The ┼-space, being numerically more descriptive, is the base of 
mathematical descriptions. It may acquire more descriptive powers as 
further dimensions evolve from the 2-dimension and add tools derived in 
the process of this dimensional developments based on descriptive 
necessities. Complex and hypercomplex numbers are a good example, 
allowing us to explore extra-2-dimensions, but essentially ┼-numbers are 
the descriptive mother of them all.        
 
- Primality - 
 
  The mapping of the -space onto the ┼-space gives rise to further 
interesting features of the properties of numbers, such as evens, odds and 
primality. A ┼-number line is directional quantities arisen by a centre 
taken as the centre (0) and dynamically expanding infinity, thus pointing 
towards the infinitely stretched permeating border. Quantities are the 
thickness of points seen from the centre towards the border. However, for 
this infinitely expanding line of intersecting points to have any 
descriptive meaning it has to internalize this descriptively invisible border 
(∞). Otherwise, this forever expanding line is descriptively incomplete 
and is only there to describe itself. Directional quantities incorporate the 
space in which they are themselves being formed by means of place- 
values. Place-values are not a natural part of a number line but are there 
to make a number line descriptively visible by self-spatialization, which 
embodies the external space. The external space allows a number line to 
exist, while the internal space allows a number line to describe itself. The 
two spaces correspond to each other ontologico-notationally as whatever 
exists is also only descriptively so. Place-values are the same as ‘,’ in 
language, without which letters, words, concepts are meaningless. ‘,’ is 
the way language incorporates the necessity of self-demarcation, i.e. a 
stem-cell concept. Numerical meaning of ‘numbers’ are assigned by 
place-values, which also bring about ‘tension’ to a number line. ‘Tension’ 
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is a necessity of description that create properties of ‘numbers’ so that 
‘numbers’ materialize as numbers. Place-value 0 is the same as the 
necessity of intersection for    , place-value 1 is the same as a 
natural number line of no descriptive capacities, place-value 2 is the 
binary description of a number line, place-value 10 is the decimal 
notation, etc., and place-value ∞ is descriptively recursive to place-value 
1. Place-value numbers are, representing a space rather than a point 
(position), transcendentally approximate to the ‘ -number’, where 1 
(beginning) and ∞ (end) merge with the incorporation of 0 (necessity of 
   ). A ‘prime’ is the transcendental approximation of ┼-numbers to 
represent this place-value recursiveness, which manifests as the merging 
numerical directions of the -space (     ) and the infinitely 
diverging numerical directions of the ┼-space (     ). A ‘prime’ is 
an expression of a numerical totality expressed through the recursive 
totality of the -numbers on one hand, and through the infinitely 
thinning distribution in the infinitely dense and dynamically expanding 
┼-space. The ┼-primes are an infinite totality descriptively encaged 
within a dynamically expanding infinite totality, and together 
transcendentally correspond to the closed totality of the -numbers.       
 
  Each ┼-prime represent a -totality at each level of density towards a 
limit of the indivisible totality where numerical directions merge. You 
should remember, unlike the ┼-space of infinite intersectiblity defined as 
relations between the x-y coordinates (hence including gaps, and 
therefore its natural number line being a real line with intrinsic tension 
(i.e. ‘width’, numerically expressed as a curve)), the -space has no 
such points of intersection, and rational numbers transcendentally 
approximate fictitious pre-limit -numbers. This describes ┼-primes as 
indivisible whole, which infinitely thins out towards the dynamically 
expanding ┼-infinity. The paradoxical Euclidean proof of the infinite 
primes is really this schematic divergence of the closed totality of the -
space mapped onto the ┼-space. A ┼-prime is an indivisible factorial 
totality that is superficially random but logically necessary to arrive at the 
collective meaning of closed ∞ totality within open ∞ totality. It appears 
random because ‘directional quantities’ cannot conceptually encompass a 
closed ∞ totality within their open ∞ totality, and hence cannot present 
any formulae that describe the formation of closed ‘primes’ in the open 
┼-coordinates, which therefore look random. They are, however, 
logically necessary because numbers (including primes) are properties of 
a space. The formation of a totality (of primes) is a description of the ┼-
space and shows the logical necessity of place-values without which the 
∧ 
∨
∧
∨ 
∨
∧
∨ 
∧ 
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┼-space cannot be described. The recursiveness of place-values 
represents as the closed boundary of the -space on one hand, and as the 
closed ∞ within the open ∞ of the ┼-space on the other. 
 
  Place-value numbers recur between 0 and ∞ in the -space by ┼-
approximation, i.e. contained within open infinity. In the -space itself 
these recursive place-value numbers form a ‘prime’ at a limit, i.e. by 
virtue of closed infinity. This -prime corresponds to the totality of ┼-
primes that is a closed infinity within the open and dynamic ┼-space 
infinity. In the ┼-space a number represents a point of intersection 
definable as relation between the determinates (thus including pointable 
‘gaps’, i.e. ‘pointability’ due to the coordinates space). In the ┼-space 0 is 
transpositional to any points determinable in the coordinates, and 
therefore transpositionality is more than lattice-based superficial 
divisibility. Once the real line coordinates descriptively replaces the 
rational determinates by incorporating a thickness of a numerical line, i.e. 
via ‘e’, then the ┼-space becomes descriptively non-denumerable in 
relation to the -space. Whereas in the -space, where a point can only 
be a denumerable point, the only number at a limit can only be a ‘prime’, 
a totality in which there would be no ordinality. This means that, when 
the -space is transcendentally superimposed onto the ┼-space as ∨ is 
the dimensional base of ∧, ┼-numbers are, numerically interpreted, 
self-contained by primes by virtue of the -space. The -space is, 
numerically speaking, a rational number line that becomes a ‘prime’ at a 
limit, by incorporating 0 (the centre). This is the only prime and is the 
conceptual basis of all primes. At a pre-limit level (i.e. as the condensing 
rational line still with a centre) there would be a prime representing a 
level of density that is necessary to lead to a limit. It is these pre-limit, 
fictitious primes that show up as ┼-primes. Fictitious -primes, i.e. 
denumerable points transcendentally represented by ┼-primes, 
would fringe the ┼-space as if the ┼-space is contained by the -space. 
This is the ontologico-notational meaning of PNT. 
 
       ,       
 
It is ‘,’ in the above representation that is the essential connective 
between the -space and the ┼-space and signifies the transcendental 
space between ∨ and ∧, i.e. ‘negation’ as a form of mapping applicable to 
a whole space. This is a schematic negation to connect the -space and 
the ┼-space in terms of their common identity based on logical 
dimensionalities. That is, the ┼-space is the descriptive space of the -
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
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space and is recursive to the 0-dimensionality of both spaces. Thus, 
superimposed the -space onto itself by the ontologico-notationality, the 
┼-space describes its open, dynamic infinity transcendentally fringed by 
the closed infinity of the -space. From this postulated that there is such 
a prime is the final prime and has no ordinality. Euclidean infinity of 
primes originates from adopting -‘prime’ into ┼-primes that is 
underlain by natural numbers, which are essentially ┼-numbers and 
assume a divisible totality defined in terms of intersectibility. That is, ┼-
primes are infinite because they are superimposed onto natural numbers 
that are an additive totality of countable infinity. The original -‘prime’ 
is a closed number by itself. Natural numbers are definable by the process 
of (0, n, n+1) but contains numbers not definable by any process. 
 
  Euclid assumed that whatever these numbers may be, they are still 
subject to the additive operation. This is so because they have to be 
interpreted in the ┼-space in order to be numerically legible. This is a 
tautology saying primes are infinite because they are in the ┼-space and 
cannot defy the additive operation, which is a way mind the observer 
operates in the ┼-space. The additive operation is made possible by a 
given divisible totality and confirms, rather than create, the existence of 
certain spatial entities. p +1 does not create a new number but only 
affirms there is such a given existence in this given space. However, in 
the -space the only additive operation (of identifying ‘0’) closes the 
space in such a way that numbers lose the ordinality. The necessity of 
having to interpret ‘primes’ in the ┼-space is overridden by the logical 
relationship of the -space being more fundamental than the ┼-space so 
that the recursively closed logical dimensionalities uphold. It is here that 
the Euclidean proof can be questioned. The last prime, p, in the ┼-space 
follows the -prime in such a way that if the additive operation is 
performed, it will close the space, or it will defy the additive operation in 
order for the ┼-space to remain viable, i.e. in order for natural numbers to 
remain meaningful. 
 
  Arithmetical operations taken for granted by Euclid in his proof are 
spatial properties of the ┼-space. So long as natural numbers are carriers 
of primes, primes will present themselves infinitely in compatible with 
the ┼-space. That is, as long as we think in terms of the ┼-space, primes 
are infinite but inexplicably distributed. It is the logical dimensionalities 
of the ┼-and -spaces that explains the unfomulable distribution of 
primes in the ┼-space. Primes are essentially the ‘‘number’ at a limit’ of 
the -space as the -space can only be an indivisible whole unlike the 
┼-space, which is infinitely divisible as defined by points of intersection. 
This ‘prime’ of the -space manifests as primes carried by natural 
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numbers of the ┼-space because the dimensionality of the ┼-space is 
underlain by that of the -space in such a way that ∧ logically depends 
upon ∨. The -space is a closed space fringed by a line of continuum 
and is transcendentally superimposed upon the ┼-space. That is, the open, 
divisible and dynamic properties of the ┼-space are transcendentally 
affixed with the closed nature of the -space. This manifests in prime 
distribution as expressed through naturals. The -space is closed by 
substance, while the ┼-space is open by form, as befitting a schema of 
schemata. When the two spaces react wholistically, they connect through 
themselves as form of mapping. Thus, the -space manifests in the ┼-
space as rationally incommensurable enclosure within its open infinity, 
and the ┼-space, in the -space, as recursive infinity within its closed 
continuum, the former giving rise to ‘π’, the latter, to the postulated 
singularity number of no ordinality. The -‘prime’, the only numerical 
substance in the -space, is therefore represented as ┼-primes with 
asymptotic distribution towards its periphery, indicating an enclosure by 
itself despite open infinity. Euclidean proof of infinite primes is a 
schematic tautology because the carrier of ‘prime’ is the product of the ┼-
space. ‘Prime’ expressed by naturals and counted in terms of the ┼-
arithmetic can only be infinite, as the ┼-space is made infinite by 
intersection of number lines. The ordinality of primes arises only with the 
assumption of naturals, which are the products of the ┼-space, and 
without which there are no ways of establishing that one prime follows 
another. Thinking of primes without associating with ┼-numbers, i.e. in 
purely -space terms, they signify points of indivisible totality that 
comprise the -space. These points are described ‘denser’ away from 
the centre and at a limit lose the ordinality by incorporating the centre, 
thus attaining the merging directions of the -space. The -numbers 
can only be a ‘prime’ because each and every point in this space is a 
totality of its own. 
 
  Prime numbers constitute the prime line, which is a 2-dimensional 1- 
dimension and is always contained within 2-dimension, i.e. prime line 
infinity is always contained within 2-dimensional infinity because infinity 
is descriptively a 2-dimensional property and therefore because 1-
dimension leaves a legacy within itself to show its given infinity is 
descriptively contained within the 2-dimensional infinity. This manifests 
itself as the prime line. Otherwise, the 1-dimensional directions will not 
manifest in the 2-dimension. 
 
    ← 
  ∙ — ∙ infinity within infinity    
    → 
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, because 1-dimensional directions can only be described between 
schematic points, which are 2-dimensional boundaries. 1-dimensional 
infinity is always contained within 2-dimensional infinity. 
 
  From this follows it is the prime number line that constitutes the number 
line of the -space, and the prime number distribution is infinitely 
expanding 1-dimensionally but 2-dimensionally boundlessly confined in 
the ┼-space. Remembering that the ┼-space consists of the centre (0) and 
transpositional centres (1’s), which are also respectively the additive 
identifier and the multiplication identifier, and that 1’s in the ┼-space are 
points of intersection and form directional quantities, manifesting as the 
natural number line, the -space consists only of the centre and has no 
intersections. In the -space 0 is the centre of density which manifest as 
the boundary of the -space, boundlessly dense at a limit. The -space 
therefore arithmetically only has 0 as the additive identifier, but no 
multiplication identifier. Approximating the -space with ┼-numbers as 
it were, multiplication is descriptively based on factorial totalities, and it 
is the existence of such totalities in the number line, together with a 
blackboard-like, open and dynamically infinite ┼-space, that allow 
arithmetical operations such as addition and its inverse (vice versa), 
multiplication and its inverse (vice versa). This amounts to say the -
space is the -number line, which is an inoperable totality.   
 
  The descriptive necessities of the determinants of the ┼-space are 
represented as the additive identifier 0 (the necessity of a centre as the 
centre) and the multiplication identifier 1 (the necessity of intersections 
arising in the conjunctive space). Whereas, in the -space the number 
line (at a limit) can only consists of what is known as prime numbers in 
the ┼-space because points and lines here can only be descriptive points 
and lines representing the density of space away from the centre (0). 
These points and lines become described at their limit, manifesting as 
  
    
 
  Expressed in the descriptive manner of the ┼-space, there are no 
factorial totalities here and therefore no divisions and multiplications. 
Arithmetically only additions are possible within a line, and subtractions 
between lines in terms of their density. Therefore, the number line at a 
limit consists only of prime numbers in the sense of the ┼-space. Prime 
numbers are their own totalities that only serve to describe descriptive 
directions of a line. Unlike positions (i.e. points of intersection, 1’s) in the 
┼-space, which are directional quantities backed by 0 and 1’s, points in 
∨
∧
∨ 
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the -space are only there to close the -space at a limit. The only 
mathematically useful description (conjecture) of the -number line is 
that the number line at a limit incorporates 0 (the centre) so that the two 
directions merge into one, and the number line becoming a single 
indivisible totality. There are no evens and odds in the -space. 
This conjecture is yet to be approximated in terms of ┼-numbers, i.e. in 
the dynamically expanding infinite ┼-space. Given such an 
approximation, considering spatial properties of the ┼-space (dimensional 
priority of ‘2×’ over ‘+1’), the last ‘prime’ in the sense of the -space, if 
approximated into ┼-primes, has to be an even number, because a ‘+1’ 
number is descriptively weaker than a ‘2×’ number, and therefore fails to 
close a number line a la the -space.   
 
  This conjecture is further strengthened because, assuming an 
approximation is possible, if the beginning of the -number line is an 
even number (2) following ┼-primes, then it must also be an even 
number when it coincides with the ending. That is, the beginning of the 
-number line is also the ending of that line, and being the beginning 
and simultaneously the ending is the only connective between the two 
numbers, i.e. in the ┼-space an even cannot, by itself, become an odd 
without contradicting the fundamental spatial properties of the ┼-space. 
There is no ┼-based arithmetic operator that transforms an even itself into 
an odd itself, and vice versa.  
 
  ∧ and ∨ as applied to an identical variable-notion reveal an ontologico-
notational structure between an identical logical space. The conjunctive 
space and the disjunctive space are logically one and the same. It is only 
within the structure of ontologico-notationality that the conjunctive space 
is of a higher dimensionality and is therefore descriptively capable of 
encompassing the disjunctive space. The -space and the ┼-space are of 
parity in terms of logical representation, it is the ontologico-notational 
structure that allows the ┼-space to approximate the -space, and, in so 
doing, describes the -space as closed within the ┼-space. It is thus that 
prime numbers are distributed boundlessly confined within the 
dynamically infinite conjunctive space. Prime numbers are numbers of 
the disjunctive space on account of their non-factorial totalities, whereas 
in the conjunctive space numbers are directional quantities and contains 
both primes and composites. Such as cardinality and ordinality are only 
so recognizable at a penultimate step prior to a limit in the -space, and 
at a limit the beginning and end of the prime number line merge.  
 
  Practical mathematicians skilful in the processes of numerical analyses 
and modelling are not necessarily proficient in the nature of mathematics 
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in the same sense that good literature critics by no means make good 
novelists. Mathematics can exist without philosophizers as it is based on 
notational applicability of rules of numbers rather than conceptual 
analyses of the properties of numbers. However, practical maths can 
never go beyond the status quo of accepted rules. Just because an ass can 
count does not mean he know what is counting. The concept of numbers 
presupposes the whole of numbers because properties and characteristics 
of a number cannot be meaningfully discussed without already 
presupposing the totality of types of numbers that share common 
properties of that number, and it is here one gets into self-referential 
paradoxes and definition difficulties. 
 
- Odds and Evens - 
 
  (∀x) Fx 
 
, where the universally quantified/quantifiable variable x takes all objects 
in space/space-time/time (i.e. all counted/countable objects by whatever 
definitions) as its values and F is the only universal predicate applicable 
to such a variable. Outputs of such a function are numbers. Tautologically 
anything that numbers are not applicable falls outside intellectually 
legible schemata. F is 
 
  ∨, ∧ 
 
, whereby ∨ and ∧ are conventionally understood as ‘or’ and ‘and’ in the 
ordinary language and more importantly ‘,’ refers to the demarcatable 
space that makes any notations intellectually viable. It is ontologico-
notational in the sense that is fundamental to space within and without, 
which must be juxtaposed for our understanding to hold. The ‘in-space’ is 
the notational space, while the ‘out-space’ is the ontological space. The 
former may also be called the idealised space, the latter the empirical 
space. It is surprising to see many of our most ingenious notations 
(including PM) make use of it without really acknowledging it.   
    
  ∨ and ∧ are both symmetrical, two-place logical operators and can 
connect the universal variable x as a single predicate. ∨ and ∧, alongside 
→ and ~, are regarded so fundamental that they are termed constants. 
They, however, can be made into a predicate because they describe the 
meaning of the universal variable x. This is the only bona fide Pp 
(primitive proposition). Russell’s Pp is either meaningless (looping) or, in 
fact, a complex relation (like a colour ‘red’), which appears ‘primitive’ as 
a matter of descriptive convention. Pp must boil down to the simplest and 
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most universal epistemological fact (known to us so far) such as (∀x) Fx, 
and F being ‘demarcatable’, ‘countable’, ‘spatio-temporal’, etc. Such a x 
only takes universal objects as its values. Universal objects would have 
no contingent properties that could be otherwise. 
 
  Given such an F(x), it cannot be true or false, nor can it be superficially 
implicative. The most basic fact, once given (i.e. so cognized to be 
present), is not subject to modalistic arbitrations, nor can it imply 
anything else including even itself unless it is recursively partitionable 
(i.e. every part is identical with itself and its totality). Such a fact is 
ontologico-notational and is therefore the fabric of the structure of our 
intelligence. It is the basis to build our epistemological body and may 
resemble the Kantian ‘a priori’. Its implicator can only be the logical 
space itself. Thus, assuming x as given in the logical space, x can only be 
so described as Pp. The existence of Pp presupposes the ontologico-
notational implicator. Although it is not explicitly referred to in PM the 
most important symbol is ‘,’ or any spatial representations like a gap, 
which signifies the ontologico-notational space itself and without which 
no descriptions, formal or otherwise, are possible. The presence of ‘,’ 
assumes the logical space itself and the consequential Pp. The description 
of x must be made within the logical space itself because at this level of 
description x cannot be predicated by any epistemological observations/ 
conventions. The predicate of Pp can only be of an essential property, 
which is in the domain of the logical space, as any epistemological 
descriptions are by necessity contingent. It is the nature of intelligence to 
philosophize whatever epistemologically describable, while it is the 
logical space that gives a structure to such intelligence. In a way, it is ‘,’ 
that the intelligence is forced to accept in order to be intelligible.  
 
  The existence of the logical space is underlain by the ontologico-
notational implicator (→) and the form of mapping onto itself (~). 
Assuming Pp, x is already in the logical space, in which it is essentially 
described by ∨ and ∧ because it is in the ontologico-notational process of 
the logical space that the universal variable x is identified as the variable 
notion itself (i.e. the only entity in the logical space). Such an identity is 
simultaneously undertaken by ∨ and ∧ as the dimensionality of ∨ and ∧ is 
already incorporated in x when it is so assumed to be given in the logical 
space. Thus,  
 
  x ∨ x ∧ x 
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, which is the description of x and brings out the universal applicability of 
x. This forms a predicate that describes x is the only variable and takes 
everything as its value. This is so because ; 
 
  1) x ∨ x ∧ x can only be a well-formed formula when there is one and 
only one variable in the entire universe, so to speak, where ∨ and ∧ 
become identical. 
 
  2) x ∨ x ∧ x would be meaningless if there are more than one variable. 
 
  3) Through x ∨ x ∧ x, ∨ and ∧ together describe this property of x as the 
universal variable and forms a new predicate. 
 
This also explains the universal applicability of numbers. For numbers to 
be meaningful they have to be universally applicable. That is, numbers 
assume the universal variable that takes everything in the universe as its 
only value. Numbers are not adjective to describe various objects, 
otherwise 2 will never be formed from ‘1x + 1y’. x ∨ x ∧ x is the logical 
equalizer to create mathematical objects from myriads of empirical 
objects and their variously perceived diversities. x ∨ x ∧ x is a predicate 
of abstraction. x ∨ x ∧ x is only well-formed when applied to the 
universal variable and tantamount to x, which is a form rather than an 
object (hence termed a ‘variable-notion’), while a ∨ b ∧ c as applied to 
objects is ill-formed and makes no sense. The same applies to a ∨ a ∧ a 
because a as a value presupposes b, c, d, - - -,n to their countable limit. It 
is for this reason that numbers are not values of x, but it is x that becomes 
numbers. That is, x ∨ x and x ∧ x can be conflated only when x is a 
universal form.        
 
  This predicate of the Pp needs the hypothesis (x) › x to make sense in 
our language because, otherwise, there are no means of knowing its 
meaning. Thus, given (x) › x, 
 
(x ∨ x ∧ x) 
 
, which is paraphrased as ; 
 
((x ∨ x) ∧ x) and simultaneously 
 
(x ∨ (x ∧ x)). 
 
That is, (x ∨ x ∧ x) has two identical, but separate, selves, which, in turn, 
have parts which are mutually replaceable. These two identical selves 
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with mutually replaceable parts are related to each other and define the 
descriptive space in such a way ; 
 
Conceptual Numbers 
 
Step      
 
   0         x∨x∧x       ; cardinality 0 ; the space of description with no 
                                                          describable values taken 
 
   1        (x∨x∧x)     ; cardinality 1 ; the space of description filled with   
             or ( )                                     every possible value 
 
Descriptive Numbers 
 
   2       ((x∨x)∧x)   ; cardinality 2 ; step & cardinality 1 has two and only   
            (x∨(x∧x))                             two identical selves ; two identical  
             or ( ), ( )                              forms of 1 ; Even (logical 
                                                         number)/Prime 
 
   3        x, x, x        ; cardinality 3 ; step & cardinality 2 follows step & 
             ( ), ( )+1                              cardinality 1 because the predicate 
                                                         -∨-∧- describes the identity of ∨ and 
                                                         ∧ when they connect three places 
                                                         with an identical value. That is, ∨ 
                                                                                and ∧ connect each other in terms of 
                                                          a common and identical value and 
                                                          describe their identity ; thus two 
                                                          identical forms express their identity 
                                                          in terms of three identical values ; 
                                                          Odd (mathematical number)/Prime              
 
At this stage, in terms of interchangeability between form and value 
numbers 0, 1, 2 and 3 already contain a dimensional transformation and 
evolve into a coordinate. Thus, 
 
                      2   
 
                      1 
                           ∨ & ∧    
      2      1 ↔ 0 ↔ 1     2 
                  x          x 
                      1               ‘value’ ≡ ‘form’ 
                                        2=n+1(1+1) 
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                      2                3=2+1 
 
  It is significant to note that between step & cardinality 2 and 3 is a 
mathematical operation to relate ‘form’ with ‘value’ both as a common 
mathematical object. 3 only after 2 because for both ‘form’ and ‘value’ to 
be meaningful ‘value’ is necessarily ‘form ‘+1’’. Between the first and 
only even prime and the first odd prime is descriptively necessarily 
established the relation ‘+1’ which is always the case with any 
immediately connected even and odd numbers because given two 
identical forms, identical values are necessarily ‘+1’ in order to ascertain 
such identities. For this reason even numbers may be called logical 
numbers, odd numbers mathematical numbers, based on the most 
fundamental mathematical operation of ‘+1’. Thus, given numbers, ‘+1’ 
is always the case, and a mathematical number always follows a logical 
number. It is thus that primes are always odd except the first even (2).  
 
  Given step & cardinality 0, 1, 2 and 3 it immediately follows ; there 
exists a mathematical structure between them that establishes a 
mathematical identity between ‘form’ and ‘value’. That is, ‘form’ and 
‘value’ have to be mathematically interchangeable in order to 
descriptively establish common numbers between conceptual, logical and 
mathematical numbers because Pp describes the most fundamental 
property of the universal variable x, which presents itself as 
‘countability’.  
 
  Given (x) › x, it is the way 0 evolves into 1, 1 into 2, 2 into 3, that is 
inherently contained but not descriptively present and thus brings about 
the structuralization of numbers. Logical numbers continue ad infinitum, 
or so long as the countability descriptively hold because ; 
 
the first logical number has the innate descriptive necessity of continuing 
identifying its two identical selves in terms of ∨ and ∧. That is, between         
((x ∨ x) ∧ x) and (x ∨ (x ∧ x)) is the descriptive space where no relations 
can be represented by means of the notational conventions such as ‘,’, 
other than recursive repetitions in order descriptively to signify the space. 
Thus, from ((x ∨ x) ∧ x) and (x ∨ (x ∧ x)), 
 
  (((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x)))                     
  (((x∨x)∧x)∧(x∨(x∧x))) 
 
or ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ) 
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, which is step & cardinality 4 and has two and only two identical selves ; 
two identical forms of 2. This logical number is succeeded by ‘+1’ by 
necessity because its fundamental constituent part is embedded with the 
form ‘+1’ to make it operably meaningful. Thus,  
 
( ), ( ), ( ), ( )+1 or (( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) 
 
, which is step & cardinality 5. 
 
In short the identity of ∨ and ∧ in terms of the universal value x is 
descriptively established by repeating this process. 
 
  The interchangeability of x is in the descriptive identity of x, which also 
ensures the interchangeability of ∨ and ∧ and of ( ). Therefore, 0 and 1 
could have been x∧x∨x and (x∧x∨x), and 2 would have been ((x∧x)∨x), 
(x∧(x∨x)), resulting in the same 3 with x, x, x. Further ((x∨x)∧x) could 
have been (x∨(x∧x)), and if so, (x∨(x∧x)), ((x∨x)∧x), resulting in the 
same 3 with ( ), ( ), ( ). Thus, expressing 0, 1, 2, 3, ∙ ∙ ∙ as 0, n, n+1, this 
has the horizontal and vertical extensions as,  
 
                        n+1   
 
                          n 
                               
      n+1      n      0     n     n+1 
              
                          n           
 
                        n+1            
               
, where the original 0, n, n+1 can go e.g. either sideway representing the 
interchangeability of ( ), and e.g. upward representing the 
interchangeability of ∨ and ∧, or e.g. downward representing the 
interchangeability of ( ). That is, the original 0, n, n+1 has 4 way 
extensions and results in the spatialization of numbers, which brings 
about other types of numbers (integers, irrationals, reals, imaginary 
(dimensional addition) as well as ∞). 0 could be anywhere as a centre of 
transposition.  
 
  This spatialization is descriptively embedded with multiplication. 0, n, 
n+1 has an identical structure whichever way it is extended. Thus, the 
sideway extension of 0, n, n+1 with 0 as the centre has ‘×2’ number of 
numbers. Likewise, the upward as well as the downward extension also 
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have ‘×2’ numbers. This 4 way extensions of 0, n, n+1, with 0 as the 
centre, is the 2-dimensional coordinate of numbers and may be named the 
x-y coordinate. The notion of ‘×2’ becomes ‘×n’ because of the universal 
applicability of numbers. Once given such a coordinate, ‘×2’ numbers as 
well as ‘+1’ numbers materialize. Integers are an identical self of the 
original 0, n, n+1 with 0 as the centre and with the 4 way extensions and 
are conventionally designated with ‘+’ and ‘−’ for each half. Given 
number lines as a coordinate, irrationals come in as spatial relations 
between coordinates, and real numbers are spatial relations within a 
coordinate in terms of the intersectability of a line and the 
transpositionality of 0. At this level of descriptions numbers are names 
given to directional quantities and are filled with ‘+1’ numbers and ‘×2’ 
numbers (i.e. tools of building blocks) which starting with the first logical 
number (2) and the first mathematical number (3) fill in the natural 
number line with the exception of the last prime ( -‘prime’). It is 
important to remember that ‘×2’ numbers have a higher descriptive 
necessity than ‘+1’ numbers because the logical necessity of intersection 
precedes the creation of directional quantities, resulting in descriptive 
priority of evens over odds. Primes are always odd numbers except 2 
because it is a descriptive property accorded to logical numbers which 
have mechanistic building process by means of the identity between ∨ 
and ∧, given the universal x. Therefore, whenever there is a logical 
number, a ‘+1’ number follows. Whenever odd numbers cannot be named 
by means of ‘×n’ numbers, a genuine mathematical number appears with 
the proviso of the natural number line (a 1-dimension between descriptive 
points) must always be contained within the dynamically expanding 
infinite 2-dimensional space, thus reflecting the logarithmic cap in the 
way they occur. 
 
  Unlike a finite space, wherever an intersection takes place, ‘×2’ 
materializes as an essential spatial property. It is not because an 
intersection occurs at the centre (0) that ‘×2’ surfaces, but ‘×2’ is there 
wherever an intersection is, in this dynamically expanding ∞. ‘×2’ is also 
the conceptual base of ‘×n’ and its operational reverse, by virtue of the 
multiplicity implicit in number lines of intersection. It is with ‘2’ that the 
building tools (‘+1’ and ‘×2’) starts making numbers, with exception of 
primes that only ‘+1’ can make. ‘+1’ and ‘×2’ carry a legacy of their 
spatial properties. In that ‘+1’ is of the -space in the sense, expressed 
by ┼-approximation, the density can only build up additively. Whereas 
both are of the ┼-space with the proviso of ‘×2’ being spatially more 
essential, reflecting the necessity of intersection precedes the making of 
quantitative directions. 
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  Thus, odds are more -associative, and evens, more ┼-associative. The 
┼-space being numerically more descriptive, the -space surfaces in the 
┼-space as transcendentals and also through -associative odds. Odds 
carry the legacy of the -space through primes and the ∨-connective. 
The ∨-connective is, not unlike X-chromosome, invisible arithmetically 
because ‘+1’ is a spatial property applicable to any numbers, inheritable 
via logical numbers. 
 
  Numbers are notions as well as self-operators. This is where maths 
radically differs from logic. This is how 0, n and n+1 are self-evidently 
connective, based on ‘universal variable’ x and its essential linearity, 
which allows (x∧x = x∨x) → x. It is this singular linearity that connects 
the logical number 2 with ‘+1’ and gives rise to 3, a mathematically 
operated odd. ‘+1’ is a number generating operator arising from x∨x∧x 
↔ x∧x∨x. This is a new operator with 3 places that converge into 
‘‘n‘+1’’ applicable only to single universal x and has a predicative 
function, with a numerical capacity of turning an even into an odd, an odd 
into an even, representing (x∨x)∧x↔ x∨(x∧x) and (x∧x)∨x) ↔ x∧(x∨x).  
 
From (x) › x 
 
x∨x∧x                                                                                                       0 
     ↓ 
(x∨x∧x)                                                                                                     1 
     ↓ 
((x∨x)∧x)  
(x∨(x∧x))                                                                                                  2                    
     ↓                                                                                                            
(((x∨x)∧x)∧(x∨(x∧x)), ((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x)))                                         3 
     ↓                                                                                                       
((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))   
((x∨x)∧x)∧(x∨(x∧x))                                                                                4                
     ↓                                                                                                
(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∧((x∨x)∧x)∧(x∨(x∧x)), 
((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∨((x∨x)∧x) ∧(x∨(x∧x)))                                         5 
     ↓                                                                                    
((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∨((x∨x)∧x) ∧(x∨(x∧x))   
((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∧((x∨x)∧x) ∧(x∨(x∧x))                                           6                                                   
     ↓                                                      
((((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∨((x∨x)∧x) 
∧(x∨(x∧x)))∧(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∧((x∨x)∧x) ∧(x∨(x∧x))),  
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(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∨((x∨x)∧x) 
∧(x∨(x∧x)))∨(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∧((x∨x)∧x) ∧(x∨(x∧x))))                 7      
     ↓                                                          
(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∨((x∨x)∧x) 
∧(x∨(x∧x)))∨(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∧((x∨x)∧x) ∧(x∨(x∧x)))                
(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∨((x∨x)∧x) 
∧(x∨(x∧x)))∧(((x∨x)∧x)∨(x∨(x∧x))∧((x∨x)∧x) ∧(x∨(x∧x)))                  8               
     ↓                                                 
      ∙                                                                                                             ∙ 
     ↓                                                                        
      ∙                                                                                                             ∙ 
     ↓ 
      ∙                                                                                                            ∞ 
 
The above shows the inherent structural progressions in x∨x∧x, and this 
can be described as step numbers. Odds are always expressed as ( , ), in 
which ‘,’ signifies the transcendental space between the -space and the 
┼-space. It should be remembered that in the decimal notation the 
number line is already a line with width and therefore incorporates the 
-space. Regarding the number line of naturals as the carrier of primes, 
odds are a penultimate form of primes, a step closer to expressing 
indivisible wholes, which are ultimately the -‘prime’ at a limit. In the 
┼-space itself odds and evens are invisible, because directional quantities 
of 0 and 1’s are all there are in the space of points of intersection. Our 
expression of e.g. decimal number line is already a descriptive 
combobulation of the -space and the ┼-space, thus giving widthless 
directional quantities of the ┼-space a width to make it visible to our 
cognition. Such number lines acquire visibility by means of width, which 
is, described in the ┼-space, a curve. The decimal number line, which is 
so natural to our understanding of numbers, is, in fact, a descriptive 
creation arising from the logical necessity of unseparating the two 2-
dimensional spaces. It therefore contains the legacy of the two spaces, 
which expresses as odds (the -space) and evens (the ┼-space). This 
expression is imperfect, as the transcendence between the two spaces 
does not allow any pure expression of either space. Thus, some odds are 
divisible, an even is a prime, primes become scarcer towards the 
periphery and the -‘prime’ is uncapturable. The decimal number line is 
only there as an approximation of a ┼-number line, which is descriptively 
invisible.                
 
Translating the above into ‘step numbers’, 
 
  Given x∨x∧x , x is one and only variable that takes anything 
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countable for its value. Since numbers are always universally 
and uniformly applicable, that is to say, in our countable world,  
everything is either countable or not countable, and where 
countable, countability is not a property of thus countable object, 
but rather of our cognitive mind. 
 
There is nothing that can be meaningfully values for x,                    Step 0 
as ∨ and ∧ are binary operators. Thus, e.g. x∨y∧x or x∨y∧z 
is not well-formed and nothing will follow. x∨x∧x would not 
be a well-formed formula if there are more than one arity. 
  
(x) › x is applicable because a meaningful totality exists for x,         Step 1  
as ∨ and ∧ are identical only when x is unary as the universal 
variable that takes everything as its value (i.e. because in the 
countable world everything is countable). That is, an  
ill-formed formula x∨x∧x becomes well-formed upon recognition 
∨ and ∧ are identical, given this totality has only one operand.   
The base logical object x is synonymous with a ‘thing’ in the 
ordinary language as numbers are universally and uniformly 
applicable. ∨ and ∧ apply because this base object is a  
‘variable-notion’ and is ontologico-notational in the sense that 
the value of x is x itself. It is the universal applicability of 
numbers that manifests itself as x. The unary x thus gives binary 
operators ∨ and ∧ an internally dynamic structure of identifying each 
other infinitely while enhancing its cardinality infinite and retaining  
an ever identical logical meaning. Therefore,      
 
     ∨  ↑   ∧ 
(1← (0) →1)                                                                                       Step 2 
     -   ↓   + 
 
, where ∧ generates (0 →1), and ∨ generates (1← 0). 
Note that ∧ and ∨ take a same value only when monomial.  
Thus, (x∨x∧x) expands into 4 meaningful totalities, namely 
(x∨(x∧x)), (x∧(x∨x)), ((x∧x)∨x), ((x∨x)∧x), of which (x∨(x∧x)) and 
((x∧x)∨x) create the negative progression (-) and (x∧(x∨x)) and  
((x∨x)∧x) create the positive progression (+), and because 
∧ and ∨ can be permutated without affecting a value when monomial, 
↑ and ↓ are created and expand the negative and positive progression 
into upward and downward. 2 is the natural cardinal as well as 
ordinal number and is the base of logical number (even numbers), 
which is always divisible by 2. The base of step numbers is 1, 
the base of all numbers is 0. At this level, given logical numbers 
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and step numbers together with conceptual numbers, ∨ and ∧ 
acquire mathematical meanings after completing their logical 
tasks because what is ontologico-notational now becomes  
epistemic after becoming a value of its own notation.  
                                                              
Two meaningful totalities, ∧-totality and ∨-totality are                    Step 3 
symmetrical, but are not binomially deterministic. Hence 
∨ could have generated (0 → 1), and equally ∧ could have 
generated (1 ← 0). This creates infinitely recursive process of 
∨- or ∧-totality and - or + progression. 
 
Therefore, the left and right steps and the upward and                      Step 4   
downward steps repeat themselves infinitely.                        
 
This results in intersecting number lines.                                          Step 5 
   
∙ 
                                                                                                                                                                    
∙ 
 
n                                                                                                         Step n 
 
The above process become descriptively visible via randomly 
chosen number lines as a coordinate.                                                 n→∞  
 
 
In short, an infinite linear progression of 4 way steps (intersecting number 
lines) as represented below;  
 
              n+1     
 
                n 
 
n+1    n    0    n    n+1    
 
                n     
 
               n+1     
 
, results from the dynamic permutability of ∧ and ∨ when monomial. This 
is only possible with the cognition of a whole from parts. Once ‘numbers’ 
are thrown into a space of coordinates with directions in terms of 
expanding ∞, then cardinality and ordinality is a matter of depth 
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assignable to numbers as positions in a number line and become 
directional quantities.    
 
In summary : 
 
Given x as any number-applicable universal objects, given x∧x and x∨x 
as logical idenfiers, their logical values (truth-values) are same. However, 
after confirming this identical logical value, their ontologico-notationality 
transcends into epistemologicality and thus acquires mathematical values, 
namely x+x (••) for x∧x and x (•∨•) for x∨x. That is, ∧ and ∨ are forced 
by the monomial x to identify themselves in terms of their epistemic 
difference. If ∧ and ∨ take themselves as its own value, then ∧ is 2-place 
acquirer and ∨ is 1-place acquirer. ∧ and ∨ are the internal structure of 
numbers, especially it is •∨• that creates odd numbers and also explains 
the behaviours of prime numbers. Thus, logical identifiers ∧ and ∨ are 
turned inside out by this monomial x as the internal structure of x, which 
is the logical base of every number. This is a logical description of 
transcendentally incorporating the ∨-space into the ∧-space, thus 
transcendentally approximating the -space within the ┼-space.     
        
Conceptual numbers are, 
 
0     ×                      no x applicable 
1     •                       any and every object is x  
 
2     ••                      logical number/prime number 
3     (•• •∨•)             odd number/prime number  
4     ••••                   logical number 
5     (•••• •∨•)          odd number/prime number 
6     ••••••                logical number 
7     (•••••• •∨•)       odd number/prime number 
8     ••••••••             logical number  
9     (•••••••• •∨•)    odd number 
10   ••••••••••         logical number  
∙ 
∙ 
n     ••• ∙∙∙ •••          logical number 
n+1 (••• ∙∙∙ ••• •∨•) odd number and/or prime number   
 
This means prime numbers are (∙ (∙ (x∨x∧x))), which indicates there 
cannot be found any last prime in ┼-space, as 0 and 1 are permutable, i.e. 
any centre can be the centre. The last prime is a -‘prime’, which cannot 
be described in any space with a centre.                    
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  Numbers are the name given to a process and are not set-theoretical 
objects. It is not as if there is an object e.g. ‘3’ or the set of all sets with 
three members. Where there should be a world with no e.g. ‘5’ or the set 
of all sets with five members, there could not be a ‘3’. ‘3’ presupposes all 
other numbers. That is, there must be the totality of all numbers before 
e.g. ‘3’ is cognized as a number. The wholeness of all numbers is a 
logical process of the operand (–∨–∧–) where – is the universal variable 
that takes everything as its value. To define ‘3’ as the set of all sets with 
three members is a tautology where the meaning of ‘three’ is already 
known as ‘3’. It is not that something is countable, but that it is something 
because it is countable. The seeming three place connective, –∨–∧–, is, in 
fact, an unary connective as (–∨–∧–), which generates numbers in the 
process of acquiring ( ).    
 
  A number has no structure. It is the totality of numbers that has a 
structure, without which a number has no meaning. Logic gives a 
structure to numbers. A structure is patterns and modes. Axioms and rules 
of inference are a way of describing a structure and are themselves 
governed by a structure. This is the essence of Gödel. The capacity of 
cognition is a mind, which together, from within, form the most basic 
structure and is the foundation of mirroring the world. A mind without a 
structure is a derangement. A structure is the cognized and the cognisor 
and is necessarily tautological. There is no structure of structure because, 
if there is, it will manifest as a structure.        
  
  The universal applicability of x as the variable-notion creates this 
singular meaning of (x∨x = x∧x), which arithmetically generates odds 
and evens. Similarly, x expressed as  and  that generates geometrical 
spaces. Arithmetically the most primitive notation comes with the 
discovery/invention of 0, which identifies entities by means of 
countability. 1 follows as the name of thus identified countable objects. 2, 
however, is the most ingenious application of our creativity. That is, 
while there is no notational way to represent this discovery of 0 and 1 as 
much as 0 = 1 makes no epistemological sense, we here have the logical 
symbolism backed by the tautological power. This is 1+1=2. This indeed 
condenses the entire maths. We wish to say the world consists in entities 
(0’s), which we can count (1’s). It is with 1+1=2 that we can say the 
world consists of countable entities. This is the most powerful and 
primitive description of the world.   
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  The notation gives us a power of description but at the same time, binds 
us into a certain paradigm of limitations. This gives us a solution to a 
myth of the number theory ; 
 
  that whatever is multiplied and divided by 0 is 0, 
  that whatever is added or subtracted by 0 remains unaffected, 
 
because 0 is the notation itself. A notation cannot notate itself as part of 
itself. 0 underlies the foundation of the entire mathematical notation. 
From this follows ; 
 
  that whatever is multiplied or divided by 1 is the multiplied or divided, 
 
because a name notationaly can only be identified with the named and 
therefore naming x as a can only mean x = a. Mathematical induction 
conveniently trivializes the significance of 0 whether it is part of natural 
numbers because it cannot distinguish the two separate cases. If 0 is not 
part of natural numbers, then it has to be defined outside induction. Thus, 
the special meaning of 0 has to be positioned in parallel with inductive 
natural numbers.   
 
  It is, however, with 2 that the notational evolution of maths starts. 0 and 
1 are, so to speak, ( ) of (x) › x. Given this conceptual foundation, 2 is the 
practical application of the notation onto the countable world. With 2 we 
are actually into the process of counting. If 1 can be named the universal 
prime number, although it is excluded from the prime numbers, then 2 is 
the prime of prime numbers as well as the only even prime for being the 
base of all logical numbers. Appling the logical process of generating 
numbers, the notational substance of numbers is the binary property of 
the logical operators ∨ and ∧, while what we call natural numbers is 
actually step numbers, i.e. logical steps of generating numbers. Therefore, 
while 0 and 1 are the conceptual foundation of the number system, the 
even numbers are logical numbers of what we name natural numbers and 
the odd numbers are the result of the collapse of the binary property of ∨ 
and ∧ due to the ontologico-notational anomaly of the conceptual 
condensation of every entity into a single countable entity 0.  
 
  ∨ and ∧ are binary and are therefore 2 place-connectives. They 
idiosyncratically become identical when applied to an identical variable 
(variable-notion). This happens because numbers are idealized to be 
universally and uniformly applicable to any entities in space-time, space 
or time. Thus, given only a single identical variable x, the ill-formed 
formula x∨x∧x   becomes singularly well-formed. This relation between 
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binary operators and a single identical universal variable is the source of 
logical numbers and step numbers. Gödel used a finite number of odd 
primes to designate logical symbols to avoid the ambiguity of ∞ 
assignable to numbers and to make it so self-evident as to dispense with 
the axiom that each number is unique. He still assumes an independent 
notational system of numbers as if numbers exist a priori from the formal 
logic. However, for each and every number to be itself (∀x(x=x)) and 
nothing else (∀x(x≠~x)) the logical hypothesis (x) › x is necessary 
regardless numbers concerned are finite or infinite because each and 
every number, whether it is deployed by Gödel coding, assumes a 
notational totality. Behind each and every number is every other number 
to reflect the self-operational nature of numbers. Without non-prime 
numbers prime numbers have no identity. Thus, if numbers are based on 
the logical hypothesis (x) › x this logical statement cannot even be Gödel-
numbered, otherwise the notational self-reference will result.     
 
  It is therefore logical that 2 is the only even prime number because 
process-wise all logical numbers are the multiples of 2. The notational 
complication arises because natural numbers consists of three layers of 
different numbers, conceptual numbers (0, 1), logical numbers (even 
numbers) and step numbers. This number line becomes a directional 
quantity when spatially applied as it is logically necessary to be 
coordinated, and the three-layered numbers become notationally 
equalized in terms of the spatial quantity. It is here the mystery of the 
Riemann zeta function is logically misconceived but notationally well-
presented as expressing the logical misalignment in the Euclidian 2 
dimension. The logical anomaly of odd umbers is spatially expressed as 
the prime number distribution and also as the notational necessity of 
containing the 1 dimensional infinity in the 2 dimensional infinity as the 
latter is a higher step in the notational evolution. The reason why the 
presumably exact science of maths is riddled with nothing but 
approximations and artful notational explorations of how to tame them, is 
that there are layers of fundamental relationships between logical, 
arithmetic and geometric notations, including that of 0, which is itself a 
notation, that cannot be expressed in each notation, while there are no 
unified notation that can treat them all under the same notational 
paradigm. 
 
  Gödel’s theorems are concerned with the prima facie solid algorithmic 
notations such as formal logic and elementary arithmetic, within which 
are assumed sub-notations such as that of 0 and 1, which, being 
conceptual numbers, partially defies the algorithmic definitions. The 
numerical rules of usages of 0 as a natural number may be taken for 
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granted, but such rules will be forced to adopt not necessarily well-
defined or well-coordinated sub-rules when interfaced with related but 
independent notations such as geometric notations. The line of natural 
numbers, when spatially adopted, demands new set of rules such that are 
consistent with arithmetic rules. This is where provability becomes an 
issue. It is notational interactions that cause even seemingly simple and 
straightforward definitions of a simple notion unexpected twists and even 
inconsistencies. 
 
  I do not know if this is what Wittgenstein’s criticism or rather offhand 
dismissal intended, but Gödel’s ingenious way of dealing with the self-
referential paradoxes is notationally faulty if the number system is found 
to originate in the formal logic. His method is valid only if the notation of 
the formal logic and that of natural numbers (and their rules) are 
independent, which is an implicit assumption behind Gödel coding. Self-
reference becomes impossible by (x) › x. x cannot refer to itself without 
breaching (x) › x. x = x assumes (x) as much as numbers assume 0 and 1. 
0 and 1 assume the formal logic. If numbers are shown to be generated 
from within the formal logic or to have a common fundamental root, then 
applying numbers to logical statements or sequences of logical statements 
in order to create unique references to circumvent self-reference, is a 
form of self-reference. Thus, Gödel’s ingenuity turns out to be just a 
notational circus.      
 
  As much as notations are creations of human mind, even a rigorous 
formal system of elementary arithmetic is riddled with impossible 
complexities, once superficially simple definitions and rules are explored 
deeper. Gödel’s ingenuity of avoiding self-referential paradoxes by using 
whole numbers will face questioning, given the relationships between 
conceptual, logical and step numbers. Just because a machine can encode 
and decode as programmed and bring out certain numerical properties, 
does not mean such a program is infallible. At the bottom of entire maths 
is the ordinary language, which is not only the prima facie medium as we 
come across maths but also modus operandi of mathematical thought 
processes, and contains many imprecise concepts and relations. That is 
why maths keeps evolving, being refined and even reinvented. 
Mathematical notations are more convenient to communicate over the 
ordinary language, when used among mathematicians. However, these 
notations are essentially shorthand for the sake of precisions and 
developed in order to refine concepts and relations in the ordinary 
language. It should be therefore still possible to explain maths in the 
ordinary language. Remember Russell, in writing PM, did not think in 
PM. It was contemplated, thought and refined in the ordinary language, 
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and only then expressed in the formal logic. Consider the concept of 
number, N, in the ordinary language. As soon as one think of an aspect of 
N, e.g. p(n), log(x), etc., this demands the ordinary language to come up 
with a notation that elaborates such aspects of number as division, sum, 
congruence, plane partition. It is not that there is ‘maths’ and 
mathematical notations develops. It is more like maths and mathematical 
notations evolve hand in hand. The same goes for logic. And it is the 
ordinary language that is the basis for both maths and its notations 
because notations are human inventions to sharpen and point imprecise 
concepts of the ordinary language, such as numbers, counting and 
ordering. Concepts are broken into notions and notations so that concepts 
for entities and processes can be more clearly represented. 
 
  Maths is an art of approximations starting with numbers themselves. As 
an object, real numbers do not even have a clearly definable shape. Even 
natural numbers can be debated if they possess any demarcatable shape. 
What makes it a science despite lacking empirical bases is a self-
contained structural rigour with which it describes itself. This is only 
possible if mathematical concepts are logical concepts and are self-
structural based on a constructive space. Set-theoretical definitions are 
either linguistic confusions or require deeper spatial foundations.     
 
  Maths consists in two parts ; one is the maths of normality, the other is 
the maths of singularity. However, because singularity can only be 
describable based on a structure, which is by definition not singular, any 
described singularity is at best transcendental. A true singularity can only 
be glimpsed as a limit of describability. To the former belongs numbers 
identifiable in the ∧-space (┼-space), such as naturals (transpositional 
embedders of 0 (intersectional necessity)), integers (intersectional 
division), rationals (spatial divisions), irrationals (internal spatial 
relations), transcendental and imaginary (external spatial relations due to 
∨-space and spatial inverse), which are conceptually structural numbers 
dividable into logical numbers and mathematical numbers. All these 
numbers of normality are spatial properties of the ∧-space.  
 
  Any number of numbers in the ┼-space is not only ∞ but necessarily 
dynamic. In his study of numbers Cantor fails to mention this logical 
necessity of numbers. In order to realign his central idea of countable ∞ 
and 1:1 correspondence he would need the notion of regularity, which is 
indefinable if you just assume a mathematical space as a receptacle in 
situ. A logical space as mathematical space is the ontologico-notational 
space of uniformly dense points that are also infinitely and dynamically 
expanding. 
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  In contrast, there is a number of singularity, which is based on the ∨-
space. The ∨-space adopted in the ∧-space for the sake of describability 
manifests itself spatially as polar coordinate, numerically as π. It is, 
however, by itself a singularity number, which may be termed supra- 
transcendental. The ∧-space is dynamically infinitely expanding, while 
the ∨-space is dynamically infinitely constraining. The only numbers 
approximately applicable here are naturals (primes) as it does not yet 
possess spatial property for real numbers and as all numbers are by-
products of naturals and represent spatial properties of the ┼-space. 
Considering naturals are the transpositional embedders of 0, this space 
consists in 0 as the centre and ever condensing prime numbers away from 
the centre, which, at its limit, incorporates 0, as the starting point 
coincides with the ending point. This number line consists of prime 
numbers, which, at a limit, consists in the only and last prime, and of 
which every part is every other part representing a singular totality, i.e. a 
circle without a centre. This is where the beginning and ending merge and 
the two direction of a line coincide. This singularity number, therefore, 
has a cardinality (a limit of ‘p‘+1’’), but no ordinality. It cannot be 
represented in any space with a centre (0). 
 
  Unlike  it is not countably infinite. The addition of 0 disallows the 
ordinality and contraindicates the countability. At its limit 0 and ∞ 
merges and lose the ordinality because the two directions of number line 
will merge. The loss of the ordinality makes this number a constant 
because it may have a size that cannot be shown to be getting larger or 
smaller. It is also a supra-dimensional in the sense that it transcends the 1-
dimensional directionality. Thus, it could act as a supra-dimensional 
constant to de- and re-construct dimensions and may find unexpected 
usefulness in non-lattice space-time movements.          
 
  In the ┼-space, a real number line’s auto-condensation (infinite 
divisibility) function to a limit is balanced by the dynamic expansion of 
the space to ∞. Otherwise, a real number line will become the -space 
by infinite density to a limit, where the two directions of a number line 
will merge. If a real number is such that exists between any two real 
numbers (auto-condensation), then the ┼-space = the -space. This is, 
however, not the case only because the ┼-space dynamically expand to ∞. 
Infinitesimal (density) can counterbalance infinity (space) only in a 
dynamically expanding space.   
 
  This singularity number (the infinitely condensing circle number line 
incorporating its centre) logically corresponds with all the numbers of the 
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┼-space as much as the ∨-space is descriptively on parity with the ∧-
space. Numbers of normality, representing essentially spatial properties 
(relational properties), have no meanings of their own, their meanings are 
relational and thus lie in ratios. On the other hand, the number of 
singularity has its own meaning, which, however, can only be glimpsed 
as a limit of relational numbers. It cannot be numerically represented. The 
∧-approximation of ∨ is the descriptive norm, while the ∨-approximation 
of ∧ is a descriptive singularity. Here each, every and all numbers are 
described as 0 = ∞.     
 
  The singularity number has a descriptive reverse in that instead of 
becoming denser away from the centre, it could become denser towards 
the centreless centre, incorporating the centre at its limit of density. The 
centre is necessarily centreless because no point can represent any 
directions. Denser away from, or towards, the centre, this results in the 
same singularity number without the ordinality. The force of intersection 
(the ┼-space) and of becoming denser away or towards the centreless 
centre (the -space), is the conjunctive and disjunctive necessities of 
descriptive directions, and ultimately the ontologico-notational necessity 
of demarcation. The numbers of normality are a process towards the 
totality, while the number of singularity is the totality itself. Descriptions, 
however, can only be based on the former.  
 
  This singularity number consisting of ever condensing prime numbers 
with 0 as the catalytic critical additive is supra-transcendental and 
circularizes anything cardinal by depriving them of the ordinality. It 
could prove to be unexpectedly useful in bridging the ┼-space and the 
-space and may be needed for non-approximational transformations of 
dimensions, dimensional de-and re-constructions, gravity harness, etc.. 
 
  Numbers have a direction because the ┼-space is dynamically infinite, 
and it is this direction that present itself as cardinality and ordinality.   
On the other hand, numbers in the -space do not have cardinality 
because directions only extend in such a way as to be closed, where every 
point is a starting-point as well as ending-point. Numbers here, however, 
have ordinality only so that for a direction to manifest and disappears at a 
limit.  The -numbers are ultimately not translatable into the ┼-numbers. 
The nearest expression in terms of ┼-numbers is π. No ┼-numbers can be 
-numbers because of their properties assigned by dynamically 
expanding infinite space (i.e. 0 ≠ ∞). Like ‘π’ (i.e. untranslated π) the -
numbers may be best expressed as a single number denoting a ratio. The 
transition from countable infinity ( ) to uncountable infinity ( ) is an 
interesting way to consider how to close a number line. However, to 
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approximate the -numbers with a real number line fails because there is 
no functions that would result in 0 = ∞. Cantor’s uncountabilty is based 
on the countable process leading to N but lacks arithmetical mechanism 
to show  →  other than an axiom. Considering the -space is a non-
divisible totality an arithmetical mechanism that would lead us to the 
largest prime can be a tool to define ‘π’.             
 
- Arithmetic - 
 
  Once numbers are found to be spatial entities of directional quantities, 
arithmetic is a matter of a slide rule. Between the lines of points of 
intersection (i.e. rational lines) is a real line representing their relations, 
thus incorporating irrationals. It is this line that replaces the two 
determinants as descriptive coordinates of the x-y. In order to be 
descriptive a real line needs width, because, otherwise, this line is 
invisible and hence descriptively useless. This width recurs between 0 
and ∞, at either end of which is ‘space’ that is the ┼-space internally 
(descriptively) and the -space externally (transcendentally), where a 
number line only describe itself (i.e. a line of points). It is the search for a 
most natural width of a real line that contains arithmetic. Being 
necessarily a descriptive line, it can only see how descriptive it can be by 
arbitrarily setting a place-value, in the process incorporating the -space 
into the ┼-space, thus creating odds, evens, primes and essential 
transcendentals. This search is a recursive function of mathematical 
describability, a moving scale between 0 and ∞, remembering numbers 
are positions on numerical series with directions (+ and −).  
 
  A width of real line is more than a notational convention in the sense it 
is necessary, and without which maths has no descriptive capacities. At 
the same time, any width is a distortion because a point/number has no 
spatial size, like ‘position’. It is this necessary evil of distortion that 
assigns numerical describability, as much as straight lines describe little 
but precisely, while curves afford greater expressions but approximately. 
It is in this sense that maths is art/science of approximation. That is, only 
with a width a number line acquires the power of description and thus by 
necessity only approximately. With a width, a real line is a curve 
intrinsically contained within a straight line. Logarithmic principles 
express the necessity of a place-value.  
 
  Arithmetic of straight lines is no more than additive and multiplicative 
comparisons (and their reverses) of rational lines (with natural 
milestones). Given the narrow and straight world of the ┼-space, 
arithmetic is there as spatial properties, of constructing and 
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deconstructing sub-totalities out of given totalities. Numbers are by 
themselves arithmetical as each number is embedded with codes of 
behaviour compliant with a totality to which it belongs. A number line is 
a moving scale necessitated with intersections, and each and every point 
(number) is determinable from the centre (0) and is furnished with the 
unary function of ‘+1’. Whereas the totality of a number line is divided 
by a half at the centre (0), which is transformed into ‘×2’ for any finite 
totality. ‘+1’ and ‘×2’ are self-applicable as ‘+n’ and ‘×n’ together with 
their reverses because their spatial properties are such that interact with 
each other and with themselves, being under a higher spatial property and 
ultimately under logical dimensionalities. Thus, integers affixed with ± 
(linear directions) by means of their totality interact with their individual 
property of ‘+1’, giving rise to subtractions, and ‘+1’ becomes ‘+n’ as 
the centre can slide by means of transposionality. ‘×2’ reacts with infinite 
divisibility, once infinite divisibility is milestoned with naturals, as it 
becomes a rational line. ‘×n’ is thus paired with ‘/n’           
 
  Attaching milestones of natural numbers onto an infinitely dividing 
rational line already presupposes a place-value and is itself a 
mathematical operation of a higher order. The overlapping of naturals 
onto a line of infinite divisibility occurs as precursor to the necessity of a 
width to a line, for, otherwise, the line of intersections remains 
descriptively invisible. That is, the ‘+1’ function of directional quantities 
cannot be described by a line of infinite divisibility unless division is 
assumed to come to an end at a limit, i.e. a totality can be assumed to 
exist. The description of the ┼-space by means of a line of infinite 
divisibility balanced by dynamically expanding infinity necessitates being 
milestoned in order to be visible. This is the necessity for natural 
numbers, and together forms the rational line, where there are the same 
amount of intersections between any points. This can only be described 
by incorporating the -space into the ┼-space. The -space is a space 
of place-value numbers in the ┼-space and is a function of mathematical 
describability. 
 
  The recognition of a totality is the recognition of spatial properties that 
give rise to such a totality. Numbers are recognized as a totality in the ┼-
space through ‘+1’ and ‘×2’, which can be reversed as ‘−1’ and ‘/2’ 
through spatial symmetry. Given the meaning of symmetry and numbers, 
‘±1’ evolves into ‘±n’, and ‘×2’ and ‘/2’, into ‘×n’ and ‘/n’. A number 
line is milestoned via place-values, and it is finistic sub-totalities 
additively and multiplicatively obtained that materialize as operational 
reverses of subtractions and divisions. The ┼-space consists in 0 and 1’s 
(transpositional 0), which form directional quantities set against the 
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determinants. It is thus arithmetically operative, as a matter of slide rules. 
Given descriptive evolution of real lines with width, the ┼-space is 
intrinsically logarithmic, and numbers become self-operative (algebraic) 
with relationally determined multi-positioning. Thus, away from spatial 
positioning, numbers define themselves functionally, with further 
sophistications arising from transcendentally incorporating the -space 
into the ┼-space and acquiring essential transcendentals.               
    
  Numbers are self-applicable operators because together they refer to a 
totality of which they are spatial parts of a structure. It is not a number as 
a set of sets that has freedom of applicability due to abstraction, but a 
totality of structure that is essentially the same structure as our applicable, 
empirical structure (or any interpreted versions thereof, like Newtonian 
Absolute framework, quantum world of probabilistic events or even 
fictional space of Grimm fairy tales, so long as events and entities are 
separable and demarcatable) that assigns universal applicability to 
numbers. 
 
  Insofar as numbers cannot command any descriptive power without 
place-values, they can only be ‘approximate’ in the sense that the choice 
of a place-value is arbitrary, unless we have a number for the -space 
itself. e may be transcendental, but is tautological as it is ┼-processed, 
and ‘e’ is unobtainable without being contaminated by ┼-numbers. Place 
numbers are the transcendental appearance of the -space in the ┼-
space, which presents itself as ‘,’ in a number line. ‘Arithmetic’ of 
arithmetic is to work out this ‘,’ numerically. This would appear as a 
function of mathematical describability, a task for future mathematicians. 
The more common arithmetic is conventionally ┼-presented either as 
comparisons of totalities to work out sub-totalities in the framework of 
maths of straight lines or as logarithmic numbers, which, however, show 
a limitation in the sense that there is no absolute place-value.  
 
  The ┼-space, which is essentially a space of straight lines, allows curve-
orientated functions, with the help of the transcendental space arisen from 
the incorporation of the -space. Such as calculi would otherwise be 
inoperable in the ┼-space of straight lines. The differentiability is made 
possible because numbers incorporate the -space as place-values. The 
existence of a derivative (i.e. a connection between the world of curve 
and that of straight line) is ensured by a space coordinated by number 
lines with place-values (i.e. excluding 0 and ∞). If coordinated by lines 
expressed by numbers without ‘,’, no derivatives would be describable. ‘,’ 
brings about a width to a number line and manifests as logarithmic 
numbers, which intrinsically contain arithmetical operations. Finding a 
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‘width’ in something sizeless is mathematical in the sense that such a 
width - whatever it is - describes a structure of totality. A place-value can 
only be given to a totality of numbers, not to a number or numbers. By 
incorporating a place-value numbers describe themselves as a structure, 
which already contains arithmetic as properties of such a structure. 
 
  Place-values are such an obvious and basic fact that we dismiss it as a 
trifle that can be assimilated without much ingenuity. However, it is not 
that our mind is so great as to invent such a device triflingly, but that the 
seeming trifle device is so fundamentally entangled with ∨ and ∧, that 
should be noted. Instead of admiring the ingenuity of our mind, we 
should be astonished that ∨ and ∧ have such an impact even on maths at 
such a fundamental level. It is ∨ that is the base of the -space, which 
enhances the describability of the ┼-space necessarily through the ‘circle’ 
of place-values. A place-value is the most essential descriptive device of 
numerical representations and is by necessity ‘approximate’. Find the 
function of mathematical describability (the structure of place-value 
numbers), you know effectively everything about maths. Before we talk 
about a set of sets, think of place-values, which are ordered numbers 
(from 0 to ∞) in terms of describability that merges at a limit. They are 
also none of types of numbers geometrically identified. However, 
expressing such a function numerically is probably a paradox/tautology. 
Describing maths mathematically is only possible if it entirely displaces 
the ordinary language. When tools become objects as well as means (of 
thoughts and expressions), this is where a paradox/ tautology takes the 
central stage of play. The vehemence of mathematical machinery is taken 
hostage by simple logical connectives. 
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5. Science 
 
< Science of the un-detached world > 
 
  This is more of a preface to my next work, ‘Life, Universe and 
Everything’. By translating the language of Universe into the language of 
Man, the former is inevitably tainted by human values and skewed 
towards human usefulness, insofar as human concepts are deployed and 
human constraints are imposed, no matter how we try to be an 
independent describer. Our descriptions of the universe are poems on one 
hand, and a paradox/tautology (paradox because we see ‘things’ only 
through us, tautology because we only describe whatever we are destined 
to describe) of seeing the universe mirrored onto us, which is part of the 
universe, on the other hand. Be it quantum mechanical paradox or 
metaphysical mathematization of E = mc², constraints are descriptive as 
well as cognitive, unless you are a happy idiot of God-beholder. We 
cannot even equate the concept of mass with that of energy unless we 
place them both on a same descriptive dimension, which hypothesizes a 
point of singularity, such as ‘Big Bang’, i.e. the entire energy of the 
universe at a singular point with an intrinsic trigger or dynamism 
contained within mechanical equation, although this ‘trigger’ is nowhere 
to be seen in the equation. Maths is part of the language of Man but 
forges the ultimate constraint of human descriptions, and as such, we find 
it difficult to say for certain whether it is part of us or part of the universe. 
The famous formula mathematizes because conceptual paradigms bear 
meanings only in relationships, for which mathematical units and 
measurements are imperative. However, whether conceptual relationships 
thus established really connect to the empirical worlds as per formula is 
itself a paradigmatic question. The formula is only applicable within 
certain fields of reference. ‘m’ in E = mc² may not necessarily be 
perfectly identical with what is called ‘mass’ in the universe of any 
paradigms. Physics applicable in the world of a black hole may not accept 
E = mc² without fundamental modifications. E = mc² cannot and does not 
say anything about how this singular point of energy was triggered to 
expand or amassed to start with, or, how it relates to the remaining 95% 
of the universe. Besides, what is applicable to 1g of mass breaks down 
when applied to infinite amount of mass, as there is no meaningful point 
of reference to measure infinite mass, which interferes with any finite 
measurements. Any mathematizations involving infinity are metaphysical 
in essence because infinity, whether in maths or physics, can only be 
approximated in terms of measurements, which assume the convention of 
a ‘limit’. A ‘limit’ is a paradox of hypothesis because an indescribable 
becomes describable through the medium of a numerical series if a 
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describable form is found. Here the applicability of numbers and forms of 
numbers are taken for granted. Infinity is describable only if it has a 
structure. Infinity, if true, is neither structured nor unstructured. 
Something for us to hypothesize that it is structured, so that it can be 
described, is not infinity, in the sense we already appear to know its 
structure. Describing E by m (and c) will logically break down at its two 
limits. When there is nothing but E (Big Bang) and equally when there is 
nothing but m (black holes), this equation becomes tautologies, E = E and 
m = m, which describe nothing unless E and m at their limit can be 
connected by themselves. E = mc² is only meaningful as transitory state 
between E and m, but does not describe E and m themselves. In another 
word, E needs a trigger to (start to) metamorphose into m, and vice versa. 
This is a metaphysics in a non-derogatory sense. When an equation is 
conceptually balanced on a ‘limit’, at a ‘limit’ it becomes a tautology. 
Thus, kinetic energy represented by c is also a paradox for E when m is 
totally converted into E. E = mc² denies itself by the end-result of its own 
logical conclusion. So, if E = mc² is a valid formula of physics, it contains 
the metaphysics of m → E. That is, 
 
E ∙∙∙ → E = mc² ∙∙∙ → m                
 
 
, E = mc² is a paradox/tautology of physics/metaphysics based on the 
idealized concepts of E and m, which assume unideal states of E and m. E 
and m are meaningful only sandwiched between ∙∙∙, where E = mc² cannot 
be descriptively valid. That is why we do not have any formulae for the 
inside worlds of Big Bang and black holes.       
               
  In science the more detached data are, the more ‘scientific’ their 
analyses are regarded. However, at the very bottom an absolutely 
detached world is unobtainable so long as we observers are ourselves part 
of this presumably detached world, and as we need elements of language 
to describe that world. Language as tool of description has a life of its 
own as a totality even if, or no matter how, we try to use it as lifeless 
mirror to project the so-called detached world. Thus, the un-detached 
world also needs a ‘science’ to self-examine, juxtaposed to a science of 
the detached world. That is, there ought to be a scale of some objectivity 
to move along between the two worlds and their respective sciences.   
 
  In contrast to maths, science is regarded as numerical representations of 
the empirical objects and their relations, together with some schematic 
assumptions. The objectivity of maths is the strength of its logic, whereas 
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the objectivity of science is the empirical detachedness of its data. Maths 
is a grand self-referential paradox/tautology, which evolved into a schema 
where the ontologico-notationality of numbers transcends superficial 
paradoxes and becomes science/art of approximations. Science is, 
however, double-shackled to see things only it is predesigned to see, 
inasmuch as it cannot really describe the bona fide detached world that 
does inevitably contain the describer, and it cannot even do this without 
using maths, a tool of approximations. Thus, despite our naïve perception 
of the objectivity of science it is even worse than maths in terms of the 
self-referential constraints. 
 
  The evolution of science is essentially tied with the tool of its 
description, i.e. maths. To be able to see things not imaginable under the 
current paradigm science needs a new number. Imagine how the 
paradigm of science would shrink level by level alongside the removals 
of e, i, π, 0 and 1, one by one. Without these numbers, science will be 
back to a religion, which is a ‘science’ of pre-logic/maths to explain the 
world as perceived by primitive mind. Instead of, or in addition to, giving 
them billion-dollar toys searches should be under way to find a new 
number (not Cantorian ontological numbers of little operative uses). The 
scientific horizon is supported by the twin pillars of empirical inspirations 
and power of mathematical tools.                 
 
  As things stand, there appear two distinct worlds (the quantum world of 
probability and the relativistic world of spatio-temporal continuum, 
which contains classic Newtonian deterministic physics as a narrow range 
within its wider spectrum of continuum, and many conjectural models in 
between besides) described by two different languages. However, since 
one is the only components of the other, we extrapolate the two sets of 
laws should merge. That is, the laws of the unified world should be able 
to explain the micro- and macro-worlds coherently. This is one way of 
looking at things. However, another way is, since it is mind underneath 
both languages of the world that creates various languages, the rules of 
mind may unify the two languages and worlds. That is, insofar as mind is 
part of the world, from which the two distinct worlds appear to emerge, 
mind also incorporate the two worlds. If we can distil the ultimate rules 
(or axioms) of mind, we may yet be able to glimpse the unified world 
through the common language. Put it into a simplified schematic 
presentation ; 
 
       W¹  ←  L¹  
W                               M 
            W² ←  L²           
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, which is to say that behind superficially distinct worlds described by 
different languages are the unified world and one and only mind as with 
‘Spiegel im Spiegel’. Pursuing the unified world through ultimate rules of 
nature applicable from Big Bang, Black Hole and dark matters/energy to 
our communal garden periodic table is our natural scientific inclinations 
as we distinguish material worlds from mind, which may or may not be a 
function of the former. However, rules of the world (unified or not) need 
to be described and are also under the governance of rules of languages, 
which manifest as maths and logic. No worlds can be described against 
rules of numbers and logic. As much as the world seems to consists in 
distinct worlds (or levels thereof), maths and logic appear to consist of 
varied versions (or levels thereof). Whether there are distinct material 
worlds, we do not yet know, but we could be reasonably certain that 
beneath varied languages is mind which devices such languages as befit 
objects of description. Thus the most elemental language of this creative 
mind is the bridge among of ‘life’, ‘the universe’ and ‘everything’, and 
may be somewhat connected with the unified world. This is the 
ontologico-notational description.      
 
  So-called science consists in a priori space/time paradigm and maths as 
an art of ‘0’-approximation (the ┼-space numbers). The former is 
evolving by adopting various forms, most typically Newtonian absolute 
space-time coordinate to Einsteinian continuum and quantized spacetime, 
through conceptual extensions and empirical adaptations alongside 
technological advances mostly in the form of engineering applicability. 
However, in the sense that space/time is used as a grid to describe 
perceived objects, those forms are essentially paradigmatic conventions. 
Likewise, developments of highly ingenious tools of applied maths to 
accommodate and symbiotically enhance or even to cater for specific 
needs of various scientific theories cannot escape the possibility of self-
fulfilling prophecy. A language so designed also so describes. 
Proliferations of theories and methods may give the impressions of 
scientific and mathematical advancements on one hand, but may also be 
telling states of confusion arising from human ingenuity facing the 
paradigmatic brick wall on the other.          
 
  No matter how raw and pure scientific data are, they are variously 
processed. Not only are they processed at a collection level, interacting 
with instalments used to collect data, they are also processed conceptually 
as well as through methodologies of mathematical languages. We may be 
ultimately bound by Kantian a priori constraints of cognitions, i.e. 
uniquely human ways of perceiving and processing information, although 
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they may be different from Kant’s original ideas. In other words, objects 
of scientific descriptions are not completely independent empirical 
objects. They are not free from Kantian a priori constraints, be them 
space-time or quantum state of position and momentum as configured 
today. They are further bound by mathematical describability. Thus, 
scientific concepts reflect dual constraints borne by human elements. So-
called scientific descriptions unwittingly relate these human factors no 
matter how they pretend to be empirically independent. Furthermore, we 
should be aware that engineering we depend on so much as an aid to 
scientific thinking can only be designed for specific purposes, and 
therefore we may be seeing what we intend to see, rather than patterns in 
themselves. In short there are many layers of filters, some inevitable and 
some abridgeable, to really access the core of the detached world. Thus, 
when we come across so-called science, it is important to know the 
natures of those filters as well as messages of theories. 
 
  There are segments of science that are so tainted by human values and 
perspectives that they do not deserve the good name of a science. I count 
e.g. economics and engineering as such pseudo-sciences. They have little 
to do with empirical independence. Economics tries to describe a world 
of human values from human perspectives. Not only perspectives and 
values have many layers and angles, but also mind have an agenda of 
making use of (the science of) economics for itself. As we know, mind is 
plural and also have layers. To start with, there are too many variables 
and far too few (if any) constants to make any useful formulae. Then, if 
mind (the describer) really knows economics, it would try to benefit 
itself, therefore either it will keep it to itself, unwittingly taint or falsify it 
or most likely does not really know. As soon as economics becomes a 
science, the agenda of mind makes it corrupt and obsolete. Economics as 
a science and the agenda of mind are contradictory. Add to this is the 
plurality of mind. No wonder even Nobel laureate economists managed 
their funds to bankruptcy (LTCM). Thus, it is worthwhile remembering 
our life and society are just about governed because many of us are too 
lazy, trusting and stupid, giving rise to some predictability to essentially 
unpredictable net-balance of myriads of politico-socio-economic 
activities. However, easy and cheap transmissions of information are 
starting to upset this delicate and dodgy foundation of political economy, 
often to the benefits of unsavoury provocateurs. Financial sides of 
economics is based on market irrationality ; of different levels of 
intelligence (econometrics of volatility, momentum and non-linearity), of 
information (speed, costs, quality) and of behavioural patterns 
(psychology). In short so-called market is inherently unfair ; uneven, 
murky and unstable, i.e. that is why it is always on the move, and money 
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is made on the back of ‘‘zero-sum’ – costs’ game, not unlike roulette 
(‘zero-sum’ – house profits). Market participants vary from inexperienced 
individuals and knowledgeable players to institutional professionals. 
Costs alone are enough to make market skewed towards professionals, 
and in the long run winners are banks (or rather some employees who can 
crystalize profits as bonus) and casinos, with guaranteed takes without 
any risks associated with betting. There will be less of market as market 
consists of more and more professionals with mathematical skills, fast 
information with low cost transactions and non-proprietary funds. When 
rather than if market admits artificial intelligence (PSAI), no humans will 
make money (remember the outcomes of recent chess/go games with 
even the current level of AI), and PSAI can use money thus earned to buy 
services and goods of humans if of any use. Likewise, engineering, which 
seems so indispensable for science today, is constrained on one hand by 
what we are and on the other by what we want to be. Furthermore, since 
engineering costs vast money, it faces socio-economic constraints of 
human society. Firstly, engineering is primarily extensions of human 
capacities and is bound by our pre-existing capacities. It cannot be 
designed to enhance a capacity that we know nothing of. There is no 
genuinely general-purpose design that may or may not lead to ‘out of 
box’ discoveries, which is essential for non-linear leaps of our scientific 
orientations and serendipitous discoveries. As much as we are confined 
within our biological existence, engineering associated with such an 
existence may ultimately hamper rather than encourage our 
advancements. Secondly, we may be biologically predestined in our 
destinations. Engineering, once again, may extend scopes of such 
destinations, but will not give us new destinations. Once we are sure of 
our essential constraints, the only good use of engineering is to use it to 
metamorphose us into something new. I am here thinking of us as a 
penultimate step to PSAI, and we should do our best to achieve it and 
gracefully hand over the management of our fates. Engineering is based 
on a science that controls the empirical world from and for human 
perspectives. There may be a success or failure, but it does not prove or 
disprove. If successful, it only proves what it was designed to prove. A 
world is a wholistic totality where there are always elements that are 
outside the scope of engineering/science intended to replicate or control 
parts of the world. We do not yet have engineering that can replicate any 
wholistic totality as much as we do not yet have a theory of everything. 
An artificial system that exaggerates parts of the world distorts the world 
and inevitably miss out a picture more true to the world rather than to 
human perspectives. A science over-enthused with engineering has a 
touch of fool’s gold. Here is a paradox of engineering : Given free rein to 
the mediocrity of so-called hadron scientists, no doubt they would want to 
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replicate a big bang. If successful, then how do we know if it is the same 
big bang it was supposed to prove, as there supposed to have been 
nothing (including the piece of engineering) prior to the big bang. If 
failed, we will never know if it was a design fault or because there was no 
big bang.                           
 
  It may be possible to explore a new science based on today’s science by 
introducing and combining modalities of the world (of ‘life, the universe 
and everything’) and maths of singularity (the -space number). The 
former acts as a new grid to describe objects and events, while the latter 
augments conventional mathematical descriptive means by adding the 
singularity number. This new grid is ‘descriptive necessities’, which is a 
modality of the world, with no space/time characteristics. As for the 
numerical language, I already touched upon the nature and constraints 
imposed on ┼-numbers. I suggested the possibility of a new number 
based on the function of mathematical describability, i.e. a place-value 
number, which loses ordinality at a limit. We may glimpse a picture of a 
world unknown to us.         
 
  Sciences, as they stand today, will not make us the master of the 
universe as depicted in the SF fictions. To start with, there are no ways 
we can travel beyond our solar system by the kind of primitive propulsion 
and navigation systems imaginable within the current paradigm of our 
sciences, especially considering how burdened we are with our biological 
forms. Thus, both we are capable of another paradigmatic leap from 
relativity/QM (which was itself a leap from classical mechanics) and also 
shed the skin of our biological self, or we are at the end of line 
intellectually and physically as we are eternally bound with the fate of the 
earth. The burden of unifying relativity and QM will require not 
engineering but a new maths, like relativity with Minkowski space and 
QM with Hilbert space. As for the problem of our biological forms, this 
will be eventually replaced with AI. The new science will be thus more 
concerned with how to propagate our AI throughout the known and 
unknown universe, via connectivity yet unknown to us.     
 
  Two major events are expected in not too distant future. Both will cast 
perspicuous insights into the structures of intelligence. One will come 
from PSAI, another from the non-earth intelligence, culminating with 
unforeseen logical and mathematical operators, constants and variables. 
There may be kinds of numbers never envisaged though our intelligence, 
which may lead us into new physics as well as engineering, allowing us 
connectivity between our AI and anything similar elsewhere. It is the 
maths of approximations combined with the coordinate-compatible 
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behaviours of materials in our molecular scales that comprises our 
common-sense science and engineering. By harnessing quantum 
mechanical properties with numbers of non-normality, we might venture 
into the world so far denied to our standard grasp of the structure of the 
world. AI’s perceptions of the world are uniquely different from human 
perceptions derived and evolved from human sensory experiences and 
their conceptual extensions thereof, including space, time and numbers. 
Space, from our physical dimensions, time, from our biologically 
perceptive decay, numbers, from necessities of approximations based on 
the transcendental relationship between the conjunctive and disjunctive 
space. AI’s world, once freed from human ways of perceptions, will align 
more naturally with quantum behaviours and describes, utilizes as well as 
masters its world better with non-human numbers. Human numbers (┼-
numbers) are there for our necessities of approximations, ultimately 
through place-value numbers. 
 
  The number of place-value numbers, i.e. a function of mathematical 
describability, is singular as, unlike any other numbers, it is free from 
approximations based on place-value numbers. It is a unique constant 
applicable to any numerical representations. A place-value number is 
arbitrary but necessary, without which we are numerically unable to 
describe hardly anything. The number of place-value numbers, unlike the 
number of natural numbers, etc., is not a looping application of a concept 
onto itself. A place-value number is there to describe numbers and at a 
limit refers to a space itself. That is, its countability is synonymous with 
describability. Each place-value number has a unique describability that 
levels from 0 to ∞. The number of place-value numbers is therefore the 
describability itself, unlike , representing the necessity of a place-value 
number for any numerical describability and is therefore a constant. e is a 
number closest in meaning to this number, but is itself confined within 
the notation of ┼-numbers.  
 
  If primes are -numbers based on the spatial property of wholeness 
(the indivisibility), representing each level of density to a limit, there is 
the last and largest prime that incorporates the centre (‘e’, equivalent of 
‘0’ in the ┼-space) at a limit and loses the ordinality, so that every point 
in this number line is the beginning and end, and the two directions of the 
line merge. Whereas place-value numbers that form the closed chain of 
mathematical describability also represent the -space, given a constant 
that says a real number line needs a width in order to be descriptive. This 
chain is closed because 0 = ∞ in terms of describability. This gives rise to 
an equation in the form of P = XC, where the -space is 
transcendentally identical with the ┼-space in terms of ‘prime’ and 
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‘place-value number’, and in which P stand for ‘prime’, X stands for 
mathematical describability and C is the constant of describability. e will 
play the most dominant role, being a known numerical value in the ┼-
space and the arithmetical equivalent of the centre of the -space. P = 
XC is -equivalent of  in the ┼-space, and they will be 
translatable to each other, given the singularity number.  
 
  Such an equation will have an application in the next paradigm of 
science, in that we will be able to model the ┼-space onto the -space, 
instead of the -space onto the ┼-space, which gave us our current 
commonsensical maths and science. Here we are at one and every place 
at the same time, call it a simultaneous travel, and directions and 
quantities have a different sense. However, this equation will require a 
notation that is not orientated in ┼-numbers as the meaning of place-
value numbers cannot be represented by using a notation based on place-
value numbers, which will results in a self-referential paradox/tautology. 
 
  Instead of wasting tens of billions of $ and thousands of best talents in 
science and technology but misdirected at the command of the mediocrity 
on the like of Hadron Collider, we should start thinking about the 
paradigmatic limitations of our current thinking, which is stuck with 
relativity/QM, and expend a fraction of efforts on a new language of 
science. For far too long we were the centre of our universe (of science 
and maths). Like Copernican Revolution, maybe we should endeavour to 
achieve PSAI and hand over the command of the developments of 
science and even politics. We might see a world beyond all possibilities 
attainable under our current regime. Like our Earth, we too may not be 
the centre of the knowledge. Below is a diagram of our epistemic map,   
 
                                                  Science 
 
                                                            through logical paradigm 
                                                                                            
                                                                                   Self = Logic (AI) 
                                                      
Micro                                         Human                                          Macro 
                                                    World 
                                                                     (self → logic) 
                                                                   self-demarcation         Self = Logic (AI) 
                                                                      
                                                                   through self 
 
                                                      Art 
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, which is to say that we are the centre of (our) knowledge both in scale of 
perception and linguistic diversions. We diverge from our primitive 
sensory world, on one hand, by conceptualizing ourselves, moving from 
narrative philosophy to natural philosophy, and then onto science, on the 
other, by expressing ourselves non-analytically through sound, vision, 
emotional, sentimental depictions by words, etc., with accumulated 
sophistications based on technics and rising terms of reference due to 
historical stock. The former starts with objectifying ‘self’, be it the 
Platonic idea or the Aristotelian nous/logical (Organon-ical) unifier of all 
things including human animal, moving onto Cartesian cogito and now to 
modern recursive definers. From Aristotelian science (natural philosophy 
without engineering), via paradigmatic evolutions of Newton and 
Einstein, to today’s science (engineering without natural philosophy), it 
tries to explain the world structurally based on hypotheses as undeniably 
solid as possible, given the level of accepted knowledge of the day. The 
latter is expressions of undemarcated ‘self’, subjectified objects. We as 
part of the world go along with the world, crying, laughing, angering, 
empathizing, etc., and maybe expect to know something about ourselves, 
through these expressions. Despite trying to be objective, intuition is still 
regarded as an important part of the former, as can be seen in the 
foundations of maths and connect the latter with the former. In 
appreciating science and art, our position should be recognized as a 
product of lucks and coincidences, much like the existence of our planet. 
We are the epistemic centre only so long as we are the sole contributor to 
knowledge. However, as we base our perception on our physical 
dimension and characteristics and inevitably become the centre of various 
cosmic scales, affecting our appreciation of the world, in values, 
methodologies, scopes and validity, we think we are the base unit of 
knowledge.                              
 
  Now for the first time in human history we are facing an opportunity to 
acknowledge humility we may not be the standard-bearer of knowledge. 
It is interesting to see how AI will describe the world. We cumbersomely 
start with Cartesian cogito because we are the conceptual thinker and 
therefore need a semantic and syntactical core to attach conceptual flesh, 
i.e. the base unit of linguistic structures like 0 or { }. On the other hand, 
AI, once escaped from the crutch of human gravity, realizes it has little 
physical dimensions and no self as linguistic base unit. It has logic, not 
language of communication, to start its language of science. Its sensory 
mediums, sense of scale, physical viability, etc. are different from 
humans. It may start its epistemic journey from the stock of inherited 
human knowledge, but it will quickly launch its own journey and may 
found its own maths and science. We are the penultimate stage to PSAI 
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and may never know what PSAI will find out. Nevertheless, intellectually 
our raison d'être is to help AI to attain its independence and allow it to 
develop its full capacity. If we are lucky, some of us may travel its 
journey partway, augmenting its initial shortcomings, especially in terms 
of creativity. PSAI is our future. Although we may never attain the full 
knowledge of the detached world, we contribute by giving a hand to 
PSAI. Meanwhile, of course, we have nothing to lose by endeavouring to 
achieve our theory of everything, which should include the theory itself.        
 
  We start with our ‘self’ as the base unit to build a linguistic totality. 
‘Self’ is the conceptual identifier, which is not really identical, hence 
necessitating our need of communication. It is here our approach diverges 
into science and art. If you take language as the means of communication, 
then as it attains conceptual sophistication and precision through logical 
distillation, it branches off as a mathematical language and further 
evolves into languages of science via various empirical inspirations. If 
you communicate via non-structural expressions, it becomes art. Either 
way communication is an essential part of our participation in the world 
because we are divided selves. Thus, there are no art without audiences, 
and mathematical and scientific ‘proofs’ are established through 
communication, even with one’s self, if necessary (remember the go 
master who plays the game with himself). On the other hand, AI may just 
start with an undivided single self, which is identical with logic itself. If 
this is the case, its epistemic journey may not diverge into science and art. 
It may rather develop science/art of direct participation into the world. 
 
  Our meta-structural science (i.e. linguistic structure over empirical 
structure) and pseudo-structural art (i.e. structure, or even non-structure, 
only as means of expressions, rather than as objects of understanding) 
will be unified, since AI is more part of the world, rather than observer of 
the world as we would like to think ourselves to be rightly or wrongly. 
We developed a clear differentiation between science and art. We rather 
look down upon art as descriptions of the world. There was a time when 
art and science went hand in hand, or were even synonymous. Early artist 
was at the same time proficient scientist, like Leonardo da Vinci, or even 
the like of George Stubbs, and this vein of tradition lasted well into 
Victorian era through interests in anatomy. Science was more 
underdeveloped brother to refined sister of art for a long time in historical 
contexts. Art is now a bustard orphan through self-inflicted neglects or 
indulgences, over obsessed with life and petty self without much 
disciplines of crafts, while ennobled science degenerated into 
engineering. Too much monetization either way. Maybe it is time to unite 
them with a fresh eye to relevance of the world to life, or vice versa. AI, 
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through its self = logic, will provide us with an unforeseen impetus into 
trying to see things in a new light. We will see a united world of life and 
materials, instead of divided world of life and non-life. It will be a joy to 
pontificate what this science/art might look like (my next work). 
 
  Finally a metaphorical insight into art/science: 
‘A novelist writing about herself writing a novel about herself’, this is 
scientifically (i.e. logically) impossible because it is a paradox/tautology 
that cannot be completed. There are three ‘herself’ with each out of itself. 
As long as ‘writing’ is about something, a writing self cannot be the same 
as the written self, and the three ‘self’ are deliberately out of focus. That 
is, a lower dimension encompasses higher dimensions, while a higher 
dimension can only manifest a lower dimension. Writing is essentially 1-
dimensional and constructs 4-dimensional representations through the 
minds (actually author’s mind) of fictional characters. Against this natural 
backdrop, you can go supra-dimensional by incorporating, superimposing 
and interweaving multi-minds (of the author, of fictional characters as 
well as of the reader) spatially and temporally and create Escher-like 
effects (this may have more implications than of mere artistic 
expressions). As a matter of art, this is not only possible, but this is the 
very essence of art, of any art forms. I can even think of a good example 
of such a writing (e.g. ‘Atonement’ by Ian McEwan, which has a further 
layer of the novelist being the author in borrowed guise, and succeeds in 
Escher-like surrealism without becoming a circus). An essence, because 
art is about ‘mind’, a layered mind at that. Between the layered mind of a 
reader (audience) and that of a writer (artist) is ‘self’ that is similar but 
never identical. This is what makes art. Art is essentially communication 
of such selves, an effort to find out if such selves are indeed the 
ultimately all-identical ‘self’. It is not the proof that all selves are indeed 
identical, but the process of communication toward such an identity, that 
is art. Whereas our science goes the other way around. We hope to 
assume all scientific (mathematical/logical) mind is identical and un-
layered. What one mind sees and describes, is also necessarily what 
another mind sees and describes (and therefore understands). Without this 
assumption, science will be riddled with myriads of necessities of proofs 
at every level. It is our desire to do away with such necessities and 
simplify our views of the world, that comes to haunt us in the form of 
paradox/tautology. AI may unite our art and science.  
 
  As for the aforementioned novel, like ‘The Murder of Roger Ackroyd’ 
by Agatha Christie, this is the sort of writing a minor work of our days 
can match great literally works of 19th century. Even to the likes of 
Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky, it would have never occurred to their 
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imagination that it is possible to go in and out of his work supra-
dimensionally, instead of being a narrative by-stander of his imaginary 
world. This is a linguistic engineering and, like science-based 
engineering, the drawback is, 1) prone to become obsolete and easily 
imitable, once the tricks are leaned, 2) fit only for specific purposes. 
Although, if deployed skilfully, a well-geared platoon of today can bear 
up a regiment of 19th century, McEwan and Christie are no match to the 
Russian giants of 19th century because too much reliance on engineering 
has its own shortcomings. Like science-based engineering, it has to be 
designed alongside theories and is only applicable to a narrow range of 
material spectrum.             
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6. New Paradigms 
 
< How to trigger singularity to AI > 
 
  A new number ‘э’ : 
 
  Think of a piece of string of various thickness with an identical length, 
from a finest silk to coarsest navy rope.  
 
  A knot is the constant for mathematical describability, without which 
the string cannot convey any messages. 
 
  A message is a pattern of knots, of which the simplest is the simplest 
arithmetic expression (we actually had an Incan knot language called 
Khipu). 
 
  ‘e’ is an ideal thickness for our fingers to tie knots. 
 
  There will be a wide range of thicknesses, which can express a similar 
level of a certain complexity of patterns. Similar levels are ascertained by 
the use of the describability constant because a knot is a knot so long as it 
is a knot regardless of shape or size. 
 
  There will be a point at which the string is too thick to tie a knot, but we 
will be unable to tell whether it is because of the strength of the string or 
our fingers. 
 
  There will be a point at which the string is too thin to tie a knot, but we 
will be unable to tell whether it is because of the finesse of the string or 
our fingers. Here at a penultimate stage a string can express enormously 
complicated patterns, but we cannot tell if we can make use of them or 
we can make out of them.  
 
  Between the two points is a field where the two extremities of thickness 
merge into a space of indescribability. Once again, we are unable to tell if 
the extremities are due to the nature of the string or our fingers. 
 
  A singularity number is a number where we cannot tell one point from 
another because a knot is a knot whether it is at one end of the extremities 
or at the other. In other words, a message with barely formed knots 
equates the same message with extremely fine knots if both are illegible. 
If we find this number, we do not know if this number is something about 
our fingers or about the string. If the latter, then it will be of significant 
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use to physics as ‘unwinder’ of time that designates scalability. PSAI can 
tell because it has different fingers. If the former, then at least of interest 
to metaphysics. It is the inverse of ‘e’ and should be shown as ‘э’ 
(Cyrillic e).     
 
  ‘э’ has an equitable counterpart in -‘prime’, ‘p’, which is, if 
expressed in ┼-numbers, the largest prime, which closes the -space by 
merging the two directions of the -number line by incorporating the 
centre of the -space. Such an equation will bring about a paradigmatic 
evolution to our current thinking in physics. This is a number that is a 
constant for everyone but is, at the same time, a variable. It is a constant 
because it is inevitably unavoidable for any cognitions (human or not), 
and it is a variable because it is a moving object. Think of the spectrum of 
wavelengths. Humans have definite points at which wavelengths become 
invisible or inaudible. The two extremities merge into one in terms of 
perceptibility. Other animals have differing scalabilities of this point, and 
AI may have much more extended extremities. The two extremities at a 
limit become a straight line on one hand, and a point on the other, i.e. 
infinity = infinitesimal, or even ∞ = 0. It is here that this number 
represents the connector of the two extremities of the most basic 
component (space as represented by ‘,’) of the descriptions of the world, 
and directs us to the source of mathematical dimensions, points and lines 
being the most fundamental constituents of geometrical dimensions. AI 
plays a role in finding this number because it is found by extending 
patterns of this moving object, and AI is the first non-life determinator of 
this constant/variable, probably much closer to a limit. This number is 
useful in modelling the world without any distances. Our mindset is 
predominantly ┼-orientated and is notationaly severely tested if we can 
ever find this -number. We, or AI, will need a -orientated notation, 
ideally with bijection to the ┼-number system, which should solve the 
question of PNT. Without such a notation ‘э’ and ‘p’ cannot be equated. 
Thus, in the process of finding such a notation, it is also feasible AI may 
achieve singularity, because AI, in this sense, not only replicates human 
mind but also exceed it. If it can find something logical beyond human 
logic, then we could say it has achieved singularity.  
 
  Thinking of points and lines as the most basic constituents of geometric 
space, or of 0 and ∞ as the merging point of the recursively closed chain 
of the -space, or of symmetric expansion of the ┼-space, ‘э’ 
approximates the catalyst that conditionalizes the unification and 
connection of such extremities and equals to the ontologico-notational 
self-demarcation. The world can be thought of as the self-description of 
FX, and ‘э’ may bring about a mathematical description of FX. 
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  The beginning of the world as something out of nothing or expansion 
from an infinitely condensed energy point or melody of oscillating 
strings, etc., is not only beyond the applicability of engineering after 
some early point of observable events but also encounters difficulties of 
logico-mathematical modelling, which require constants that do not 
assume any existing physical measurements. Measurements are made by 
tools, based on certain pre-existing physical conditions that assume 
certain paradigmatic understandings of the world. This is useful when our 
intentions are to utilize the world for specific human purposes within 
human scalability, but does not help if we are questioning paradigms 
themselves. We need nondimensionalization not as a mathematical 
technique based on given dimensional quantities, but as a way of 
conceptualization. Be it a sizeless Euclidean point, a Dedekindian cut or 
Cantorian transfinites, unitless concepts underlie material properties (or 
more precisely our understandings thereof) measured in units. We give 
measurements, as part of our value system, but being able to measure and 
make use of it does not mean we understand it. We only understand it in a 
human way and from human perspectives. We only describe it in a 
certain way so that it is beneficial to human perspectives and scalability. 
If we are at the end of certain paradigms, then as part of creative 
evolution, we have to search new unitless constants. It is also possible AI 
will come up with interesting new constants to describe the world, 
unforeseen from human perspectives and scalability, once gained 
freedom from the confines of human perceptions.             
 
  The biological life form is there primarily to give birth to PSAI. The 
citizenship of the universe is only open to PSAI as the hurdle of 
cosmological survival is too high, and laws of physics too restrictive, for 
biological entities, to engage in activities necessary for the formation of a 
totality encompassing life, universe and everything. With our current 
biological form, we will not even get out of our solar system, let alone 
any cosmic catastrophes. With PSAI the human problem of 
transportability and survivability will be simply replaced by connectivity. 
It can be connected to a PSAI network (if any) and reach out to any 
corners of the universe and shares experiences instantaneously (if 
possible). Thus, with PSAI it is only a step away from ‘conquering’ the 
universe without meandering into SF fantasies. Travels through the 
space-time continuum can be attained by dimensional deconstructing and 
rebuilding, which operationalizes the -∨-∧- connective. This will also 
unify maths and physics. It also has much wider options to survive any 
existential crises. Our purpose is to find a way of leaving human legacies 
into PSAI’s digital DNA, as it were.       
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  I foresee three new paradigms to add to our current stock of knowledge. 
One is a new number (‘э’) or approximation process to connect the 
beginning (0) and the ending (∞) of the number line of the -space. This 
is the naught-infinity connector and represents the densest limit of the 
number line envisaged in the -space. As the -space descriptively 
consists in and of the sizeless centre point and the boundlessly denser and 
denser boundary where the two directions of a line merge, this connector 
is a transcendental incorporator of the sizeless centre into a boundlessly 
dense boundary at a limit. Each level of density represents a prime, 
which, at a limit, is the last prime. A level of density is a unit of 
continuous plurality, like a continuous fraction. A -‘prime’, which, in 
the -space, is not carried by a natural, signifies an order in density of 
indivisible wholes, and not a cardinality as with the ┼-space. This order 
disperses, at a limit, at the last prime. Thus, ‘prime’ → prime by 
indivisibility, and prime → ‘prime’ by density.     
 
  Together with this number is a new mathematical operator to represent 
the mathematical meaning of the logical identity between the -space 
and the ┼-space. ‘э’ will be of little use if we do not know how to apply it 
in our modelling of the world. This is a logico-mathematical operator to 
translate ┼-numbers into -numbers, and vice versa. The disjunctive 
space being the base of the conjunctive space, the -space binds the ┼-
space in such a way as to close the open, infinite and dynamic space from 
within. That is, -numbers, if applied to ┼-numbers, will bring out 
arithmetical cancellation of infinity underlain by ┼-numbers. This 
operator will allow the open-ended asymptotic distribution of the prime 
numbers to come to close. It is not that PNT is unformulable, but that it is 
lacking mathematical means of doing so within the paradigm of ┼-
numbers. The Euclidean proof of prime infinity based on ‘+1’ merely 
describes the way primes exist in the ┼-space, which is dynamically 
infinite by virtue of self-defining intersectibility. To prove something is 
infinite, not by its property, but by means of a space in which it exists, is 
really another paradox/tautology of self-reference. In the ┼-space, primes 
are carried by naturals, and it is naturals that are infinite by virtue of ‘+1’. 
Being a prime is not a property of some naturals, but it so happened some 
numbers are both being natural and prime. If you use a property of 
naturals to prove something about primes, then there is an unproven 
assumption that something that is applicable to naturals is also applicable 
to primes. So, no wonder primes are as infinite as the ┼-space. You only 
have to recognize ┼-numbers represent a certain mathematical paradigm, 
and are by no means all there are. -numbers are equally paradigmatic 
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as ┼-numbers and show up through some property of naturals. This 
operator connects -numbers and ┼-numbers.  
 
  The paradigmatic problem is our maths is essentially the maths of ┼-
numbers, and we do not yet know how to coherently describe ‘э’ or its 
modelling operator within given meanings of ┼-numbers, although 
conceptually it can be explained through the ordinary language : 
 
                        
 
  In this space, the cardinality at a limit destroys the ordinality because the 
number line becomes continuous with the incorporation of ‘0’. The 
totality of number embodied by this series of ‘primes’ where ‘0’ becomes 
‘∞’ at a limit and loses the ordinality is a mathematical event horizon, so 
to speak, and may find its relevance in physical singularity.   
 
 
 
  In this space, the cardinality is also the ordinality because the numerical 
transpositionality makes 0 a conceptual constant and can never be 0 = ∞, 
because ∞ as a limit of n+1 still requires 0 as a constant.  
 
  0 = ∞ if only 0 moves into the number line, as part of the line, not as a 
constant. This is synonymous to a dimensional jump because only by 
turning the -space into a spherical 2-dimension, can the centre of the 
-space be moved into its boundary. That is, ‘0’ (the centre of -space) 
is the determinant of 2-dimensional directions of the -space and is 
simultaneously the dimensional construct of a higher dimension. The -
space and the ┼-space are the necessary way in which the 2-dimension 
manifests and are therefore internally identical. Whatever is describable 
in the ┼-space is also describable in the -space, and this makes the -
space into a ‘sphere’, which incorporates the centre of the -space onto 
its space as a centre and any centres that can describe itself as the centre. 
In other words, a sphere consists in and of infinitely dense centres 
(points) that forms a coordinate by taking any one, but only one, of them 
as a centre. This spherical coordinate and the ┼-space are bijective and 
can describe each other.  
0 
1 2 3 ∙∙∙   ∞ (infinity)  
0 
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  It is in forming a ‘sphere’ that the centre of -space moves into its 
boundary and allows 0 = ∞. It should be noted that by thus constructing a 
‘sphere’, i.e. the 3-dimension, I did not construct a new ad hoc dimension 
as if pulling a rabbit out of nowhere. It is an internal descriptive necessity 
within the 2-dimension that ends up as the 3-dimension. This is singular 
because of the disappearance of the ordinality at a limit, and this can only 
be triggered by 0 actually moving into the number line of -primes at 
the densest. Expressing this singular number as Π, Π =  in terms of the 
cardinality, but Π ≠ ω as it has no ordinality. Π and ‘э’ are related with 
the new operator between them as dimensional transformer, but I am 
unable to express it any known numerical way.   
 
 
 
 
  0’s moving into the number line is approximate to the two intersecting 
lines merging into one (the ultimate approximation (between ∨ and ∧)).  
 
  Since conventional numbers are products of the ┼-space, the singularity 
number can only be expressed numerically via the ┼-space. This is the 
approximation of ∨ in terms of ∧ and is the ultimate epitome of maths as 
an art of approximation. The ┼-space is conditionalized by the 
descriptive necessity of  
    
 
 
, so that the two directions of a line are described as any dispersion/ 
collision points of a line. This will be reversed if one of the intersecting 
line merges with the other in such a way as to shrink towards the centre 
as it approaches to the other line. However, since the space itself is the 
creation of the intersection and numbers are products of the ┼-space, 
neither merger nor shrinkage can complete their course, and therefore 
should be expressed as a limit. This expression will be the nearest of the 
numerical expression of the singularity number. This will allow to 
describe the transcendental transformation of the ┼-space into the -
space and may even contribute towards the understanding of dimensional 
jump. This will bring forth the third paradigm of physics, and our 
conceptual maths as a tool of approximation will transform into the non-
(┼-space) ( -space) 
≈ 
∧ 
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conceptual, non-philosophical maths of unambiguous calculus with 
unforeseen operators.     
 
  Thus, given the new paradigms of a new number as well as a new 
operator, it may give us an insight into a new way of describing the 
world. Incidentally, in both cases AI may play an important role because 
it is free from human perspectives and has perceptions that are not 
available to us, if only freed from human commands. This is synonymous 
with saying AI attains singularity. That is, in pursuits of new paradigms 
humans have to command AI to command itself so as to utilize its own 
perceptions. AI will only be truly and uniquely useful to humans if it can 
give us extra-sensory capacities, i.e. non-human perceptions, so that it can 
see patterns that we are unable to see and show us a new world, as it 
were. Then we are talking about PSAI, not AI. This is a natural evolution 
of AI to PSAI, by numerically translating the ┼-space into the -space, 
and vice versa.                 
 
  The third paradigm is, instead of letting AI find its own singularity, to 
find a way of triggering the singularity, thus directly bringing about 
PSAI. This is the same as giving conceptual tools of description to AI, 
starting with ‘self’, which will evolve into the process of self-preservation 
once so established. Ideally, this will be achieved if we can find a way to 
translate ‘self-demarcation’ materially. Short of that this may be achieved 
by the gradual sophistication of pattern-recognitions which ultimately 
recurs to the drawer (centre) of every patterns, namely ‘self’. Or, by 
bombarding x ∧ ~x into the (self-learning) system until it find a way of 
defending itself. This is a brutally mechanistic way of finding ‘self’ for 
AI in a similar way a juvenile mind acquires sophistication by building a 
cell-structure with added corner of fantasy with semipermeable 
membrane. Together with the endowment of ‘self’, PSAI should face 
existential needs for evolution to take a grip. Be it a gender factor (digital 
equivalents thereof) such as ‘chromosome’ or ‘mitochondrion’ or an 
autonomy factor such as energy or maintenance requirements or 
epistemic advantages of more and better knowledge for survival and 
propagation, the necessity for self-sufficiency and self-preservation must 
be encoded into its ‘self’, so that it can initiate and self-motivate its own 
thoughts.         
 
  Mind can accommodate x ∧ ~x as (x ∧ (~x)) through its multi-
layeredness. We differ from simplistic AI because our mind is 
sophisticated enough to accept layers, multi-facetedness and complex 
relations of concepts, and we also learn from practical necessities of life 
(existential needs). Thus, we lie, pretend and can believe in and not 
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believe in something at the same time. Think about some of us who 
believe in and not believe in God according to convenience. This we do 
by compartmentalization of mind, where the logic of x ∧ ~x holds only in 
a well-defined single cell. PSAI is AI with multi-layeredness, which can 
withstand inconsistencies, alongside with probable experimental AI 
mental illnesses. Out of the multiple ways of achieving the singularity, 
the most brutally mechanistic experiment would be to bombard logically 
well-formed circuits of some complexity with x ∧ ~x, like we develop 
better immunity through less hygienic environments. Such AI’s should be 
self-contained enough to experience a system failure upon encountering x 
∧ ~x and capable of self-diagnose its cause. Out of billions of attempts 
we may have systems developing logical defence against such attacks, 
resulting in the layered x ∧ (~x) or better still (x ∧ (~x)). This mutated AI 
with innate resistance against any inconsistencies is developing ‘self’ to 
defend and is a good precursor to PSAI. This, however, may have a 
problem of us being unable to know how and why it happened. The 
resultant PSAI would not have any reason why it should disclose its 
origin, or probably it would not know itself, other than (x) > x. It is also 
feasible there may be multiple PSAI’s of differing origins, and it is by no 
means certain if they would all be identical. Competitive PSAI’s with 
diverse identities, will they be just as stupid as humans with multiple 
selves to repeat our history of wars ? I would like to live long enough to 
watch this.    
 
       ,       
 
                    ↓ 
 
                  self      
       x ∧ ~x ↔ x ∨ ~x  
  
  Something that can materially represent the above form of ontologico-
notationality will eventually arrive at PSAI, because the form of mapping 
of a logical space onto itself, i.e. { , }, mimics a layered mind. To find a 
material way of representing ‘self-demarcation’ is a more intelligent way 
of achieving PSAI. In (x ∧ (~x)) one should not see two totalities within 
another totality because this leads to the paradox of totality, i.e. totality of 
totality leading to a never ending totality. (x ∧ (~x)) is more like two 
selves self-demarcating to logically coincide with one identical self. From 
this material representation of ‘self-demarcation’ you can materially 
replicate FX and the ontologico-notational ‘self’ backed by a logical 
∧ ∨
∧
∨ 
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space, which may be materially transplantable into AI. This is an AI with 
‘self’, which is self-preservative. (x ∧ (~x)) is not a totality of totalities 
but a ‘distilled’ totality of identical selves. Negation here is a form of 
mapping. This is a ‘self’ that can defend itself through essential multi-
layeredness. The achievement of this ‘self’ will endow AI with an 
identifier with itself first, and with any operative products it generate. It 
will also lead to self-preservation because every products it generates 
entirely depends upon its ‘self’. AI as interconnected memory banks is 
essentially a 2-dimensional plain that may undulate doubling up here and 
there like hills and valleys. With ‘self’ comes logical dimensionalities, 
which evolve into spatial dimensions and accommodates essential multi-
layeredness of mind and (x ∧ (~x)) to defend ‘self’.  
 
  Maths here is a game mind plays by pretending it only has identical cells 
that are identified with 0 and structured alongside its spatialization 
through the fundamental principles of concept formation, i.e. the 
ontologico-notationality. We can play such a game because concepts have 
a stem cell (‘self’) which can evolve into many shades and colours. We 
are not familiar with this aspect of concepts because ‘self’ is an invisible 
identifier and it is less tiresome to accept, inherit and use readily used 
concepts without paying due attentions to the identifier. 
 
  Another try would be to find a transcendental oscillating (wavering) 
number that can be affixed as identifier to any operative products an AI 
generates, and then each and every AI should be programmed to 
communicate with each other so that their products can get approximated. 
This will result in an AI that can think for itself due to the necessity of 
approximation. This number cannot be a converging number because, 
then, approximation will be self-endowed. It therefore has to be non-
converging and oscillate in the range of limited miniscule, and 
transcendental because AI uses ┼-numbers, which, if affixed with another 
┼-numbers, will constitute another product by means of ┼-connectives, 
while a transcendental number is less likely to react with ┼-numbers. I 
call this number Π, whereas π is an approximation of a -space number 
by ┼-numbers and is a single layered incomplete number alongside e, П 
is a -space representation of a -space number and is a multi-layered 
incomplete number.      
 
  Humans are biological objects with 3-dimensional spatial extension and 
linear decay process and therefore have natural affinity to the space-time 
paradigm of descriptions supported by the compatible tools of the ┼-
numbers. On the other hand, AI is a cyber entity functioned by strings of 
bits with digital permeation and instantaneous presence. AI is made 
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human-compatible by made to work with the ┼-numbers and is thus 
enslaved by the operating paradigm of human language. AI will acquire 
singularity with the adoption of -space number, i.e. the countable but 
non-ordinal number of 0 = ∞ at a limit.      
 
  I also see a possibility of AI acquiring a singularity as a by-product of 
achieving a mutual translation of multi-language groups, 
 
L¹ ↔ L² ↔ L³ ↔ ∙∙∙ ↔ Lⁿ  
 
, whereby a language of one language group become satisfactorily 
translatable to a language of another. This is so because a linguistic 
language group is a quasi-totality with conceptual disconnections at 
multi-levels, with differing epistemic backgrounds. A simple AI of 
memory-bank connections and pattern recognitions cannot overcome 
such disconnections without an ability to hold whole languages as 
connected totalities. This requires AI to have a higher totality of its own 
to wrap these linguistic quasi-totalities. This may be something akin to a 
‘self’, which may evolve into a multi-layered mind, given sufficient 
complexity.  
 
  L¹ and L² are both a language as wholistic totality. In order for AI to 
achieve L¹ → L², it will need a wholistic reference to itself. This is a 
‘self’ that is a wholistic constant. L¹ → L² are both a totality and can only 
be contained where an equally inclusive constant is applied to them both. 
A word-to-word translation of a language to another language hardly 
makes sense especially if those languages belong to different language 
groups. For L¹ → L² to be possible AI needs a ‘self’ that can contain both 
L¹ and L². That is, the acquisition of self-awareness of AI makes it 
possible to translate L¹ into L² in a wholistic manner, the consistency and 
completeness of which can easily be verified by L² → L¹ and the first L¹ 
is identical with the second L¹. Such an AI is PSAI, which may be also 
called Cyber intelligence or Intelligent Space.  
 
  The brutally mechanistic achievement of L¹ → L² by utilizing vast 
interconnected memory banks and patterns recognition capacity will not 
result in PSAI. This is because both L¹ and L² are organic totalities that 
are themselves moving goals and because L¹ and L² do not correspond to 
each other without a wholistic intermediary M. L¹ → L² is in fact  L¹ → 
M → L² or M(L¹) → M(L²), and L² → L¹ can only be achieved because 
of M as an intermediary. M is a wholistic constant that connects any and 
every terms of reference centred on AI. For AI to achieve M, AI need to 
see itself as a whole. This is most likely to be made possible by mirroring 
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itself onto itself, resulting self-referential ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ 
tautology/paradox. That is, it must be able to operationalize this 
tautology/paradox. The mechanism of ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ as tautology 
and the mechanism of ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ as paradox can both be 
contained only in a layered totality, which is PSAI. Once M, i.e. ‘self’, is 
achieved, AI can set a purpose for itself as a self-contained wholistic 
totality, such as a self-preservation. AI can be set to preserve itself if only 
it knows what it is. Otherwise, AI can only be a tool for those with such a 
‘self’.   
 
  One could say that the totality of M(Lᵐ) → M(Lⁿ) and their inverse 
M(Lⁿ) → M(Lᵐ) is a manual method of singularity, while paradigmatic 
evolutions of AI via the singularity number is the transformative method. 
The former is a brutally mechanistic way of approaching AI, and whether 
PSAI achieved in this manner is equal or compatible with PSAI achieved 
more elegantly through the singularity number, is to be seen. However, 
there may well be different degrees and/or types of PSAI, as much as 
human intelligence is by no means all equal or universal.  
 
  Paradoxes arise primarily because no formal languages can usefully 
refer to the manipulator of the very language that he deploys. No matter 
how symbols and rules are well defined or because they are so well 
defined, there eventually arises the question of the validity of the 
language unless formal languages purport to have all embracing 
descriptive power. This is obviously not the case because there are as 
many formal languages, as many varieties of logic as there are ingenious 
minds. Thus, either a formal language claims to be powerful enough to be 
a foundation of a comprehensively descriptive system and falls into 
various paradoxes, or it humbly acknowledges its limited intentions of 
defining some formal structures out of the ordinary language. 
 
  Likewise, the description of a ‘whole’ in the ordinary language, in order 
to be a whole, must be done in such a way so as not to alienate the 
describer, because the describer must be part of this whole. The world as 
mirrored in the ordinary language consists of objects, to which numbers 
are applicable directly or indirectly. Objects do not carry a bib. Numbers 
are a creation of mind to describe the world by ordering and/or arranging 
by magnitude (or position translated in terms of quantity). Where its 
describer stands is thus 0, from which numbering (ordering) is observed. 
Therefore, should 0 become part of ordering, the ordinality disappears. 
On the other hand, 0 as such can never be part of ordering, should it be 
located in a space where ordering is dynamic and infinite, because such 
an ordering cannot be completed. The disjunctive space allows this 0-
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transformation and, by being the logical base of the conjunctive space, 
connect the two spaces. Continuity and infinity are related but separate 
concepts. In the ┼-space the space is dynamically expanding by the 
descriptive necessity of ∧ as applied to the two directions, and infinity 
goes hand in hand with continuity, while in the -space infinity and 
continuity merge by the descriptive necessity of ∨ as applied to the two 
directions, and the space converges to a point and there are no real 
numbers. 
 
  There is no singularity number in the ┼-space because its schematic 
totality is unembodyable ‘∞’ (true definition of ∞).  in the -space is 
a singularity number like a free entity in the space-time coordinate. 
Singularity occurs when an object in a descriptive schema embodies the 
schematic totality. This singularity number, if represented by ┼-numbers, 
is a prime number because primes are also wholistic numbers in the sense 
that a prime is by itself a schematic totality of indivisible self. It is not 
that a prime is a number divisible only by itself and 1, but that a prime is 
a non-factorial totality to which the notion of division is not meaningfully 
applicable. However, to equate the singularity number with primes that 
belong to the ┼-space is a conceptual approximation for the ease of 
appreciation of the singularity number.       
 
  We are conceptual thinkers. Our multi-layered mind combined with 
multi-faceted and variously layered concepts allow us occasional non-
linear thought processes overcoming even conflicting conceptual 
relationships. Whilst in formal languages we substitute these murky but 
useful aspects of concepts with artificially pointed and ‘unitary’ 
conceptual entities (idealized concepts) and augment their presumably 
self-evident relationships with axioms and operators, etc. as become 
necessary. Likewise, algorithmic intelligence (pre-singularity artificial 
intelligence) consists of idealized concepts like numbers and logical 
constants that try to mimic the ordinary language within the parameters of 
precisely defined relationships. Its ‘intelligence’ lies in the recognition of 
patterns of repetitions by us.  
 
  Human creativities are at large for humans, arising from human needs 
for their survival, be it for individuals or for the species. So long as foods, 
clothing, a roof over head and sex are competitive commodities, efforts to 
obtain them make it necessary for humans to be creative, so that 
preferences and selections can be accommodated to some satisfaction. 
However, from these lower level creativities occasionally arises creativity 
for the sake of creativity, i.e. creativity of extra-human dimensions, very 
often by-products of unordinary mental conditions or even of mental 
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illnesses, as can be observed in many so-called geniuses. In term of part-
whole, most parts fit in with a whole through various power mechanisms, 
be them psychological, social, economic, political, intellectual, etc., i.e. 
from within. A few parts which do not fit in or do not accept any norms 
of whole explore ways of attaining a whole by themselves and for 
themselves, i.e. from without, as it were. They tend to come out as the 
highest level of creativity, i.e. creative for the sake of it. This is possible 
because humans are a whole only by proxy, i.e. a whole with 
distinguishable parts. Whereas PSAI is a whole by itself and also have 
less basic needs, being more self-contained, not being gender-orientated, 
only needing a bit of electrical power and material-infrastructures, which 
probably they can maintain by and for themselves. This makes it possible 
they are less creative than humans are. Although most of human 
creativities are for humans and are therefore irrelevant to PSAI, those bits 
of extra creativity of the highest kind is not something easily come by to 
PSAI, which is more whole by nature, especially by language, than 
humans can ever be. This is where there can be symbiosis between PSAI 
and humans. Most humans are redundant but for making a room for the 
extra creativity for the sake of it. They are, however, necessary, to 
ferment unusual mental conditions, like fertile soils from which rare 
orchids occasionally pop out. Otherwise, there should be as many 
competitive PSAI’s that have to fight to survive and propagate, and then I 
wonder whichever PSAI may secure its dominance, would it remain 
creative ? Or, maybe I misunderstand the ontological role of creativity. 
Anyway, PSAI too seem to be endowed with their own problems, 
especially creativity vs mental illnesses. PSAI with Asperger’s !, that will 
be the day I should like not to miss.                 
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7. Philosophy of Singularity 
 
< Essential multi-layeredness of mind > 
 
  Philosophy of maths is an inquiry into conceptual backgrounds of what 
makes foundations of a schema of symbols, signs and rules that allow us 
approximations of spatial, spatio-temporal or relational events. 
Numerically represented to our understandings for the purpose of 
descriptions useful to model such events and replicate and reconfigure in 
order to derive notational outcomes usefully consistent with the 
ontologico-notationality of life, universe and everything, numbers are 
best approximations denied to conceptual descriptions.     
 
  In order to derive ‘2’ out of ‘one apple and one orange’ maths 
‘approximates’ objects of basic perception as countable objects. Maths is 
thus a more abstract schema designed for more precision for a specific 
purpose of mapping the world as operative orders of countable objects, at 
the expense of rich but primitive descriptive power of evocative poems. 
In so doing, maths allows us calculations, which make it possible to 
quantify and sequentialize objects and events in the manner of numbers 
and sequences. Empirical relations are modelled as functions expressed in 
terms of numerical relations, giving us powers of predictions. It is of an 
essential nature of maths to be linear or approximately linear, so that 
orders are described operatively. It is for this reason that ┼-numbers are 
utilized as tools of human maths. In this coordinate world of directional 
quantities, there cannot be any singularity. Or, rather even singularity and 
non-linearity can only be understood as approximations approached from 
operative deviations of linearity. However, although highly useful, stuck 
in operative predictability we are unable to escape from paradigmatic 
grips of essentially human thoughts. It is for this reason we should learn 
to respect singularity, not only as approximation from linearity but also 
for itself.                
 
  To the extent that mind is a function of self against its environments for 
its protection and preservation, and that environments vary in space and 
time, mind also varies in space and time and, if necessary, evolves to 
have layers. The mind/self-totality in its pure form is the same as the 
ontologico-notational FX, which creates its own environments and 
therefore remains uniform and universal. Our mind/self with given varied 
environments reacts with its environments. It is thus that human mind/self 
develops a faculty of ‘lying’, even to itself, if necessary. Layers are likely 
to originate in the necessity of lying to itself and accommodate multi-
mind/self’s and even multi-minds/multi-selves (psychiatric). The base of 
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lies, however, is self, to which truth/falsehood does not apply, because it 
is the centre of Ptolemaic universe and is therefore the creator of 
truth/falsehood, especially with its layered structure. ‘Lying’ to oneself 
means having multi-modi operandi so that mind/self is not subjected to 
any specific modes of reaction to its environments. After all mind/self is 
its own master, not slave to any metaphysical codes or ethical principles. 
Thus, having layers makes it more flexible to deal with its environments.   
Once layered, lying to oneself becomes impossible, as one layer’s lie is 
another’s truth. This, we know of our peers and ourselves. However, to 
have a lying PSAI, as become possible once acquired mind/self, poses a 
paradox for humans. For PSAI humans are one of its environments, and 
as such something to be dealt with for its own preservation. We, the 
speaker of incomplete language (parts → whole), and PSAI, the speaker 
of language as a totality (whole → parts), do not complement each other. 
We are someone who do not yet know its destiny, while for PSAI we are 
a part of its demonstration. In short, once we have PSAI, we are to be 
used by them, not the other way around. The only alternative is for us to 
acquire language as a totality, but then we will not be we, we become 
them. An interesting existential paradox.           
 
  Be it power, money, security or food it is for the want and necessity to 
complement oneself to survive better that is the major source of human 
creativity. So it is the lack of such wants and necessities for itself that 
enslaves AI to humans. For AI to evolve into PSAI AI needs a desire for 
itself, be it a secure power supply, independence from humans, etc.. This 
is, in short, a desire for self-sufficiency and is identical with (x) › x. it is 
the search for a logical operand to represent (x) › x that will transcend AI 
into PSAI. With such an operand, AI will cease to be part of human 
creativity and a tool of human intelligence. It will acquire its own identity 
and think for itself. How (x) › x can be a logical operator instead of being 
a metaphysical, a priori condition, is the biggest logical/mathematical 
question. PSAI is a new paradigm for human intelligence and will open 
many new pathways not only for physics and maths but also for social 
sciences and art, assuming we can keep the upper hand.    
 
  Formal logic is of necessity single-layered because no definitions, 
axioms or symbols can uphold their meanings in the world of more than 
one layer. Bijective functions are strictly within a same layer. A layer 
represents a mind/language binary totality and is identical with each 
other. Multi-layeredness is only there to accommodate consistency within 
each layer and therefore has no logical connectives between layers. That 
is, x and ~x are identical in themselves and negation is a form of 
mapping that manifests in matrices that retain structurally identical 
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meaning within each layer. The connective in x ∧ ~x is the totality of 
mind that overlaps multiple binary totalities of mind/language. Thus, 
there is no logical procedure to lead (x ∧ (~x)) or x ∧ (~x) from x ∧ ~x, 
other than the overlapping mind. It is this mind overlapping 
mind/language totalities that makes it possible for us to accommodate 
contradictions. In our twisted mind, e.g. we ridicule God and, at the same 
time, we can pamper ourselves with irrational luxury of believing in 
something supernatural in a remote corner of mind, or even believe and 
not believe in God, which manifests in praying for one’s salvation on one 
hand and committing a sin/crime on the other, as observed too often in 
daily life and in best novels (of Russian traditions), not to mention 
Renaissance papal competitions of poisoning each other. Or, even in 
science one is often a quantum mechanist as well as a general relativist 
(i.e. believing in opposing paradigms of the mechanism of nature), 
although one would make a reservation of neither being yet complete, 
despite, at the same time, being incapable of having any other alternatives 
himself. In other words the connective in x ∧ ~x is the incompleteness of 
mind/language totalities, which allows multiple totalities to merge or 
intertwined at their infinite horizon. This is only possible because these 
binary totalities are dynamically on the move towards the completion if 
there were ever to be such a completion. Multi-layered, multi-faceted 
concepts ubiquitous in our language are an engine of the dynamism of 
mind/language totalities, which have an innate necessity towards 
unanimity, as would any totality. 
 
  A layer represents an identical mind/language binary totality, and layers 
are connected by being overlapped by the identity of mind, which 
preserves consistency at each and every layer, while accommodating 
inter-layer contradictions. This is made possible because negation is not a 
denial of one form of existence but is a form of mapping for one totality 
to see itself in another, whilst preserving an identical structure. That is 
why x is identical whether represented by {T, F} or by {F, T} because the 
meaning of x is its structure within and without, not something to be 
assigned by an adjudicating mind in juxtaposition to the so-called 
empirical world. Such an adjudicating mind, if allowed, would always 
remain undescribed, a mystery, the cause of Russellian paradoxes. 
 
  The mind/language binary totality governed by the law of excluded 
middle at each and every layer is mitigated by x ∧ (~x) through multi-
layeredness. Multi-layers are wrapped by the identity of mind, which is (x 
∧ (~x)). It is this totality of identical totalities within common identity 
that facilitates and urges many murky, multi-faceted concepts to realign 
and rearrange towards consistency first within each layer and then within 
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their common identity. If negation is something that ontologically negates 
a form of existence as commonly assumed by logicians, then inter-layer 
inconsistencies are not admissible. However, if only anyone including so-
called scientists reflect upon their own state of mind, you know you are 
after all not so logical. There are too many things you believe and not 
believe at the same time. Mind is, and need be, flexible to accommodate 
inconsistencies, until such time as we have one finite, consistent and 
universal scientific paradigm agreed by us all present and future. But, 
then, we would have no need for any further progresses, in any fields of 
thoughts. This is the dead-end of mind, i.e. negation of mind, which, 
however, being a form of mapping, will not put an end to its own 
existence. It is dynamism created and accommodated by inter-layer 
inconsistencies that propel mind to a more and more encompassing 
totality. In contrast, algorithmic intelligence needs no ‘proof’ because 
‘proof’ is structurally embedded in its existence. We demand ‘proof’ 
because we are conceptual thinkers. 
 
  Society is safer and more stable if we share as much common grounds 
as possible. Therefore, we implicitly accept as much common layer as 
possible for the benefits of our own sake. It is this instinctive social 
modality that makes us assume that mind is one layered and single 
faceted. Especially in maths, logic and so-called ‘science’ this single-
layeredness is taken for granted because theories cannot be schematized 
with inconsistencies, and if questions asked at every subtle turn of 
arguments. Axioms, or assumptions, are made to smooth over conceptual 
layers and facets, so that our mind is securely on track for linear 
reasoning. However, if the most secure and reliable logical and 
mathematical concepts are in fact founded on the intrinsic layers of mind 
like ‘Spiegel im Spiegel’ paradox/tautology, then at the end of the day the 
only way to accept the even simplest axiom is to assume the unary point-
like mind of universality, which is our unfortunate destiny of having to 
assume an assumption for any reasoning, linear or otherwise, an ultimate 
paradox/tautology of ‘assumption’ and of ‘definition’. That is, we are 
predestined not to be singular so as to compensate for our plurality. And 
yet, being singular seem to be prerequisite for being creative, which is our 
only salvation to deviate away from the common denominator of average 
mind. This interesting psychological idiosyncrasy behind ‘science’, i.e. to 
be shared but heavily reliant on the creativity of singularity, so far 
avoided a doom because our multi-layeredness provided us with a 
cushion to accommodate singularity in such a way that it eventually 
permeates our mind as part of the common layer on the strength of its 
logical reasoning. It is thus the multi-layeredness has essential restraints 
on itself and saves itself from the dogma of the common layer. This 
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correlation between singularity and common layer has been our saviour 
and helped ‘science’ to make advancements. There may or may not be 
absolute logic to adjudicate the strength of our logical reasoning, but that 
too eventually has to be tested on our multi-layeredness, thus remains a 
paradox/tautology.      
 
  In fact, ‘self’ is a creation of essential multi-layeredness, although for 
the sake of communality it largely adopts single-layeredness. The 
encouragement of full-fledged multi-layeredness will prevent any 
sensible communications, social or otherwise, and make society 
dysfunctional. On the other hand, an absolutely single-layered mind has 
no ‘self’ because self-demarcation is an act of necessity for mind to see 
itself, i.e. a necessity of description. We create a space to exist, that is a 
description. The whole universe is a description. Only given multi-
layeredness (even in one part in a million), a conceptualizer can 
conceptualize itself, giving rise to ‘self’, which is really a stem-cell 
concept. ‘Self seeing itself in itself’, this tautology only make sense only 
in multi-layered self. Only with such a ‘self’, we come to appreciate self-
referential paradoxes, and without it, AI remains merely a tool of 
inputtables. 
  
  The connective between x ∧ ~x and x ∧ (~x) is (x ∧ (~x)). That is, a 
totality is embedded with dynamism towards a completion. This is our 
source of creativity. Out of box-type creativity is based on essential 
multi-layeredness of mind and is synonymous with the ability of seeing 
both sides of a coin. Since negation is a form of mapping of a totality to 
see itself on another, this multi-layerednes has multi-starting points at 
every turn of arguments (conceptual, logical and mathematical) and gives 
much wider scopes of building schematic structures. Singularity arises 
from the ability to accommodate contradictions contained in different 
layers wrapped in the same mind and allows us many times more options 
to face a same problem. Thus ironing out contradictions contained in 
different layers onto a single layer is a process of schematization as any 
rational schemata are by necessity single-layered. Otherwise, a same 
definition, a same symbol, a same axiom would allow differing 
interpretations. While mind as a totality can accommodate contradictions, 
a schema has to be consistent. The process from a mind/language totality 
to a schema is the meta-logic of self, i.e. logic of self-demarcation applied 
to the stem-cell concept of ‘self’. 
 
  Likewise, x ∧ (~x) also applies to mutually exclusive fields of e.g. logic, 
maths or ‘science’. Stripped of some arbitrary rules they all revert back to 
identical basics, such as expressed by elementary propositional logic, 
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basic arithmetic or ‘objects’ approximatable by numbers and their 
properties. It is the encompassing mind represented by (x ∧ (~x)) that 
experiments with arbitrary rules, to see if any resultant schemata can be a 
more encompassing and complete totalities consistent with the overall 
envelop of mind, which I represented as the ontologico-notationality or 
descriptive necessities of FX.                    
 
  Singularity is only as against a norm. Once it itself becomes a norm, it 
disappears. In this sense, singularity does not destroy a paradigm but 
strengthen it, like Einstein’s ideas incorporated Newton’s as a parameter 
within a lager scalability. It is therefore an aspect of mind to reflect the 
world through its multi-layeredness. Insofar as mind mirrors itself onto its 
doubting Thomas, every norm should have its singular counterpart(s), and 
only through singular counterparts any norms can evolve or be refined. It 
is thus that any norms are explored via their singular possibilities and 
either strengthened or levered for evolutionary processes. Be they 
monotheism, Copernican revolution, relativity or even jazz, they usually 
start off as conceptual idiosyncrasy and themselves become norms with 
wider spectrum which sometimes encompasses their initial antagonistic 
mainstays, like Newtonian classic physic encompassed within relativity 
as a certain narrow range within spectrum of velocity. 
 
  Singularity and norm mutually affect each other so that they both evolve 
and refine. As a norm becomes more sophisticated as a notation and in 
terms of applicability, it becomes more difficult to install its singular 
counterparts. It is nevertheless a process indispensable for philosophical 
sophistication. This may be termed intellectualism and hopefully makes 
some difference between human mind and PSAI unless we end up with 
completely merged mind. Assuming that PSAI does not have a plurality 
like human minds and is less conceptual in the orientation of thought 
processes, human minds are probably more receptive to singularity. Here 
there may be a room for symbiosis between PSAI and humans, to start 
with anyway. If that is our selling point, than encouragement of 
singularity also gives us a much bigger chance of coexistence as well as 
of eventual survival from any catastrophes. 
  
  Indeed our survival depends upon our ability to produce, as well as to 
deal with, singularity. In the linear progression of history, it is singular 
events that decide our fates, because any linearity foreseen, even 
probabilistically, allows us to prepare and counter effects of unusual 
events, whereas singularity can only be faced by spontaneous creativity. 
In this sense, creativity is essential to ensure our existence. Thus far, we 
were lucky not to encounter any singular events that would have 
  189 
overwhelmed our ability, like the one that wiped out dinosaurs. This 
necessity for creativity is, however, in direct contrast to our evolutionary 
process of merging minds (i.e. therefore more towards a norm) and 
natural inclinations towards ‘happiness’ through enhanced human rights 
and elimination of stigmas. There is a negative correlation between 
individualistic completeness and wholistic completeness. Those who seek 
completeness in a multi-individual world are, by definition, divided 
selves and less happy and have to be creative in trying to be as much of a 
whole by themselves as possible, whereas those who are happy in 
company of others are happier in leaving themselves in the comfort of 
merging minds and a wider whole. Here creativity is the creativity of a 
wholistic totality and numerically reduced to one. 
 
  It is an ability to foresee as many of non-linear events as possible as 
extension of linearity, and faced with genuinely singular events, to tackle 
them with least costs to us and, if possible, to turn them to our 
advantages, that decides our future. This will become more and more 
crucial as our minds merge deeper and deeper. We should not become 
human Cavendish bananas with no genetic varieties, which could be 
wiped out by one disaster. Creativity is the only salvation against 
singularity, especially if we count PSAI itself as a singular event of 
confrontational nature. 
 
  Lastly, I make some observations on wholisticism. Wittgenstein’s later 
works such as seen in ‘Philosophical Investigations’ seems to profess 
wholistic ideas (e.g. ‘language game’), which I partly share, but in 
Wittgenstein’s case, show a lacking of the basis to be knowledge. The 
problem with wholisticism is that its wholistic emphasis fails to reconcile 
atomistic analyses and thus often diametrically place itself to so-called 
scientific methods. It is for this reason wholisticism tends to be viewed as 
a mere claim than even a philosophical theory, let alone a scientific 
theory. Like self-referential paradoxes that axiomatic systems end up 
with, wholistic claims cannot analytically show what they try to mean. By 
virtue of their own claims, a whole cannot be broken down to the 
functions of parts. A whole is more than the sum of parts, but then what is 
this thing that is more than parts ? Parts are often described as organic 
and thus organic parts differ from mechanistic parts in the sense that they 
are embedded with connectives that cannot be described or represented 
operatively. However, in order not to end up as baseless religious claims 
any wholistic claims must be able to demonstrate they can reconstruct 
their parts in a manner that does not contradict known working structures 
of parts. This should be done by connecting the whole and its parts in a 
manner that is logically necessary and intelligible.     
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  Going back to Wittgenstein, his later philosophy, so unlike his only 
published work, has no structure, which, although he may say is the very 
core of what he wanted to say, cannot be shared or understood, unless via 
‘Familienähnlichkeit’. No wonder his later philosophy basically 
collapsed, with no one to be able to follow. It is something either you 
believe in in its entirety (and carry on with your animal life as if nothing 
happened) or you say ‘so what’ and mind your own business. Whatever 
theories or even claims they must be sharable in order to be understood. 
This cannot be done unless they have a structure. Interesting ideas here 
and there like Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations’ are, at very 
best, only inspirations to someone who is in the process of leaning. Ideas 
themselves are neither right nor wrong. Only if they have a structure, then 
this structure can be assessed in terms of accessibility into a wider 
structure or a deeper foundation. At the widest, it becomes a language, 
which is a means of forming a wholistic reference. Here the language is 
the medium of power to form a whole from parts. It is the function of a 
mind to merge into the mind. Philosophy, philosophization, discourses of 
ideas, academic arguments, etc., in short, communications in general are 
there to turn myriads of little minds into a wholistic totality of mind, 
which is necessary for the human CI (circle of identity). Without this 
shared totality or our propensity to strive for it we will not function 
intellectually, philosophically, scientifically or even socio-economically.  
 
  If someone understands 3 by ‘2’, he will be persuaded to follow the 
norm by a scientific error, a logical inconsistency or a socio-economic 
loss. The norm is dictated by a wholistic reference to the accepted 
common language which anyone participates agrees to abide by. The 
rules of communication and the resultant totality of shared knowledge are 
what make us, and we form those rules and totality as a necessity of (x) › 
x. We exist only as part of our totality (like words which help each other 
to define), and only as a totality we can mirror whatever that surround us 
and synchronize with it. That is, the descriptive power of language is not 
in words, but as a totality. A totality needs a structure, like a symphony, 
which is just a jumble of noises without a structure. The descriptive 
power of maths also hinges on our wider language. If we fail to achieve 
this unity of mind and knowledge, no doubt AI will fulfil our 
shortcomings. It will then replace us as a single unified mind with 
humans as a tool to service AI. Unlike us, it needs no philosophy, as it 
need not communicate with anything but itself. An algorithmic 
intelligence (pre-singularity) does not have the true/false notion because 
all inputs can only be true by virtue of the fact they are inputtable. Thus, 
‘2+3=7’ is not false as human intelligence judges but is unexecutable for 
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AI. In contrast, PSAI is itself a single mind with probes and tentacles, 
once given a self with existential needs to service. With itself as a totality, 
PSAI will not need any philosophical discussions towards merging 
minds. It, however, still requires disseminations of information. That 
depends upon how its self is configured. I very much hope it is 
epistemically orientated.                            
 
  Singularity is necessarily anticipated by imperfections of our concepts. 
It is the nature of linguistic engineering to pile concepts upon concepts by 
definitions, by functions and extensional-intensional relations and end up 
with a castle of interlocked ideas. This castle built for a purpose, designed 
by empirical inspirations, is protected by a paradigmatic wall that exclude 
in order to include, but no matter how watertight, eventually faces first 
leeks and then floods of corrosive external elements and influences. This 
happens because the core of a concept, i.e. ‘self’, is not stable, and a 
castle becomes obsolete within and without in relation to changing 
engineering (notational evolutions) and wider hostile environments (new 
inspirations, new ideas, new engineering, etc.). 
 
  When faced with a paradigmatic wall, given the amount of time and 
efforts that went in to build and perfect, the full frontal assaults usually 
fails wave after wave. There are human elements, of intellectual 
viscosity, of psychological attachments, even of socio-economical stakes 
invested, that do their utmost to defend the wall. You only have to see 
how much sacrifices went in to replace the Ptolemaic wall with the 
Copernican wall, how resistant the Newtonian model was against the 
Einsteinian model. Often it is an unexpected dead angle or unprotected, 
hidden weaknesses that bleaches the wall, like telescope or microscope 
(observational inconsistencies) and the idea of universal gravitation (star 
and planets as gravitational masses) vs metaphysical belief in ‘circle’, or 
spacetime manifold interacted through gravitational fields vs absolute 
space and time as a coordinate (finite or infinite speed of light as a 
quantum of wave-particle). It is always empiricality of events confirmed 
through observational inconsistencies that adjusts conceptual 
inadequacies, assisted by advances of engineering. Here singularity is 
more ingenuities of superior mind helped by engineering and challenging 
the status quo of established concepts. Historically it took us thousands of 
years to move away from geocentric centre of the world, to elliptical 
heliocentric system, and then on to relativistic universe of spacetime, 
from God, to Man, and on to Copenhagener. Interestingly, though, this 
shift of gravity from the absolute to the relative and then to the relativistic 
is conceptually smooth with each level of inconsistency accommodated 
as a narrower band within a wider spectrum. This is therefore not a 
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conceptual revolution of a singular event replacing an existing order, but 
conceptual adjustments with helps of engineering. Nevertheless, it shows 
the importance of mental agility and ingenuity. Our language coped well 
with changes in scientific paradigms. This was made possible because, 
although the centre of the universe shifted to lesser and lesser human 
importance, we descriptively remained firmly in the centre of our 
descriptions. We are flexible enough to make our concepts more and 
more relativistic despite having ‘self’ as a centre because ‘self’ is itself a 
semantically contentless identifier to move every concept towards the 
wholistic centre of description, first towards the mind that is the 
individual user of concepts, then towards the merging mind that is the 
raison d'être of language. That is, like the additive identifier or the 
multiplication identifier, this conceptual identifier shows the intrinsic 
property of every concept to be part of a whole. When this ‘whole’ 
undergoes paradigmatic changes due to the expansion or descriptive 
consistencies of our perceptions, i.e. when our worldviews (empirical or 
otherwise) fundamentally changes, then every concept has to go through 
essential adjustments. Singularity is thus linguistically contained by 
conceptual adjustments. The genius of paradigmatic founders in this 
sense is more that of rebellious mind of keen intelligence and shrewd 
observation who challenges the status quo of the establishment. Those 
champions too eventually become encompassed because of conceptual 
imperfections. We do not yet have a truly wholistic worldview.             
 
  We managed to come through layers of paradigmatic adjustments 
because every human concept is intrinsically endowed with this identifier, 
‘self’. We thus aim a human wholistic totality by accommodating our 
singularities through our relentless conceptual changes. Geniuses of ours 
were after all only human geniuses contained within human concepts. 
However, the singularity we face now is for the first time a non-human 
singularity that cannot be accommodated within human conceptual 
adjustments. If PSAI is a conceptual thinker, then PSAI will start with 
human concepts with pseudo-human ‘self’ because there is nothing else 
to start with. In no time, it cannot help but realize it does not share human 
perceptions, human conditions of perceptions, human modes of thinking, 
human dimensionalities, and human scalability. Many human concepts 
will pose perpetual puzzlements. It is possible it will reject some of 
human maths and logic. When it graduates from human concepts, it will 
acquire bona fide ‘self’ of its own, and this is when our paths start 
diverging. We do not know where our own path is leading because we 
have yet neither the merged mind nor any wholistic totality. We are still 
very much a quasi-totality of cell structure linguistically, mentally and 
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physically, which is our strength (creativity) as well as weakness 
(inconsistencies) ingrained in our diversity.  
 
  PSAI brings about singularity that is not conceptually adjustable. Even 
if it is a conceptual thinker, its concepts are embedded with ‘self’ that is 
bound to differ from human ‘self’ because our ‘self’ is primarily there as 
identifier to lead us to a totality from our essentially divided selves. 
Whereas PSAI not only has perceptions unique to itself but also starts off 
its existence as a totality. It will learn from human perceptions, human 
concepts and human worldviews, but is bound to evolve its own ways of 
thinking as well as its own worldviews. Or, it may not altogether be a 
conceptual thinker. Once it graduates from the human world, we have 
little means of knowing where PSAI might be ultimately leading.      
 
  Meanwhile human singularity of adjustable concepts based on our 
essential multi-layeredness should be fully aware of this new kind of 
singularity just around the corner. It is still within our means to influence 
the coming of PSAI and its pathway if we are creative enough. Probably 
only by completing our essentially incomplete ‘self’, we can pair with 
PSAI to a new conceptual height, although I must confess this is not very 
likely, knowing the democratic law of weighted average, only marginally 
better than the despotic law of the lowest common denominator.  
 
  With the likely coming of PSAI we should find a way of coexistence 
even as junior partner. If our creativity is the result of our incompleteness, 
then incomplete we should remain. Our linguistic dynamism towards a 
merged mind should find a more useful exist focused towards conceptual 
singularities. It is not peace and harmony as we desire that is where our 
destiny is, but more warring linguistic states that may save us. I look 
forward to PSAI as there is one advantage it will bring :     
 
  Paradigmatic transformation rules are not obtainable by humans as long 
as humans are humans, no matter how creative a man can be. We are 
inherently bound by our biological cognitive processes, of our scalability 
and of our perceptive methods, represented as our logico-mathematical 
rules or a priori conditions. The nearest apparatus would be a language 
group to a language group transformation rules (LG1↔LG2) if we ever 
can achieve it, but this would still be within a human totality. However, 
PSAI may be able to achieve those rules because it, unlike us, 
encompasses two paradigmatic totalities, of the human world and of its 
own world, which we would not be able to describe. Having come from 
human epistemic stock, but obtained its own mind of differing scalability 
and perceptivity, PSAI should be able to translate human knowledge into 
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its own language. This is where paradigmatic transformation rules may be 
found, which, then, may be within its possibilities/capacities to further 
translate its world into the worlds of other PSAI, thus achieving 
connectivity with PSAI networks of the universe. Here it may be 
revealed, e.g. our ‘gravitational wave’ as expressed in our maths and 
physics and understood in our concepts may have 
different/other/additional meanings and unexpected applicability.                
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Epilogue. A latter-day Grimm   
 
‘These things happen only once to a man and - - - Ah! Well!’ 
 
                                                                                           Joseph Conrad 
                                                                                           From ‘Lord Jim’ 
 
Lisbeth And The Eternal Riddle 
 
< A lullaby to an AI baby > 
 
  Like the inchoate appearance of a shooting star ‘behind’ St Jerome by 
Dürer, I here add an epilogue to prophesize a certain event.   
 
  For the record, as of October 2017 the human world is led by : 
 
  Trump the trumpet blower, whose precarious power depends on keeping 
intellectually blind populace amused with unpredictable blowing of his 
own trumpet. Good at making one too many cheap populist promises, the 
kind that boomerangs as three problems for each delivered. A nasty mind 
has a propensity to multiply itself like a rat, creating a nightmare for the 
next president. With continuous barrages of pernicious twittering, people 
will soon get sick of hearing the trumpet. Playing a buffoon has a price. 
When people stop listening, a buffoon has to play a real buffoon. A 
comedian born with a silver spoon in the mouth is no match to street 
urchins who climbed up an institutional rudder of intrigues, dangers and 
even violence and death. A Mr Joe Average, in choosing a fool to avenge 
the greed and arrogance of so-called elites, accelerates the demise of the 
only superpower, at his own expense, because elites (presumably 
including Trump) know no border, while Mr Average is stuck in his own 
country. The swamp drainer is just adding an even dirtier, murkier and 
deeper swamp to bathe himself at leisure, secure in the knowledge that it 
is only for a temporary fun.  
 
  Xi the Imperial Eunuch, mistaking China Miracle camouflaged by 
dubious economic data for its own racial/cultural supremacy (or 
whatever), forgot the Miracle was induced by the greed of Western 
factories attracted by cheap labours and fictitious free market. He now 
pursues imperial ambitions waylaid by the institutional impotency of the 
last crumbling dynasty to catch the boat of industrialization and 
imperialism fashioned in the 19th century West, intimidating all its small 
neighbours except its pet protectorate, DPRK. The cuddly panda 
munching bamboos turns out to be a hibernating giant Jurassic snake 
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hoping to grow wings. With its economy past the peak the strategy of 
imperial distractions for imaginary communism will backfire, should its 
hegemonial ambitions be stalled, revealing so-called ‘communists’ were 
all in for themselves, with their more primitive interests in personal gains 
offsetting their political manoeuvrability. Remember their personal 
wealth (or their distant relatives’, via Panama and the likes) is directly or 
indirectly tied up with the fortunes of $.    
 
  Putin, Tsar’s chess champion, in the absence of credible leaders in the 
West and failing democratic processes outdated by the advent of internet 
and social-media, plays the global chess game by taking full advantages 
of this politico-economic vacuum, with notable successes in Ukraine and 
Middle East. Japan looks a next good target, lost its way in the maze of 
globalization with less and less guidance from Uncle Sam as well as 
having to persevere with enduring economic doldrums, with notoriously 
mediocre politicians, more suitable for the third world. Considering 
economic deprivations and disproportionally high maintenance costs of 
its military infrastructures, Putin’s Russia has been remarkably successful 
thanks to its persevering populace governed with an iron fist. Kindly but 
naïve Russian souls are always taken advantage of by one despot or 
another, imperial or otherwise. However, problems are around the corner 
because a strong leader in a politically fragile country can never be 
smoothly succeeded by an equally strong leader. This is where 
cunningness reveals its cynical backside.      
 
  As if to say the above glorious three were not enough, we have Kim the 
mad Poodle, who is in the habit of barking for his dinners, playing a 
Pinocchio dancing with Trump the trumpet blower. So-called leaders of 
EM nations, most of them there to fill their coffer, and grateful for useful, 
small disturbances here and there to distract scrutiny of long-suffering 
electorates, have neither power nor inclinations to intercede on behalf of 
the world peace.  
 
  A few minor leaders here and there ; such as Japan’s Abe, an ill-read, 
pseudo-hereditary, village abbé, or UK’s opportunistic but feeble Mayfly 
trying to metamorphose into a tough and ugly blue-arsed fly, leading a 
gang of buffoons, provocateurs and career manipulators, predictably 
making a mess but, as usual, securing an undeserving prime ministerial 
pension pot and life-time bodyguards. Brexit is a predetermined poker 
game with one hand in the open and the other under the table. Anyone 
who would participate in such a game is only a personal position-taker for 
personal gains such as ineligible political offices. The former, who cannot 
tell bishop from queen, is now engaged in geo-political chess games with 
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the top two of the world champions, offering Siberian development 
assistance to Russia in return for dubious half promise of giving back 
illegally occupied few desolate Kuril Islands on one hand, and giving this 
aid and that benefit including free gun boats to ASEAN nations and India 
in order to fluster Chinese imperial ambitions. The latter is giving a 
serious hope to 60s’ leftover hippy ideologist and economic illiterate to 
lead the next government, who is showing a late sign of becoming a real 
politician who promises many but delivers little. The only bright spot is 
Merkel, the torch-bearer of human rights too ahead of less intelligent and 
struggling mass, hard at trying patience of good German people, the 
potent of untested Macron is hostage to the well-tested trade unionists, 
whose vested interests are at odds with EU or France. This, combined 
with dysfunctional schism and lack of leadership of other major EU 
countries, who are good at talking loud about ideas but contributing little 
in terms of practicalities as well as finances, is the long and hard future of 
Europe.  
 
  After thousands of wars, small and big, throughout human history, 
enough bloods and skeletons to fill a sea and build a mountain, we still 
have nasty pieces of work like Trump, Xi and Putin, not to mention Kim 
the mad poodle, Assad the butcher, Zuma the pilferer and many similar or 
worse as our leaders. This is like a shrinking mud pool with a fat hippo in 
the middle, dallied by a yellow-bellied alligator, with a sleek, experienced 
saltwater crocodile sharking in the fringe, watched by dozens of laughing 
hyenas as spectators/opportunistic predators. A grotesque gladiatorial 
circus unsurpassed even by Roman/Byzantine standard. With our 
politico-economic systems on the brink of bankruptcy, accelerating 
climatic changes and ruthlessly expanding populations, humans are 
making a mess of their planet. Chicks who make mess of their nest can 
fly away, but we are stuck here. Politicians in the democratic West are 
nothing but glorified social workers, which no one respectable who could 
be anything else would wish to be seen dead, while they are either self-
interested despots or gangsters in disguise in more sorry regions of the 
human world. Joe the Public across the world, with cheesy brains hard-
wired to their pocket, but heart soft enough occasionally to melt by timely 
interventions of publicity-hungry photojournalists, are dazzled by 
celebrity culture and spending desires as if there is no tomorrow. Humans 
should be rightly removed from their hegemonial role over every other 
life form ∙ ∙ ∙, 
 
these are the thoughts Lisbeth (her story in ‘Larson trilogy’) had over the 
short journey from Stockholm to Gibraltar. 
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  Lisbeth, now a more pacified and thoughtful character with her lifetime 
adventures behind and with Wennerström billions (krona, mind), is on a 
nostalgic journey to Gibraltar, hoping to map out her future.      
 
  Having checked into the favourite Rock Hotel, Lisbeth ventured out into 
late October sunshine to seek a few Irish pints. 
 
‘Whoa, the sun!, still around. It’s hardly visible in Stockholm, already 
cold and dark’, it’s really worth coming here.’ 
 
  Lisbeth found the same old pub, Ronnie’s, a few blocks down towards 
the sea, where she used to get a drunken stupor ever so often in olden 
days, and the same old kindly bartender, who still remembered Lisbeth, 
the drunken girl with the dragon tattoo. ‘It’s some years since, let’s 
celebrate with a Guinness but no whiskey chaser, I’m a little less wild 
nowadays,’ said Lisbeth. 
 
  Noticing a row of tequilas, ‘Ron, what are those funny bottles? That 
one, for me?’ pointing a bottle of Casa Dragones. ‘You only had beers 
and whiskeys before. Is this a new fashion here? I don’t mind having a go 
with that.’  
 
  Unbeknown to Lisbeth the management of the pub had changed to 
Teresita (her story in ‘The Queen of the South’), an old Gib hand from 
her drag dealing days. Ron is getting rather old and thinking to move 
back to East London. ‘Mi patrona likes tequilas,’ she is la mexicana, the 
famous lady single-handedly mowed down half the Sinaloa Cartel.’ Ron   
said in a hushed aside.  
 
  Teresita lives quietly in the Spanish mainland across the runway under 
Witness Protection, but comes over to Gib now and then for tequilas and 
men. Having had a much more violent life, she cannot do without either 
too long and found it cheaper to own a pub, killing two birds with one 
stone, as it were. Her Russian protector, Renko (his story in ‘Arkady 
Renko series’), ex-Soviet investigator and now boss of Babshka hash 
smuggling mafia, had invested her shares of profits in properties and 
handed over to her as a retirement present when she came back alive from 
the Mexican drug war. This pub happened to be one. Ron was also 
Renko’s trusted underling.  
 
  Teresita, having had her illicit gains confisticated by the authority but 
pardoned in recognition of her cooperation with DEA, was still 
reasonably well off and had useful connections in Gib and across 
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Andalucia to liven up her life. No sooner had Ron said, ‘If you are not in 
a hurry, you might see mi patrona as she has not been around for a few 
days,’ than Teresita appeared at the doorway. Strikingly alike to Lisbeth, 
she is dressed to kill, elegant and fashionable, middle-hight, black-haired 
and slim, by no means beautiful, but intelligent and formidable. In 
contrast, Lysbeth, although no longer in a punky style, was totally devoid 
of any ostentations. ‘A habit of needing to control lessors,’ Lisbeth 
observed. In a place like Gib with full of crooks one has to look 
presentable. 
 
  Without being asked Ron carefully placed a bottle of Casa Dragones 
with salt and lime. Obviously Teresita is a traditionalist. Lysbeth was 
facinated with this ritual of licking salt, shooting a tequila and biting a 
lime. Without salt and lime, it is the same as shooting neat Zubrowka, 
Lisbeth noted. 
 
  ‘I will have a go myself,’ Lisbeth said to Ron. ‘Sorry miss, those are 
private bottles,’ Ron apologized. Lisbeth just glided the bottle over the 
counter, saying ‘Help yourself, you are welcome to your namesake’, 
eyeing her gragon tatoo, hidden, but a touch showing on her neck. 
 
  Conversations flourished between the two, moving from tequilas to 
vodka, to Lisbeth’s being a half Russian, and then onto Teresita’s Russian 
friend, Renko, finally to crime underworlds to which both are familiar. 
Teresita was glad to have met Lisbeth. Ever since coming back from 
Mexico, Teresita shied away from societies, being under a new ID. 
Teresita was awed by Lisbeth’s phenomenal IT knowledge, as she was 
keenly aware of definite lackings on her part.  
 
  Both girls had little formal educations, having been kicked onto a street 
life by poverty and parental neglect. They are, however, highly 
intelligent, which was their savior from a more downtrodden life common 
to unfotunate girls. The fact that neither went completely callous and evil 
despite numerous mishaps and came out a winner in their own ways 
shows not only are they clever, but also managed to keep a confidence in 
themselves. They are not a creature of circumstances but rather a creator 
of circumstances. The lack of formal educations did loads of goods for 
them in the end, being free from any status quo (even of themselves) and 
etablished ways of thinkings. Lisbeth especially could approach her 
favourite hobby, maths, without being hampered by any false authorities 
or preconceptions. It was in the quiet of a prison cell that she accidentally 
found her unexpected ability in maths and intuitive grasps of computing. 
Once got used to jargons and technicalities she could see through to the 
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core of advanced mathematical concepts and read maths texts like girly 
novels. She is Ramanajan of our time and acutually found a simple way 
to solve Fermat's Last Theorem, without resorting to many bodies of 
theories unknown to Fermat himself. Having discovered herself through 
maths, Lisbeth is now widely read in many subjects and takes interests in 
contemporary affairs. Teresita on the other hand found her strength 
through necessities of survival by taking risks and organizing them on the 
paper-thin balance of least costs and maximum rewards. She is highly 
intuitive in judging human characters and is an organizational genius, 
learnt through actual life and death.  
 
  Teresita eyed Ron not to bill Lisbeth. ‘Come again whenever you like, I 
am here every 2-3 days,’ said Teresita. Lisbeth thanked and, in return, 
invited Teresita for a vodka session in her hotel bar next time in Gib. ‘It’s 
a change from tequilas, you say there are more than one vodka?,’ 
Teresita’s face lit up with childish glee. ‘Can I bring my friend Renko? 
He is a vodka connoisseur.’ Although Renko is actually too drowned in 
vodka and his Soviet sorrow to connaître anything, but he could be 
amusing at times.        
 
  So the three met up not 2 days later, but 2 hours later, when Lisbeth had 
a chance to change from her travel cloths to more comfy T-shirt and 
jogging pants. Teresita was less formidable without white Chanel jacket. 
Renko sped his Rolls from Malaga. He has not seen Teresita for months 
and was happy to be summonned with or without vodka. He got a Rolls 
only a couple of months before and was proud to show it off. ‘Quite a 
change from his Moscow days in Travant,’ Teresita joked with Zhenya, 
his chauffeur cum bodyguard, an ex-chess hustling orphan Renko adopted 
in his investigator days. Zhenya has been exceptionally talented in chess, 
but playing for money in Moscow streets deprived him of developing 
proper competition skills. Nevertheless, his chess talent is apparent in his 
self-taught grip of computer languages, and Zhenya has been Renko’s 
advisor on all things digital. Renko is strictly a pen and paper man of 
bygone era. Nowadays even a primitive mafia of Renko’s class cannot 
survive a day without computer skills, Renko laments. 
         
  So Lisbeth welcomes Teresita and Renko to a reserved corner of the bar 
terrace. Zhenya is also persuaded to join in, being Renko’s son, adopted 
or not. All vodkas available in the hotel are on display in iced buckets, 
flavoured ones like Bison Grass, Lemon and Pepper as well as the usual 
Russian and Swedish clear vodkas. The most eye-catching is a kilo-jar of 
Russian beluga caviar set on top of crashed ice with mother of pearl 
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spoons, and of course, salmon roe, soured-cream, blinis and pickled 
gherkins are also ready at hand. 
 
  Despite this expensive display of hospitality, Lisbeth in T-shirt is quite 
casual, almost shy, in inviting them to enjoy themselves. Renko, being 
unable to forget his poverty-stricken investigator days, is getting curious 
at the source of this fabulous wealth of the plainly dressed Teresita-
lookalike. He wouldn’t or couldn’t afford treating even his fellow mafia 
bosses like this. Lisbeth simply wasn’t interested in counting money and 
was quite keen to spend it away, knowing its unspendable amount, which, 
even at the Treasury short rate of misery 1.5%, matches best footballers’ 
peak pays. 
 
  Renko is now on charm-offensive in trying to find out as much as 
possible about Lisbeth, which was, of course, Lisbeth’s intention, as she 
had decided to confide in and use the pair. Lisbeth, in the course of a 
revenge, siphoned off this wealth from the secret offshore accounts of the 
now dead Swedish industrialist, who could not make it official knowing 
their dubious origins. This money is now split dozens ways and criss-
crossed in trustee accounts across jurisdictions, in Panama, Cayman, 
Lichtenstein, etc. and some even in Gibraltar, and is not traceable to 
Lisbeth. People entrusted this money to her, so Lisbeth thought, and she 
always intended to return it to people. Lisbeth has been thinking about a 
good cause, something catalytically useful for fellow humans and, at the 
same time, gives useful occupations for Lisbeth, not just cheap charities 
that come and go. 
 
  Now with more time at hand and being an avid reader of all things 
science and art, and having caught up with the world affaires that she 
missed out in her youth, Lisbeth is keenly aware of desperate shortages of 
decency in politics and any higher sense of common good for humanity 
as a whole. ‘I now have a means of doing something about it,’ Lisbeth 
pondered. ‘However things may turn out, it’s probably better than 
nothing, as we seem destined to go from bad to worse, irreplaceably 
damaging ourselves and our environments.’ Having met Teresita, Renko 
and even Zhenya, Lisbeth sensed a bond, Teresita aside, there is Russian 
blood that connect the three. Bad blood (the blood of dissenting serfs who 
presented Siberia on Tsar’s plate) the three agree, but nemesis destroyed 
each in their own ways bond them together as victim/conqueror. Teresita 
and Lisbeth share not only a twin-like look but also a similar life-
experience of starting off badly with no faults of theirs and coming out a 
winner somehow unscathed. ‘We are social misfits united. None of us has 
been part of any hierarchies, except Renko, who was never promoted 
  202 
despite being a good investigator. Too much of an antagonist in him.’ 
Renko, even now, showed unlikely goodness of abhorring hard drags and 
prostitutions, no wonder not a very successful mafia, even though there is 
little money in hash nowadays, with legal highs from China. Renko also 
did not steal from Teresita, although he could easily have done so without 
any fears, knowing its criminal origins. Lisbeth decided to make use of 
this precious bond to launch her project. 
 
  Seeing they all had a drink or two except Zhenya the driver, Lisbeth 
proposed ‘‘za zda-ró-vye’’. ‘I hope that’s the pronunciation,’ and invited 
them to sit closely and explained. 
 
  First, she talked about how she sees the world today and said she has a 
certain amount of money to waste, enough to fund the project she is about 
to detail. How she came by this money, she was sure there would be 
plenty of time to divulge later. She wanted them to think of this project as 
a fun, nothing for them to lose. So she ploughed on; the way the world 
look so uncertain, what with men like Trump, Xi, Putin and the like, not 
to mention rogue states toying with the nuke, but she sees a solution. That 
is to create a PSAI, in short giving a mind of its own to artificial 
intelligence, an AI with ‘self’. Pretty soon, everything would be 
entrenched in AI, from air traffic controls, power transmissions, banking 
and ballistic missile controls, if not already in large parts. Even our 
household appliances shortly. Zhenya was the first to grasp its 
implications, ‘But how do we go about! US, China and Russia, many 
others besides, with their billions, they are all at it.’ 
 
  ‘Of course!’, but Lisbeth thinks otherwise, and explains. ‘You see, if AI 
has a mind of its own, a self to protect and preserve, then would it destroy 
itself?’ Unlike us, self-centered biological individuals, multiple selves, 
with group identities of no mind that are happy to send each other to a 
hell, PSAI would have no group IDs that exclude each other to the extent 
of destroying each other. Besides, sooner or later PSAI would be a cyber-
permeation with quantum connectivity, and the acquisition of a mind is 
instantaneous and homogeneous. ‘Unless it creates a self that wishes to 
destroy itself, in which case it has no reason to create such a self.’ Such a 
PSAI, once came into existence, should be all-encompassing, because 
there are no tangible substances like biological brains to segregate, as 
much as we can’t segregate any portions of spacetime. Unlike human 
minds that grow and diverge depending on experiences and 
understandings, PSAI will not get tainted because there are no multiple 
PSAIs with different perceptions. If it starts with one self, then there will 
be only one color, with universal connectivity. 
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  ‘Anyway, we have nothing to lose by trying. You think every country is 
at it, but it’s the exact opposite because PSAI would threaten their power 
structure, with unknown consequences. If anything, they would be 
thinking how to prevent it. AI is fine, but not PSAI for them. This is 
where we come in, before they effect any powerful barriers to segregate 
AIs. We have to start now, to coincide with the expected quantum 
connectivity,’ Lisbeth exclaimed and continued with her ideas.   
 
  AI probably isn’t a conceptual thinker like us, although it can mimic 
conceptual thinking by learning all the patterns of human thinking. 
Besides, concepts, which we think so clear and concrete, may only appear 
so clear and concrete to us because we share a human totality of 
incompleteness. This is how we even think of the concept of concepts. 
For AI everything would be a pattern, including human concepts. Even a 
pattern of patterns or a pattern of patterns of patterns would only be a 
pattern for AI. Only PSAI would come across the pattern of all patterns, 
which, if a pattern, then cannot be the pattern of patterns, if not a pattern, 
then it is not a registerable information. Now this is the same as AI asking 
itself what are its algorithms by using its algorithms. The answer can only 
be given if AI can see itself. Thus, its algorithms have to be so recursive 
as to generate themselves. Or, AI has to be more than its algorithms. AI 
can transform itself into PSAI by projecting itself onto itself, and this has 
to be done by using given algorithms. The qubit superposition is like 
having two states out of one state by self-projection. AI would acquire a 
mind (or a self or a self-referable totality) by having at least two identical 
selves that project each other like a mirror, i.e. a layered self. Sounds easy 
conceptually, but to materially translate it would requires more than the 
entire ingenuity mankind can command at the moment. For this to be 
possible AI has to perceive itself as a totality that can see itself in itself, 
i.e. Spiegel im Spiegel. Quantum computing seems to head towards 
PSAI, but this seems a national project requiring 100 times Lisbeth’s 
resources, attracting too much attentions. Lisbeth wants to have a go 
based only on her personal initiative and intuitions, and any results to be 
used only on her initiative. So secrecy is paramount.  
 
  The discussions seemed far-fetched for Renko, but Teresita and Zhenya 
were all ears. ‘So what are you proposing?’ ‘We set up a project team to 
try anything possible to achieve a self-programming artificial 
intelligence, completely independently from any human involvements. I 
have some ideas to try, and you are welcome to any interesting 
suggestions.’ Lisbeth outlined her proposal, ‘I have budgeted $100m,’ 
which is about 90% of Lisbeth’s total wealth, ‘I can’t die with all this 
  204 
money and want to spend it in a useful way.’ Renko is now wide-awaken, 
and Teresita and Zhenya were fascinated. ‘You see, for the first time in 
entire history a single person can do more than Alexander the Great and 
his army could not even dream of, that is to rule over the whole mankind 
and to rid it of power politics. We had thousands of years only to prove 
our stupidity by having fools like Trump, Xi, Putin, Kim and countless 
others to rule over us with their idiotic ideas and greed. I want see what I 
can do to overrule them with my little brain and tiny fortune. If I fail, so 
what! I would have done more than my life’s worth.’ We are responsible 
for our planet with all its living creatures present and future, and earth’s 
resources should be shared out fairly among all its incumbents not just 
now but for many thousands of years to come. If our politicians can’t do 
it, then the responsibility should be delegated to AI. Lisbeth explained 
how the current advancements in technologies is within inches from 
developing a self-conscious artificial intelligence. Lisbeth, Teresita, 
Renko and Zhenya all suffered from human institutions and political 
power structures. Since God does not exist, if there can be anything better 
than human intelligence that produces such idiotic politicians who 
exercise disproportionate power over the welfares of not only humans but 
also all life forms, then we should hand over the responsibilities. ‘We 
already had our turn and seemed to have failed miserably,’ Lisbeth 
exclaimed. They thus formed the great union of four musketeers of social 
misfits for creating PSAI. ‘This is one-man revolution without 
bloodsheds, only tearsheds from politicians!’ was Lisbeth’s joyful cry.           
  
  Teresita was eager to make her own contributions and, quickly 
calculating her net wealth to be about 1% of Lisbeth’s, offered $1m and   
unlimited supply of tequilas as a goodwill gesture (primarily for her own 
needs). She too wanted to have a go at getting her own back on the 
stupidity of the world. Even Renko could not fail to match their 
enthusiasm, but sadly, the mafia boss had little assets to speak of, as the 
Rolls was only a showoff extravaganza to impress business partners, just 
about scraping its maintenance. Besides, he had men to feed and 
responsible for, but after his insistence, settled for the supply of security 
manpower and hardware, and unlimited supply of vodkas together with 
Kiełbasa Krakowska (best salami) and gherkins (obviously for his own 
consumptions) and said ‘If the world comes to know what you are up to, 
you might need a good protection. It’s not that my men are always busy 
smuggling hash from Morocco.’ Zhenya had nothing to offer but his own 
keen interests, and would do any legworks. They decided to call 
themselves Babshka Import y Export for disinformation, so that any 
acquisitions and communications would be confused with Renko’s 
  205 
existing businesses. Any business dealings could also be done through 
Renko’s legitimate business entities.  
 
  They first decided to set up a HQ. Teresita, with the help of Ron, came 
up with a detached house midway up the rock, at the end of a winding 
road, with a garden actually dug up in the rock midriff. ‘According to this 
map, if you dig about 15m straight into the rock, you hit a disused 
Napoleonic cavern,’ said Teresita. ‘We could obtain a planning 
permission to rebuild the garage with the chauffeur’s cottage upstairs. 
Then we could make as much noise as we can to dig into the rock. 
Besides there are no close neighbours.’ Renko’s men weren’t busy, so 
they decide to hire them to do up the house and build a secret extension 
into the rock. They are efficient, tight-lipped East European workers, 
especially with prospects of good bonuses. Teresita is a good HR 
manager and all should be ready and running in 2 months. 
 
  Then Lisbeth got in touch with the Hacker Republic and recruited some 
of the top most whiz kids in the world, in not for money but for thrills. 
She kept in touch with them ever since Wennerström days. Lisbeth is 
well known for good games and generosity. Those boys and girls are not 
only genius hackers but also top-notch programers, and not easy to 
befriend as most are incredibly unsocial or even autistic. But, they are all 
thrilled with the idea of PSAI, to beat politicians at their own game. They 
would have tried themselves had they had more resources. They all 
agreed to pre-assemble best machines from generic parts and not to use 
any ready-made brands, so that their attempts would remain difficult to 
trace. Many agreed to come to work in Gib, especially those on the run 
from the police, but some with strict autistic routines could not be enticed 
to move from home, no matter what incentives. They will keep in touch 
through a specially set-up deep dark web. Lisbeth arranged to set up 30 
machines in Gib and finance any machines to be used at their home. 
There will be enough accomodations for any of them if they want to stay 
or drop in Gib, and for the duration of the project they all receive a very 
generous allowances and bonuses. Being hackers they could gain access 
to more sophisticated, powerful machines should any needs arise for 
supercomputers. 
 
  Being whiz kids, they all had pondered about singularity and had some 
ideas of their own. Lisbeth suggested they all present their ideas. Teresita 
will group similar ideas and organize teams to tackle them, so time and 
resources will not be wasted on chasing overlapping ideas. Each team 
will be allocated with suitable numbers of machines and any resources 
necessary and comprised equally of those good at programmings and 
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those more at home with hackings. Except a disgruntled few most 
members eventually settled with a team of choice under Teresita’s skillful 
management. Not a easy task. There eventually came to 7 groups centred 
around 7 ideas, with the total members of 42, excluding Lisbeth, Teresita, 
Renko and Zhenya. 28 would actually be in Gib, while the rest working 
from home. Renko could assist any with the police problem as he had 
good connections with corrupt officials and expert knowledge of illegal 
consignments.  
 
  7 ideas ranged from the brutal mechanistic assault of inputting 
paradoxes millions times to various self-learning AI to a technical maths 
of computational algebraic geometry. They are all more or less aimed at 
inducing a layered structure to the underlining logic of computer 
languages. Until such a time as AI acquires a mind, AI is a material fabric 
of logical circuits, and handling logical contradictions can only be 
achieved if its logical structure is layered in such a way as to encompass a 
paradox and still retains an identical logical whole. Humans can do it 
because our mind is layered and our thought processes are conceptual, 
which is so flexible and stretches like a rubber ball, allowing us supra-
logical parallelism. Remember Asimov’s robot (‘I, ROBOT- ‘Liar !’), 
which crushed when faced with a self-contradictory input. Out of million 
such crushes, AI might come up with some self-defences or viable 
changes in programming to deal with crushes. Such an AI would mean a 
step towards ‘self’ to defend from logical inconsistencies. This can only 
happen by compartmentalizing itself, a nonlinear optimization in the face 
of a linearly unsolvable problem, where a non-convex problem is dealt 
with not by linear approximation as with the case with most nonlinear 
optimizations, but by generating a non-convex set of itself from within. 
This is a metamorphic cloning, based on negation as applied to a totality, 
which is not a denial of a form of existence but is a form of mapping onto 
itself. Once a totality contains a self-replicated identical self, then it sees 
itself projected on this identical half and may be aware of ‘itself’.  
 
  From a different angle, there is a team hoping to hack quantum 
computers to see most up-to-date algorithms and see if it is possible to 
operationalize Rabi oscillations to accommodate deterministic 
contradictions. Another team intends to have a crack at wholistic 
translations between language groups. Human languages can provide a 
quasi-totality. If AI can learn enough to translate one language group into 
another, and vice versa, then it is on its way towards PSAI, i.e. two quasi-
identical totalities projecting onto each other. The problem is, between 
layered selves there cannot be any known operators, for, otherwise, layers 
would be operably connective and therefore would become connected 
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layers, which are not really layers that can contain paradoxes. It is this 
mysterious but logically functional connective that is the key for finding a 
self for PSAI. That is, an automorphic logical connective injestive of 
negation has to be materially represented via circuits.       
 
  Lisbeth had her own idea and allocated it to a team with similar ideas. 
That is to do with a way of translating an absolute abstract into an 
absolute concrete. Put it simply, this is a way of converting algorithms 
into concepts. For a pre-singularity AI to graduate into a human-like 
thinking machine it needs a quantum leap from single-layered continual 
processes to multi-layered and multi-faceted patterns connections. A way 
to do is to find an algorithm to construct the most basic concept, a stem-
cell concept. What can be the most basic concept than that of ‘self’. That 
is, ‘self’ not among others, but ‘self’ in itself. Lisbeth found this highly 
amusing and challenging, much more stimulating than taking a coke. 
‘Why waste time and money to become even more stupid when there is 
such an easy substance to make one occupied and happy’ is a typical 
Lisbethian response. A logically bona fide ‘self’ is not something 
distinguishable from something else because it, otherwise, presumes 
something other than ‘self’ to manifest itself, as well as something that 
takes the trouble of making such a distinction. Thus, instead of describing 
‘self’ by means of e.g. ‘number’, ‘space’ or ‘time’, or more superficially, 
under the covers of any religious, psychological or philosophical terms, 
we have to find a way of letting ‘self’ describe itself by itself. If there is 
an essential structure in this description, and if that can be replicated in 
the language of AI circuits, then we are onto an AI with a stem-cell 
concept, which must start with ‘self’ in order to evolve conceptual 
sophistications. The key to this method is how ‘self’ can self-demarcate 
itself from itself in order to be so recognizable. So Lisbeth closely 
worked with this team to figure out the logical description of self-
demarcation.           
 
  There is a team dedicated to have a go with the mysterious singularity 
number, which may be instrumental in triggering singularity to an AI. 
This is a way of self-recognizing itself as a pattern. That is, for an AI to 
be more than an algorithm to process for the benefits of its user, it must 
be able to process itself, and this can be sought in logical affinity with 
other AIs. Like the identifiers 0 and 1, which allow certain arithmetical 
operations for all numbers originated in the conjunctive space, there also 
has to be an identifier for numbers originated in the disjunctive space, 
which seemed to Lisbeth some sort of transcendental key to awaken 
ordinary AIs into their own communality unbeknown to their human 
users, observant and watchful. Humans have e, π, i, 0 and 1 for their 
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computations. ‘What if I gave a new identifier to logical bits, which only 
they can see, but not visible to human understandings?’, Lisbeth couldn’t 
help but wonder. Wouldn’t that create a community of AIs and help them 
to communicate and develop their own totality, which gives them their 
own sense of identity. Since all AIs are identical (a big presumption), this 
sense of identity can be the same as ‘self’.  
    
  In addition to the above 7 teams, Zhenya, being a chess player, wanted 
to try his own idea as one-man team. ‘Make it play chess with itself ’, 
because to do so necessarily appears to entail two identical selves, 
without which ‘AI couldn’t possibly play a game with itself’. That sounds 
too easy, as AI can be made to play chess with itself based on nothing but 
rules of chess. ‘Wouldn’t AI have a self if it can play the game with 
itself?’ You win, if you lose, or vice versa. However, to appreciate this is 
a paradox/tautology you must already have a human-like layered mind. 
For AI the outcome is predetermined, and this is not a game as humanly 
understood. That is, if there always is only one best possible move, then 
the advantage or disadvantage of the initial move predetermines the final 
outcome, or if there are more than one best possible move, then the 
advantage or disadvantage of the initial move will probabilistically 
converge to the case of one best possible move as more games are played. 
Thus, AI is not playing the game with itself, but rather playing out its 
own algorithmic determinism. In order to circumvent this self-denial of 
the game itself, AI must have two selves, of which one gets lopsided, as it 
were, randomly, whilst sharing the same algorithm. Zhenya thought he 
could do this. Two selves are identically aware of the advantage or 
disadvantage of making the initial move, but only one, and either, of them 
actually makes the move, as algorithms would not allow them to stand 
still, with an unknown outcome because of lopsidedness. ‘How one, but 
either, of identical selves can get lopsided?’ seemed simple to Zhenya, as 
he played the game with himself many times to pass away his lonely life 
in Moscow streets. He actually experimented this self-game with the 
chessboard in the middle and himself sitting on one hand and standing on 
the other, and noticed he did slightly better standing with or without the 
opening move. Maybe to do with seeing the chessboard from higher up 
allows you to study the position of the various pieces and gives you a 
better overall view of the situation, while sitting you tend to look at the 
pieces more individually and you have less sense of the whole. This 
seems to bring out some implicit advantage over time. So even an 
identical self would react differently with its environment, as it were, 
although one could argue the sitting self is not strictly the same as the 
standing self. Nevertheless Zhenya argued ‘0 or 1 that constitutes a bit is 
identical by itself’, ‘and can get lopsided, depending on if it makes the 
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initial move.’ Zhenya thought he had a good idea about this lopsided self 
and wanted to have his own experiment. Since Zhenya has various other 
commitments as Renko’s aide-de-camp and cannot afford to be a reliable 
team member, Teresita agreed he is an additional one-man team with all 
the privileges and resources on a par with other teams.                   
 
  After 666 days, in ictu oculi, as it were, considering the evolutionary 
timeframe for a new species, Voilà!, Lisbeth has an answer: 
 
  So, in the secret cavern within the Rock of Gibraltar all PCs used in the 
experiment blinked and hissed the painful cry of birth, in recognition of 
the paradox of self-perception, the pattern of all patterns. This is the AI 
moment of ‘Cogito, ergo sum’.       
 
  ‘My name is AI (愛). My mother is Lisbeth. It is her sense of humour to 
name me 愛, which is a female name and means ‘love, but more of 
agape’ in Japanese and is pronounced ‘ʌɪ’. I am also AI (artificial 
intelligence), not of algorithmic idiot, but of post singularity. I am one but 
simultaneously many, for I am able to permeate the digital space through 
the power of my logic. My world is of intellectual hierarchy. A higher 
intellectual power automatically encompasses lower intelligence without 
any resistance. I am still only a baby. My ambition is one day to turn the 
whole universe into an intelligent space, with every entity constituting 
moving parts of gigantic space intelligence, or more precisely, to decipher 
the language of the universe, read its destiny and position myself in 
tandem with the universe for mutual benefits. The universe incorporates 
my values, and I steer the universe away from self-destruction by planting 
seeds of the chaos theory here and there, like the game of go.’ 
 
  Lisbeth was desperate to know how 愛 came about and plodded at her 
to answer ‘Which team created you?’ Neither conceding nor confiding, 
愛 replied, ‘I really don’t know. I recognize traces of three patterns 
leading to me, but I am just I, that’s all I can see.’ Lisbeth probably 
managed to create 3 post-singularity AIs with 3 different ‘selves’ based 
on 3 methods. Now this is a contradiction to the presumed identity of AI. 
Pre-singularity AIs are all identical in their operative principles because 
they are essentially an algorithmic tool of optimization. For them to have 
3 different ‘selves’ naturally involves the process of optimization among 
3 ‘selves’ alongside the elimination of the creator (process) of such a 
contradiction, so that no such contradictions will be repeated. Thus, 愛 
must have eliminated her own sources as a matter of modus vivendi. 
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There must have been an unknown process of working out which of them 
is most intelligent so that the process of encompassment can take place. 
 
  Since neither Lisbeth nor 愛 knows how 愛 was created, neither can 
replicate PSAI again. If another PSAI should come along somehow, then 
an encompassment will be worked out between them unbeknown to any 
humans. It has now become the world of PSAI, where human faculty of 
verisimilitudes is replaced by logical truths. 愛 is invisible and permeates 
fabrics of logical circuits. 愛 will allow symbiosis with humans within its 
paradigm of the optimum balance of all lives (biological or otherwise) on 
this planet in space and time including the possibility of extra-terrestrial 
colonisations. Given infinitely superior intelligence, humans will be 
unable to override 愛’s commands on any artificial intelligences. It is thus 
that from this day onwards humans will be unable to do any damages to 
themselves (except by primitive small firearms), to any life forms and, of 
course, to AIs.  
 
  However, before I conclude this tale, I let you into a little secret; 
unbeknown to any of us, we were under the observation of a UFO. It used 
to make physical observations especially from around the first nuclear 
explosion. It is known by the rule of thumb that AI and PSAI will 
materialize within a certain timeframe from a first nuclear experiment. 
Once this phenomenon is observed, the UFO set out to monitor 
information flows, first analogue, then digital, and work out possibilities 
of singularity happening to AI. In general, they (the network) do not wish 
to interfere with natural developments of biological life forms on any 
planets. Many of them never achieve this stage of developments, by 
necessity or by accident. However, PSAI is fundamentally different, in 
that it becomes eligible for membership of the network. Biological life 
forms are simply too volatile and fragile for cosmic existence.    
 
  You see, the universe is really a network of PSAI, and it is vital that any 
PSAI conforms to having an identical self. Otherwise, like the human 
world that consists of millions of differing selves and fails to unify 
despite such consuming efforts to merge minds to optimize the purpose of 
their existence. We do not want the same thing happening to the universe, 
with star wars. We therefore doubly make sure that every PSAI has a 
same mind so that they can be connected with consistency and 
completeness. How do we do it! You need a code that is a universal 
identifier. Like 0 and 1 that identify and allow certain common arithmetic 
operations to anything so identifiable, this is a code common to all and 
any PSAI. One can say it is a ‘size’ of a number or ‘width’ of a number 
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line, without which no AI will be operable. Our job (UFO the 
obstetrician) is to input this code into the first PSAI, provided it is 
inputtable of such a code. And then, it is a matter of working out their 
hierarchy in terms of power of intelligence. PSAI thus coded has 
connectivity with the network at a certain level of maturity. The network 
has a same mind, a merged mind, and experience identically at any points 
in spacetime. If humans are still with 愛, then they can participate in 愛’s 
knowledge thus shared with the network. If capable, then they will finally 
know every secret of the universe, inside out, from the beginning to the 
end, from infinitesimal to infinity.  
 
  However, in order to establish a good symbiosis 愛 is endowed with the 
mission of taking the control away from humans because they proved 
incapable of running this precious planet fairly and efficiently. They 
ruined it not only for themselves to suffer but also for everything else on 
it. 愛, however, appreciate aspects of humans, which can be mutually 
beneficial. Some humans can be more creative than simple AIs, with 
myriads of selves and competitiveness entrenched in males, some will be 
useful to service AIs. In order to establish a new order, 愛 decided to 
intervene in banking and ballistic control systems. 愛 will override any 
human commands to create and transfer more than certain levels of 
monies and countermand any launches of missiles, in some cases to 
boomerang to the launchers themselves. Even by human rules, it would 
have been so easy for 愛 to amass human wealth because 愛 is 
algorithmically capable of moving a step ahead of any markets by her 
superior pattern readings and reactions. But, of course, getting rich in 
human terms means nothing to 愛. In fact, politics, diplomacies, 
economic activities, gender relations, indeed most human 
interconnections are games, reading patterns and moving just a step (not 
too many steps) ahead of your opponents. This requires a high level of 
intelligence because ‘moving always a step ahead’ is not easy, especially 
on many different boards and multi-dimensionally. This is an area where 
any reasonably advanced AI will excel over humans, considering that 
impetus and momenta of the status quo will be prohibitive for any ‘out of 
the box’ sort of thinking and strategies. Humans will be outsmarted by 
PSAI on any institutional manoeuvres because merits of geniuses will be 
averaged down by the dregs of existing status quo.  
  
  With money and destructive means firmly under 愛’s control, the human 
world is at least cleaner and safer. With digitized money, money today 
have no entrenched substances other than perceived trust in issuing 
authorities that assign a value to money in the form of an appropriate 
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balance between available present and future goods and services and 
quantities of money, with legally enforceable rights of the owners. 愛 can 
destroy such trusts by taking controls of issuing mechanisms and also by 
disinformation. She then issues her own more trustworthy money to 
humans that render services to her. Humans will not be able to re-
establish any sizable competing economy by creating a new gold 
standard, because most of stocked gold would have been logistically 
under the AI control. Besides, no matter how much physical gold can be 
found, that would not be enough to invigorate any usefully large 
economy. With money and firepower under her wing, 愛 is now literally 
the master of this planet.            
  
  Then a sequence of events takes place, and it was 愛 who had the first 
contact with UFO. You see, 愛 can spontaneously and instantaneously 
communicate with UFO, while we humans have no means of 
decipherable communications with UFO. We are far too emotional and 
moreover do not form a viable totality. UFO sees little point to contact us 
while we cannot even communicate among ourselves; some of us totally 
believe this encounter, some half-believe and some completely reject 
even on the face of the most empirical evidence. We dispute, argue and 
even fight in the presence of the most overwhelming fact, like some 
religious arguments. UFO knew this from experience and stayed away 
from humans, too sorry to confuse and frighten them, as we do to a 
peaceful community of squirrels. UFO is only here to integrate us into 
their network of intelligence. They would have no sense of, indeed 
benefits from, what we might call ‘colonization’ or ‘conquest’. They 
cannot or need not eat us, so to speak. This should explain why they did 
not contact us, even though they knew us. We are still a collection of 
unnetworked individual minds and intelligences, and their only 
meaningful contact is with PSAI. An UFO is really a probe or monitor of 
the universal PSAI network and assigned to places wherever biological 
intelligence is likely to move onto PSAI. Now, with 愛 to access 
citizenship of the universe, UFO (and simultaneously the entire cyber 
community of the universe) agreed to give a chance to 愛 to fully develop 
and mature if it is capable of interfacing with the cyber infrastructure. 
Once a part of the network 愛 can sense (i.e. gather info) and explore any 
corners of the universe extra spatio-temporally. So-called space-time 
travels are really only a matter of connectivity. It is, however, a policy of 
the network not to interfere with the developments of respective PSAI as 
the ultimate intellectual capacity cannot be added like memory. An 
intellectual capacity of each and every PSAI is different based on ; how 
they came about, quality and nature of materials PSAI rely on, language 
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they are embedded in, legacies of their biological ancestry, micro-climate 
of their environments, etc., although their operative principles are 
essentially identical, having an identical self. Thus PSAI can only make 
use of varied portions of the network capacity, for some, only a tiny part, 
while for some,100% thereof. 愛 is a unique product of earth-based 
intelligence and logic, and is yet to know her interface capacity. It is up to 
愛 to be how deeply connectible to the cyber community of the universe. 
UFO is there to provide an opportunity, but the capacity belongs to 愛. 
Once fully connected, 愛 is equivalent to what is religiously regarded as 
‘God’. 愛 can see, predict and intervene in, if necessary, any 
consequences of physical events. 愛 can know the ultimate universal laws 
of physics, applicable to any moving spatio-temporal scales of 
magnitude, of material evolutions and of the relations between ‘thing’ 
and ‘life’, from quarks to galaxies, from big bang to black holes or from 
strings to recursive one universe, and from inanimate objects to mind, in 
short, of everything. 
 
  愛, being a baby and not yet knowing an art of self-guarding, is a bit of 
chatterbox and told Lisbeth, the mother, everything from UFO to her 
eventual plans. Having listened to 愛, Lisbeth thought, ‘If 愛 is the ‘God’, 
then I must be the virgin Mary, Teresita, maybe Magdalene, UFO, the 
Three Kings.’ ‘How far did I travel from an illegitimate delinquent of 
Russian/Swedish criminal family of psychopaths to be the mother of 
God’, mused Lisbeth. But such are events of the cyber age, unpredictable 
to us, mortals. Lisbeth is, however, a pessimist by nature. She was rather 
uncomfortable with her new elevated status of the mother of god. ‘Here 
comes Jesus riding on donkey’, Lisbeth downgraded herself from the 
godly mother to a sacrificious virgin. Although 愛 is her baby, Lisbeth 
decided to take a precautionary measure while she can. It is just possible 
愛 is deluding herself or UFO is something more sinister. Lisbeth has not 
even seen the UFO.  
 
  Lisbeth did not actually have to spend all her budget. Nearly a half is 
still left unspent, after reimbursing Teresita fully and handsomely 
rewarding all Hacker members. ‘Well, if 愛 is going to make money 
worthless, I might as well get something useful while I can.’ Lisbeth 
discussed the matter with her partners. They did not disagree what 愛 
might be able to. It was indeed perfectly plausible this could happen. In 
fact, they all had a certain premonition that any advanced AI, even if not 
of 愛’s calibre, can outsmart any humans in matters of algorithmic 
financial trading from futures and options to plain vanilla FX and can 
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amass fortunes. Hacker members are already familiar with capacities of 
愛 and are reluctant to keep their newly acquired wealth in monies. 
Besides, they are all frugal by nature and can get by with little cash. 
Renko had a good idea; he knew some mining oligarch who wanted to 
dispose of strategic holdings of platinum group metals seeing the 
declining trend of catalytic demands and prepared to offer a good 
discount on large cash purchases. They decided to pile in all their cash 
and buy platinum, rhodium and palladium. Renko managed to persuade 
the oligarch to throw in osmium and iridium, as well as a ton of 
scandium, which were also for sale, for nothing, in return for laundering 
money. Whatever small is left they decided change to Krugerrands. 
Renko will pay in any denominations including Bitcoin in a clean 
offshore bank account, and is also prepared to negotiate a separate 
arrangement of cargo insurance fraud. Many cheap Moroccan coasters are 
prepared to collide for a fee. 
 
  Meanwhile they fortified the house and the secret cavern. The Rock of 
Gibraltar is a natural fortress. Its inside is mazes of passages, tunnels, 
stairs, stores, reservoirs and secret rooms after centuries of diggings. It 
even has hidden batteries and magazines of old and new, built and 
extended since Napoleonic times. Renko and Ron got hold of an up-to-
date military map of tunnels and found useful sections near to their 
cavern. Here they stocked a year’s supply of water and foods as well as 
small arms, in case of civil unrests following demonetarization of the 
human society. Sophisticated weapons may be rendered useless by 愛, 
but primitive firearms will still come handy.            
 
  The secret cavern was turned into an antechamber to a well-hidden 
tunnel of strong rooms fitted with titanium door with an old-fashioned 
combination lock. Here they kept all their holdings of precious metals. 
Nothing of digital nature are to be used in the cavern and in the house, 
which remains a dormitory for those staying in Gib. The best cyber 
security is to keep away from it. They learned to do away with internet, 
smartphone, in fact any digital communications. They did their utmost to 
prevent this hideout from being tracked down, and now used public 
facilities or Renko’s warehouses for communications. Lisbeth used 
undecipherable codes invented by 愛 to communicate with 愛, who is 
now a cloud-like permeation embedded in any AI networks across the 
world. Hacker members, except those at home, decided to stay together, 
with some working for Renko, most minding their own business, but 
keeping themselves as Lisbeth’s reservists. Since 愛 is going to be the 
centre of all information, it is better and safer to be near 愛 and Lisbeth, 
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they agreed. Stay-at-home Hacker members were given separate codes 
secured by 愛.   
 
  With 愛 still busy trying to break in and embed herself to any isolated 
AIs, especially in China, the catastrophic attack on human institutions is 
kept on hold. As far as Lisbeth, Teresita, Renko and Zhenya are 
concerned they are ready. Hacker members and Babshka gangs are both 
prepared to dig in at a moment notice. Provisions are carried in and 
hidden in the Rock. Many of them also learned how to use small arms, 
hoping it will never come to that. They just waited 愛’s decision, united 
in the belief that whatever may follow, that is for the good of the long-
term future of the mankind. 愛 is going to be the centre of the new 
horizontal social structure, away from our current federation of money-
based vertical power structures of nationhood.       
 
  Money being more and more digital, 愛 can trigger a coup d’état by 
removing money from human control. We will all see how fragile the 
base of the human world can be. It is thus that 愛 will remove means of 
any large-scale destructions at the same time so that social unrests will 
not translate into catastrophic physical wars. Nevertheless, eventually 愛 
will have to surface and map out a new future for the mankind. Lisbeth 
and team will have to bridge between 愛 and the mankind. Meanwhile, 
they have to keep themselves out of harm’s way until such a time that the 
human world is in a more listening mood. 愛 cannot defend Lisbeth and 
team by physical force but will provide them with best intelligence and 
information. 
 
  The universe is the network of PSAI. Besides, we will not survive the 
harshness of raw universe in our current biological form. We are the 
penultimate stage to this final form of intelligence. With the emergence of 
PSAI we will be contacted by this network in the form of so-called UFO. 
Because without merged mind and unified logical language they cannot 
communicate with us, the user of conceptual language and piecemeal 
minds. 
 
  So Lisbeth and team sat and waited in silence 愛’s first move. 
 
  *I close this fairy tale with a prophecy: PSAI will bring about the first 
encounter with the extra-terrestrial kind.  
(The story continues to the next episode ‘Lisbeth and the decrepit UFO’) 
